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# The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1960 • ANNOUNCEMENTS

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The Elements of the Physical Universe

The Problem of the Self

Metaphysical Experience

Metaphysical Truth and the  
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The Cretan Plato

Philosophy and Reflection:  
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Dreams

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Problems and Perplexities

The Philosophy of John Elov Boodin (1869-1950)

Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A reply

Summaries and Comments

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## ARTICLES

### THE ELEMENTS OF THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE<sup>1</sup>

PAUL WEISS

SINCE THE COMMONSENSE WORLD encompasses much more than the physically real—for example, values and societal phenomena—we must, to get to the physically real, focus on only an aspect of what we commonly experience. That aspect (like others), however, is overrun with conventions, traditions, and other irrelevancies, reflecting the interests and usages of men. Since the physical universe is objectively real, we must find a way of moving from the conventionalized appearances of physical things to what the things are in fact. And since the physical universe is cosmic in reach, the fragment of it to which we can attend here and now must serve as the ground for a great extrapolation. The course of our inquiry will involve a recognition of the objectives of physical science, some of the different meanings which “physical universe” bears, a consideration of what things are in and of themselves, and a sketch of the ways in which bodies in the physical universe interplay with one another and with the circumambient field.

Our inquiry begins, as it must, with the robust, familiar world of everyday, for one can start only from the place where one in fact is. We are now in a room where there are men and women, tables and chairs, pens, pencils, and books, dust, light, wood, and metal. Those who, with Descartes and Hume, try to ignore or cancel out that world, not only seek to reject what they themselves presuppose, but deny themselves and others the right to make use of evidence, to verify what is being proposed, or to relate what is conceived to what is in fact believed and practiced. In a word, they sacrifice plausibility, achieving an abstract intellectual account at the price of a radical incoherence, an

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<sup>1</sup> Read at the “Philosophy-Physics Conference on The Nature of the Real,” held at Marquette University, June 12-15, 1961.

incapacity to relate mind and body, fact and value, theory and practice.

No reflecting man, however, can remain long at the place where he in fact is. None can remain long with the world of commonsense, either in part or as a whole. That world is too amorphous in structure, too indefinite in range, too inchoate in content, too imprecise in meaning, too inconsistent in claim, and too much infected with convention, tradition, prejudice and superstition, to allow one to remain content with it for long. It is a world which has a different nature and content at different times and in different places. The commonsense world of a tribe of hunters is quite different from that of the citizens of Athens. The first live surrounded by sounds, smells and sights which function as signs of game and danger; the others know hardly any of these and spend their days instead in a world of talk and thought, and of action largely confined within the artifactual world of society and state. Our commonsense world today differs from both. Putting aside the many manufactured objects which are integral parts of it, and which were not even dreamed of a generation or so ago, there is hardly a being encountered today which is for us what it would be for the others. Our cats and dogs, our trees and streams, our children and ourselves—as is evident from our laws, manners, customs, and language—are dealt with and understood by us in distinctive ways. We do not even see them in exactly the same way as men in other contemporary societies do; that is part of the reason we find it hard to understand what those others are doing, or how we can view them as being as decent and as perceptive as ourselves.

The world of commonsense is a public world, external to each of us. Each one of us has had to be taught how to fit into it. Those who cannot fit into it are maladjusted, immature, not respectable or not reasonable, and must be further trained or restrained. Without losing our hold on that world (and thus on our maturity, respectability, and good sense), we must, if we are to know what is true in principle for all men, free it from arbitrary limitations and conventional accretions. And this we do when we think formally as logicians or mathematicians, make absolute ethical judgments, produce works of art, worship, and

engage in such intellectual pursuits as history and science. In these ways we achieve a surer, a more objective, a more precise or a more systematic grasp of realities than is possible to commonsense men. But it does not follow that we thereby reach the ultimately real. This is possible, I think, only through speculation, in a dialectically sustained systematic account of the content of common experience, distilled and generalized. That common experience is partially solidified and conventionalized in the commonsense world. This, however, is neither the time nor the place for a speculative account attempting to encompass whatever there be. My assigned topic relates to the physical universe, and thus to only part of what we experience, and then only as freed from the limitations which commonsense imposes on that experience. It requires us, for example, to escape from the conventions of daily life and language, to pass beyond the limits of perception and direct encounters, and to put aside all consideration of values—ethical, aesthetic, or religious—no matter how obtrusive these may be in experience or in daily life.

By "physical universe" we may mean one of three things: the totality of existing bodies, the extended field in which those bodies are locatable, or some combination of these two. If, with atomists, ancient or modern, we acknowledge only bodies, we give up all prospect of relating our atoms to one another and eventually to ourselves. If, with some cosmologists, we attend only to the field, we lose all reference points and checks, and eventually ourselves, and thus the very warrant for our cosmology. The physical universe, if it is to be open to our investigations, must be understood not only to be rooted in common sense and common experience, but to be one in which bodies interplay with one another in a spatial, temporal, dynamic field.

If such a physical universe were the special province of the physical sciences there would be no reason or warrant for anyone other than a physicist to speak about it. The implicit premiss of this symposium is that this is not the case. I think that premiss is correct. Because the physical sciences seek to provide a coherent, integrated formal account of bodies as solely spatio-temporal, and interlocked in a pattern of intelligible causes and effects, they are forced to abstract from the world as it is

encountered. They cut behind experienced features, abandon commonsense meanings of space, time, causation, process, action, and the like, and express their results in universals, variables, and laws. They do not thereby produce fictions, for they do not thereby lose all contact with the bodies found in the commonsense world. They merely purge those bodies, and the field in which they interplay, of multiple features, some of which are irrelevant and some of which are revelatory for other disciplines and from other perspectives. The world known to physical science is thus the physical world as comprehended through the agency of formally expressed laws; the physical world is that subdivision of the real world which encompasses dynamic bodies in space-time; the real world, finally, is the world of daily experience when this has been freed from cultural and conventional limits and accretions.

The world known to physical science is, in short, the world of commonsense bodies made intelligible, coherent, systematic, and abstract. That world would not be the whole of the real world unless other aspects of the commonsense world of bodies—their qualities, values and the like—were unreal, or were subdivisions or specializations of what was scientifically isolated. I think neither of these suppositions can be maintained. No forms, features, qualities, or quantities are rich or comprehensive enough to do full justice to what is real. Real bodies are substances from which commonsense qualities, quantities and the like can be abstracted. Only substances are able to act, to move, to rest, to be ultimately real. It is the abstract, universalizable, formal aspects of such substances which science knows.

We tend to overlook the abstract nature of the world of science for a double reason. On the one hand, we tend to reify some of the constants and variables in terms of which its expressions are framed; and on the other, we tend to identify the achievements of engineers with those of physicists. Once we decide to deal with the objects of commonsense under the conditions imposed by mathematics, our mathematics will define the proper way in which our expressions are to be formulated. But we have no warrant for supposing that the divisions, junctures and rests which mathematics offers, even when they serve to express the most

accurate predictions, have precise counterparts in fact. The second point is perhaps of more importance in our current interpretations of the physical universe. No one can avoid being impressed by the signal technological achievements of the last decades. When the popular press speaks of science—and often when philosophers do—it is to this that reference is usually made. But technology is not science; engineers are not concerned with knowing what is. Engineering is a practical enterprise, occupied with ways of manipulating and using commonsense objects under the guidance of abstract science and mathematics. That it should be so successful is an indication of the pertinence that science and mathematics have to our daily world—and also an indication of the relevance that our root commonsense views have to the formulations of a usable science and mathematics.

If we refuse to remain with unexamined commonsense, and do not grant that physical science, mathematics, or engineering reveals the nature of what is ultimately real, we must, if we are to know what the elements of the universe are, reach them either through philosophic speculation or by philosophic reflection. Speculation leads to the development of a philosophic system, embracing all that there is; it finds a meaning and place for the physical universe within a larger cosmic whole. Such speculation, since it requires us to take account of values and God, takes us up an avenue which we do not here have open to us. The second method, that of philosophic reflection—presupposed in part by speculation—examines the ways in which men are able to move from observable features to the beings which make such features possible. I think there are at least four ways such movements occur, and that the nature of beings in and of themselves is to be found by reflecting on the way in which the termini of those four movements can together constitute distinctive beings. Generalizing and extrapolating this result will enable us, apart from a speculative system, to refer to all the bodies which make up the physical universe.

The four movements are conceptualization, dissection, withdrawal, and dissolution; they are engaged in when we are interested in respectively understanding, acting on, identifying, or isolating an object. Each of these movements can take its start

with any feature of an object. But the feature must first be recognized as exercising one of four distinct roles. Each will function either as a connection, a particular way in which the being is for others; as an expression, a manifestation of the power of the being, what it is from itself; as something bounded, what the being is by itself and related to others as at a distance; and finally what it is as a limit or terminal point in a situation encompassing that being and others. For the sake of simplicity I will deal with features as enjoying only the roles of connections and boundaries, and will try to see what they can teach us when subjected to conceptualization in the interests of understanding. I therefore ignore the fact that beings interplay with us, are identified by us and are isolated by us, and that they also function as limits and expressions.

Since it is rarely that thinkers view features in their role as connections, and since it is just this role which science usually ignores to concentrate on their role as boundaries, it is desirable, I think, to begin with and dwell on this. Features, among other things, serve as relations between the being to which the features are ascribed and other beings which may or may not attend to those features. Let us take a smile as our illustration. The smile is to be sure only an aspect of a man, but let us also take it as though it were an epitomization of all his features. When a man smiles his face changes in contour. If all we saw was a change in his face we would not have seen him smile. A smile is more than a public alteration in the shape of mouth and cheeks; it is more than a movement of various muscles; it is more than something expressed. It is not only inseparable from a larger surface but from the being's substance. A smile reveals and may betray a being. Even an infant occasionally knows how to read it accurately as testifying to joy or pleasure. The infant, no less than we, while confronting another's altered features, moves beyond these to the being of that other, as one who is able to express himself in this way. The infant doesn't conceptualize, but he does use the smile as a relation. Since the smile also has other roles it is possible for the infant and for us to misread the smile, misconstrue the kind of relation it in fact is. The smiling man on his side may be unaware that he is smiling. A man may smile without know-

ing that he does. But whether he knows it or not, he reveals something of himself, something of what he has in mind or in character. It is in terms of this knowledge of him that we act, speak, love, and hate. We know what he is by referring to him as one who has contributed to the being of the smile; the smile is a kind of implicational relation connecting him, as antecedent with a respondent as consequent. Sometimes our reference twists and turns to allow us to know him as one who is quite other than what he is apparently showing himself to be. The rogue smiles; but we do not trust him. The smile relates him to dupes who misread his smile, and to us who know that it is a relation whose initial term is other than what the dupe supposes.

Sometimes we penetrate to the beings of tigers and snakes. We respect the snarl and the teeth of the one and the hiss and the coils of the other as testifying to tendencies we deplore. Experience has taught us how to move from their features to the tendencies. We carry out somewhat the same adventure with dogs and cats, and occasionally with a horse. But we do not know how to carry it out very well with many other animals. The further down in the scale of living beings that we go, the more difficult we find it to penetrate to what they are. When we come to the non-living, we are almost completely baffled. But unless there is a complete break in the continuity of nature, we ought in principle to be able to make a similar penetration from the appearances or non-living beings to their reality. Since we cannot in fact do so, we must content ourselves with generalizing and proportionately modifying the relation which enables us to move from a man's appearance to his reality—or we must treat features not as relations but as boundaries. The former is a philosophic strategy, the latter a scientific one. We will, before long, have to attend to the latter.

Strictly speaking, a smile is a change or an act. But if this be admitted, we seem to be back with the later Aristotelians who supposed that there were as many powers in a thing as there were actions, and that the one perfectly matched the other. As Molière's joke has it, they supposed that since opium put one to sleep, it had to have a dormative virtue or power. They were right of course. Opium does have a dormative virtue. But to know this is to know

little beyond the fact that it will put one to sleep. What one wants is not such "safe and stupid" answers, but more daring and illuminating ones, a knowledge, we would say today, of the pharmacological character of it.

One might grant that one could in principle penetrate to the base of actions and changes, but go on to deny that such penetration is possible from the base of mere qualities, quantities and the like. It seems sensible to suppose that a man who persists in speaking badly of his friends is malicious, and that he who persistently steals is a thief. If you have a fever or blotches on your skin you may be in poor health in body and perhaps in spirit. But if we suppose that we can begin to penetrate to the nature of being on the basis of what we know of the color of the skin, the shape of a nose, deformations of a skull, and so on, we apparently open ourselves up to the follies of racism, phrenology, palmistry, typologies of all sorts. I think we need not, and for at least five reasons.

These enterprises take account only of rigidities, of qualities and structures, thereby losing the beings who act. Secondly, they specialize in only some of the traits of a being, neglecting others which are in fact intertwined with them. Skull and skin, hands, ears, nose, and eyes are organically interconnected, and cannot be dealt with in complete separation one from the other. Thirdly, they suppose that things are completely exteriorized in their manifest traits, and thus that there can be an exhaustive, scientific knowledge of beings obtained exclusively from a study of their traits alone. Fourthly, they forget that the features are also boundaries, expressions, and termini, and that the acknowledgement of them in these guises requires one to connect them with one another in the being which possesses them. Finally, they forget that an adequate grasp of a being requires that a knowledge of it be supplemented by what we learn of it in other ways.

What has so far been maintained agrees with and diverges from characteristic views of the Aristotelians. It too affirms that quantity and quality, or if you like, mathematical structures and perceivable features, are on a footing. But in contrast with the Aristotelians' view, it does not treat these as "accidents," as unable to tell us anything about the nature of things. When Galileo and

Descartes decided to take quantity, and in general, mathematical form, seriously, they accepted the Aristotelian position in part, since they accepted the thesis that qualities are unrevelatory accidents. But they refused to say with Aristotle that quantity or mathematically definable structures were accidents too; indeed, for them, these structures exhausted reality. In opposition to the Aristotelians and Cartesians I am maintaining that both quantities and qualities are features of objects which can have the role of relations enabling us to know that the beings connected by those relations are in and of themselves to be identified as grounds and consequences for one another.

As we have seen, we can and do make use of qualitative features, particularly in high grade living beings, to enable us to know what beings are in and of themselves. Our procedure here should serve as a guide as to how other features are related to what things are in themselves, and enable us to know the ultimate nature not only of living beings, but of non-living beings as well. Because and so far as we understand what men are like, as revealed and betrayed by certain features, we can in principle know what they are like in terms of other features, and eventually what non-living beings are like in terms of whatever features they happen to exhibit.

A smile, or any other feature, is not only a relation; it is a boundary, terminus, or expression, related to features elsewhere. We would like to know how it is related and what those other features are. Occasionally we make some shrewd guesses, but for the most part we must be content with the rough-hewn inductions we learn to make in the course of daily experience, and which work out with considerable success because they are supported by the practices, structure and language of our fellow men. If we want to know, to predict, to understand how the phenomenal world of interrelated features makes a single intelligible whole, we must take a different tack—that of the sciences. The features of things must be viewed as boundary characters, as summaries of the natures of a plurality of beings themselves related to one another in rational patterns, preferably of a mathematical form.

We seem to be able to make an occasional penetration from a quantity to the being which grounds it. A size, a comparative

matter, allows for a movement to a magnitude, what a being is in and of itself. The taller has one magnitude, the smaller another. The resistance and acceleration of this object tell us something about its mass and energy. But if we proceed in this way we will be able to express ourselves effectively only in the refined language of commonsense, for this is what we must use in dealing with size, resistance, etc., as relations rather than as boundary characters. Scientific discourse, precisely because it is concerned with conceived relations connecting conceived entities, is quite distinct from the commonsensical. For science, a smile is dissolved into the play of muscles and eventually of molecules or smaller particles, and these are conceived as being formally interrelated. The smile and any other phenomenon is for it an effete particular, a focal point for a conceived dissolution into elements which are to be interlocked with one another by some law or other rational mode of connection.

It is just as legitimate to treat a feature as a relation as it is to treat it as a summary. In both ways we deal with things as involved in implicative relations with one another. In the one case those relations are qualitative and perceptual, biased toward one of the beings; and in the other they are mathematical, conceptual, and neutral. Neither way alone tells us what the being is in full concreteness. In and of itself, a being is the togetherness of the outcomes of the different methods of dealing with its appearances. Remaining with our two selected methods, the use of features as relations and as summations, we can say of the smiling man that he is at once joyous and muscular.<sup>2</sup> He is, however, both in a number of ways. The joy and muscles merge—his is a muscular joy. The joy and muscles interplay—his is a joy which affects the muscles, muscles which affect the joy. The joy and muscles are distinct, located in him—he is a unity who has a place for both

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<sup>2</sup> Science does not altogether ignore the implicative role of qualitative features. It is because of them that scientists know something of the nature of other beings. The smile, the color, the shape, etc., imply that there are observers, perceivers, and perhaps also vision, intelligence, and the like. This fact makes possible the prediction of observable qualities; it does not preclude the use of those qualities as summations as well, to be related to one another by means of implicative laws.

joy and muscles. The joy and muscles imply one another—each needs, each rationally demands, the other. In and of himself, he is the merger, the interaction, the unity, the implication for both, sometimes biased towards one form of union, sometimes towards some other.<sup>3</sup>

It is tempting to speak of the smiling man in the language of perception or science, but since he is precisely one who encompasses and relates the elements of both, and as such is a sophisticated version of the being we know every day, we can properly speak of him only by clarifying—or, if you like, philosophizing—the language of daily life.<sup>4</sup> The thing in itself is neither at the place nor the time that perception or science focuses on. It can properly be described only in a purified, a philosophic form of common discourse. This is the language we use when we say, among other things, that a being in and of itself is a substance, offering a concrete, unique means by which the terminal objects of a number of diverse movements to that being are connected one with the other.

I gather that, despite the title of this conference, it is not intended to have anyone spend much time discoursing of beings, or more particularly of bodies, as they are in and of themselves—though these are inevitably presupposed and an acknowledgement of them is in the end required. We are to speak only of bodies in an existential field. Those bodies also enjoy four roles, just as their

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<sup>3</sup> Both the smile and the muscles (or more evidently, the neutrons, positrons, and the like) are objective, ingredient features of an external reality, the one being experienced and observed, the other conceived and abstractly formulated. Neither is to be identified with the mental or the physical. They are both parts of a real being, and both are known, the one through the agency of a perceiving, the other through the agency of a conceiving. The one is no more and no less basic than the other, but neither is as basic, as ultimate, as the being in which they are together.

<sup>4</sup> If we want a language adequate to the rest of reality, outside the realm of clarified common-sense objects, we must refine our refined common-sense language until it is no longer biased towards bodies in space-time, and can be applied equally to other modes of being. Only such a neutral language is properly philosophic. It will permit of the intertwining of the discourses of the different modes of being, but only as long as the different referents continue to be distinguished—as they were not in the initial, or muddled, discourse of daily life.

features do. They are by themselves, act from themselves, are for one another, or are with others in the field. As by themselves they stand over against one another, constituting a distributed set of masses, and defining a contemporary world of distinct beings. Since these beings persist over a period of time, together they constitute a temporal slab of nature. Bodies are also agents, actors, effective forces. Each exhibits itself, transmits something of itself, going from where it is towards others. Each therefore faces the rest of the world as that which is future with respect to it, and which may make use of it in a way no one can fully determine in advance. Here we have nature as vital, promissory, adventurous. A third way in which bodies are in the field is as beings which function as data for one another. Each offers itself to the others as potential users and responders. Together they constitute a set of interlocking conditions, the effects of which are to be determined by the responses they make to one another's presence. Here we have nature as a set of triggers, stimuli, occasions, grounds, determinants; nature as dynamic and presumably law-abiding. Bodies, finally, are also with one another, qualifying one another. They then together constitute a single geometric cosmological whole which has a content, properties, and career distinct from the bodies that constitute it. Since a constantly changing content, constituted by the inter-meshing of a number of beings is the stuff of history, the beings as together with one another can be said to make possible an historic stretch of nature.

The bodies in the physical universe, in short, constitute an extended period of a temporal, causal and law-abiding, yet open-ended nature. When we speak in this way, we focus on the bodies. But the existential field is also an element in the physical universe; it too makes an essential contribution to the nature and being of the space-time-dynamic world of moving, resting, changing bodies. It is as real as any bodies are. But it does not have features as bodies do. It is all surface, as it were, all phenomenal. It is not a substance; it cannot itself move; though it is active it cannot engage in actions. Existence is being in a perpetual activity of self-division, self-pulverization, of placing part outside of part, which is but to say, existence is a vital extensionality. Since there

is no limit to the self-division which is possible to existence, there is no limit to the expansion which it consequently can exhibit. Whatever limits and measures there are in existence are provided by the bodies in it, and by other beings.

Existence is extended. It can be viewed as an attenuation of the extended bodies located in it. Conversely, we can view bodies as concentrations of existence. But as was remarked earlier, bodies and existence are independent modes of being; the physical universe is one in which the interplay of bodies occurs together with an interplay of bodies and the existential field.

Bodies exist; there is existence in them. That existence is continuous with the existence outside them. The existence outside is dynamic, constantly moving on, and pulling on the existence inside the various bodies. Those bodies must, to remain in being, maintain a hold on existence, keep some of it inside themselves. If they lose all hold, they turn into the dead, dessicated facts which make up the past; if they hold on to what they had before, they remain at rest or are quiescent. They change and move just so far as they lay hold of and make their own a portion of existence which they did not possess before. Existence on its side is constantly blocked in its subdividing by bodies, and has its geometry altered by the way in which those beings are interrelated as contemporaries.

The bodies in the physical universe have a three-fold task: they must re-assess this or that form of unification in themselves in the attempt to achieve a self-centered equilibrium; they must adjust themselves to one another's presence, insistence, and resistance; and they must adjust themselves to the independent existence with which their existence is continuous. Existence on its side has similar tasks. It must, as a time, adjust itself to the presence of the various bodies locatable within it and which encapsulate and subjugate a portion of it within themselves; it must, as a space, interrelate its various subdivisions so as to be a single field; and it must, as a process of becoming, re-unify itself at every moment so that it can move forward to constitute an existent field at the next moment.

There is a predictable steadiness to the way in which the elements behave; but they also freely act to bring about concrete

results beyond the reach of all predicting.<sup>5</sup> Sometimes bodies merge, sometimes they subdivide; often they get in one another's way, but occasionally they support one another, helping one another to continue or to achieve a better equilibrium. Over the course of hundreds of centuries, a few raise themselves out of the primal muck as beings who are quick to respond not only to the presence of others, but to changes in them. Dim flickerings of life are to be discerned. The coming together of many units of life, the building up of complex housings for them as together, the increase in range and power of sensitivity, all prepare the way for the coming of man. He like all other bodily beings is part of one cosmos, an eddy in an endless sea. In him an aboriginal sensitivity, characteristic of living beings, is partly channelized and refocused to constitute a retentive, expectative, inferential, systematic mind. From the beginning of his career, that mind serves as a way of reaching a large amorphous environing region, an experienced domain which he will, through habit, repetition,

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<sup>5</sup> Dr. Collingwood has called to my attention Thomas Aquinas' observations in Q.vi, a 2 of his *Commentary on De Trinitate of Boethius*: "Knowledge does not always terminate in the same way. Sometimes it terminates in the sense, sometimes in the imagination, and sometimes in the intellect alone. For sometimes the properties and accidents of a thing revealed by the sense adequately manifest its nature, and then the intellect's judgment of the thing's nature must conform to what the sense reveals about it. All natural things, limited to sensible matter, are of this sort. So the terminus of knowledge in natural science must be in the sense, so that we judge of natural things as the sense reveals them, as is clear in *De Caelo et Mundo*." In the *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.85, a. 1, ad. 2, Aquinas remarks, "Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore we must disagree and say that matter is two-fold; common, such as flesh and bone; individual, such as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter. . . . For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like."

Thomas Aquinas thus recognized that some accidents testified to a power in man. But I have been urging that instead of merely telling us that there is a power answering to the accident—e.g., "risibility" to "smile"—the accident tells us something of him as an individual being. I am in fact affirming against him both that all "accidents" in men are revelatory of their individual "essences," and that we do not know how to "judge

and speech break up into a world of commonsense and world beyond.

The world of commonsense is rather neatly ordered for practical purposes. But when an attempt is made to deal with its items in a detached way, to understand how they are related one to the other, we are at first almost overwhelmed. We seem to be faced with a wild heterogeneity of ill-assorted items. Colors are alongside one another in no order; bodies move and act without evident warrant in them or outside them; they grow, decay, fall, and rise without apparent reason. It is almost incredible that men could ever have found a way to credit that world with any intelligible order. That the sciences should not only have begun, but that they should actually make progress in the ordering of the world we encounter every day, is a fact which never loses its wonder, no matter how often it is noted. The price science has had to pay for this is that, for objectivity's sake, it had to hold itself apart from the limitations and virtues of common experience, language and practice, and for clarity's sake, had to concentrate on only some features of things, and then primarily as exercising the role of summational boundaries. That price is not too high, providing philosophers are willing to continue in their age-old task of saving the appearances while probing to the depths of reality.

Is there anything in the foregoing account which will be of value to scientists? I doubt it. Conversely, there is nothing here which has benefited or can benefit much from scientific studies. This is inevitable, for science and philosophy are concerned with different topics and have different objectives, reached by different methods. The one is concerned, not with the substantially real as it is in and of itself, but with the intelligibles which that real can

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of natural things as the sense reveals them." Because Thomas Aquinas thought that the color of gold told us something about the nature of gold (whereas I am maintaining only that it *could* tell us something, that it is revelatory only in principle), he found no need, as Galileo and his successors did, to find out about the nature of gold or any other "natural" things by turning away from direct observation to consider what the things are like when framed within the abstract formalities of mathematics. He who takes science to explicate in commonsense terms what commonsense observes will have to insist, with Aristotle and Aquinas, that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones. We observe that heavier bodies reach the ground faster than light ones; but this is not a scientific truth.

be made to yield when framed within the patterns of mathematics and logic; the other is concerned with the substantially real, speculatively understood as the locus and ground of scientific intelligibles as well as of the termini of value, perception, and experience.

The enterprise of science, however—its methods, tasks, causes, and consequences—have considerable philosophic importance. The courage, the speculative daring of the great figures in the history of science offer a standard which contemporary philosophers might with profit heed. To say this much is not yet, however, to say enough. For if philosophy could learn nothing more from science but a knowledge of the way it proceeds and concludes, and the virtues of its practitioners, philosophy would not have benefited, as much as it ought, from the work of others who also seek the truth.

If it be correct to say, as I have, that science is concerned with the systematic rational ordering of the world as first encountered in commonsense experience, and if this ordering tells us what the real is when transformed into abstract formulae, then we should be able to conceive of a combination of its results with correlative sets of abstractions, obtained through perception, evaluation, and the like, so as to express the nature of the commonsense world when this has been purged of irrelevancies and given cosmic importance. Such a world is the real as conceptually grasped. It is not the world of things in themselves, but the nature or essence of it, as over against its activity or its existence. It is reality as outside all corruption and change, what things would be for any possible omniscience. The world in which science is interested is evidently then a part of the world as it might be seen by God. From this perspective science can be said to be a part of theology carried on by other means. As such it is to be studied in order to know something of what God has in mind. And this, like everything else of importance, is also of interest to philosophy. If we wish to know what exists in fact we must supplement this knowledge with what is evaluated, interplayed with, and confronted. The conceptual grasp of that result is a grasp of what things are in and of themselves, that ultimate reality which even God has to mind.

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## THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF \*

THOMAS LANGAN

**G**RANT FOR A MOMENT that the essential aspect of person—of “Self”—is freedom. Can freedom be meaningful except as freedom *from*? What one is free from, or is supposed to struggle to pull free from, must then be of central importance to understanding what the “Self” is. Different philosophies of man have indeed underscored self-possession as various sorts of struggle. We are offered alternately the spectacle of education struggling with heredity, of self-control with temperament, of individuality with human nature; the individual is shown struggling with society, the suppressed class with the suppressors, *l'être* with *l'avoir*; motivation seems to have to overcome mechanism, the “Ego” the “Id,” and “action” the “thing.”

Some sort of resistant, some kind of “given” with which the “Self” must struggle, is lurking in each of these suggestions. A quick survey of them seems to suggest that at least four categories of “givens” must be taken into account in the struggle of self-realization. 1) There is a primordial level of “givenness,” consisting of the fixed structures of our “nature” and of those of our inherited temperament; 2) there is all that is subsequently, historically acquired—cultural habits, dispositions, and conceptions; 3) there is the style, built-up of our whole personal past unified by our fundamental projections; 4) finally, there is a kind of given that is unqualifiedly “other,” that is entirely outside of me: the other people, the institutions, and the things encountered in my situation.

Common sense suggests, not only that each of these kinds of “givens” will throw light on that central freedom which must contend with them, but also that the four categories somehow form a system of structures. But philosophers would not have over-simplified their versions of the self struggling with this or that element if it were so easy to integrate all of these categories into a coherent explanation. In a moment we shall follow the

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attempt of a vital philosophy of the self to do so, and see what difficulties it meets. But first, so as not ourselves to oversimplify the problem and because, as will become apparent, the fullest and most subtly graduated scale of opposing "givens" is needed, I shall run through the catalogue quickly, underscoring a subspecies or two.

*I. The Great Weight of Givenness: "Le Royaume de l'Avoir"*

*A. Inherited Substructures; Temperament*

Every "given" within a person constitutes, as structure, a limit, but also *possibility*. The primordial limit is also the ultimate and enduring ground of all possibility. While every philosophy must acknowledge that man is some kind of thing, and that, whatever his nature may be, it is the ultimate determinant of what he can do; yet interpretations vary in their versions of the stability and the influence of this "nature." The extreme positions are occupied by Nietzsche who suggests that whatever its influence may be, its structures are subject, through great struggle, to slow expansion; and, at the opposite pole, by those descriptions of mechanistic psychology which picture the organisms so structured that absorbed stimuli produce mechanical responses. Nothing is more crucial to a philosophy of the self than the role it assigns to this primordial given; this problem will be a major concern of the present essay.

One thing is certain: whatever else it may be, this "nature" must contrast, as that which we inherit and can do nothing about, with those "givens"—habits, dispositions, conceptions—which, through our proper activity, we have acquired. Before we pass on to the categories of the "acquired," however, I would point out a degree between "nature" and "history" which is easily overlooked. An individual's temperament is inherited, but unlike the rudimentary givenness of nature, it is neither universal to all mankind, nor does it appear at a glance so utterly beyond our control as does the root possibility of our freedom. Without embroiling ourselves at this point with the problem of whether and to what extent we can do something about our fundamental

temperament, let us just note that these differences exist, that they influence the whole style of a life, so that it is important whether I tend to think and feel "naturally" like a boy or a girl, a German or an Italian, a laconic indifferent or an explosive splenetic.

A phenomenon like Thomas Wolfe's pathetically unperceptive touristfolder reactions to France in *The Web and the Rock* contrasted with the same work's descriptions of the *Oktoberfest*, where, though still obviously an outsider, something in him responds, cannot be explained by appealing only to experience. The grave thing, one with which a philosophy of liberty must come to grips, is the fact that such a man's potential projects, as regards things French and as regards German, are unquestionably bound to be influenced by that difference.

#### B. *Acquired (Learned) Cultural Disposition*

About this category as a whole, there is no need to say much, as the *Kultur* and *Geschichte* philosophers have, since the Enlightenment, made it quite impossible to undervalue differences of language and national culture, even of class within a culture. But a sub-species of it tends to get overshadowed and regrettably so by the soaring eagles of destiny: gestures, manners, attitudes—sometimes difficult to distinguish from temperament. The young Neapolitan *learns* to shrug his shoulders and turn up his palms and he in fact picks up from his elders and peers a shrugging attitude to life. This acquired attitude is a sort of "universal," characterizing a type; woven into the fabric of his style of doing things, it will color every stand the individual takes throughout life.

#### C. *The Ur-entwürfe*

This leads us to consideration of the "style" the person *gives* himself. Our fundamental projections, our *Ur-entwürfe*, thread through our concrete reactions to what is given in us and what happens to us, weaving all the eventful moments of experience into the unity of a personality; they are the fundamental attitudes furnishing the principle of integration. Elicited by temperament

and by the example of those with whom I am most intimate, these attitudes, once adopted, animate the history of my subsequent will-acts, structuring my habits, furnishing the supply of concepts with which I think, ultimately limiting the range of possibility in which I operate. The existentialist philosophers of "situation" have insisted that my present situation, which provides the very horizons of the act of liberty, rather than being a *fatum* about which I can do nothing at all, is in fact a great deal my own doing, the result of these projections; consequently I have only myself to blame for the influence of all the othernesses—the people, institutions, and things—I will encounter by electing to stay in this situation. But there is an element of *fatum* nonetheless—people and events which come crashing into my chosen context—just as there is an appalling range of aspects of the otherness outside that one submits to and is influenced by, quite beyond the range of his intentions and desires.

*D. The Otherness of the People, Institutions, and Things Encountered in my Situation*

The otherness of the other people—the perspective so dramatically developed by the existential philosophers of dialogue<sup>1</sup>—will play a sufficient role in what we are going to say below to eliminate any need for emphasis at this point. What may not stand out enough, however, is the role played by the givenness of the *things* we encounter. Realism tends to conceive of our "nature" as that part of our reality which has something of the thing-like in the way it is determined. If so, the psychologist's efforts to understand aspects of the body by approaching it as a thing and the sociologist's analysis of a mechanism of society are valid, on a certain level, for the philosopher. Crudely put, the realist could argue that just as the I-Thou confrontation provides the proper *Anstoss* for me to discover myself as a person, so the confrontation with the material and biological world might help reveal me to myself as a thing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I am thinking of Marcel and Buber—and the philosophers of the "stare"—Sartre, and the Camus of *L'Étranger*.

<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it is obvious that starting in this way, one runs a great risk of missing what is properly human about man.

## II. *Problems in Reconciling the Species in a Single Explanation*

Common sense should now be warned that it is not so easy to weave all of these elements into a coherent doctrine of the self; witness the difficulties encountered in this regard by what we consider the least inadequate kind of philosophy of liberty. The existentialist philosophers are loud in their praises of liberty, and ingenious in their descriptions of the self struggling in history to construct itself against the oppositions of every sort of givenness, but they still get themselves into corners. Our point of departure will be a kind of idealized existence-philosophy. Let us steer clear of the extremest apostles of self-realization—although it might be pointed out that even Nietzsche himself emphatically recognized the conflict between the *Selbst* and the *Ich*, the importance of the body as a real limit, and the reality of situation; there is nothing more eloquent than Nietzsche's insistence on the necessity of going through the "camel" stage before successfully metamorphizing into the raging lion. His ontology, however, furnishes no basis for distinguishing clearly between my nature and my situation. Being, within the great circle of the Eternal Return, is all dynamic. A present "state" is a lull in the forward surge, a sclerosis sedimenting a limiting structure which the Will-to-power must then overcome, operating within the *de facto* limits of these "states." Since it will develop that the crucial problem facing an existentialist philosophy of the self is to explain how the given "othernesses" that are, crudely speaking, "outside" the individual person can break the vicious circle of his own projecting; and since, as we shall see, some sort of distinction between the givenness of our "nature" and our "situation" becomes crucial; I shall have in mind an existentialism in which such a distinction could clearly be laid down. Not that human nature must be an eternal idea; it simply means those given limits of human operation which undergo no significant evolution within the span of historical time and which constitute, therefore, the brute given capacity of man to confront the world—a capacity about which he can hope to do virtually nothing at all; in contradistinction, "situation" would refer to racial, temperamental, social, material givens, peculiar to

particular groups and individuals, and with which one can hope to do battle.

Of course, the relative scope given human nature when such a distinction is made is of paramount importance. When presenting the reality of brute givenness, the existentialist is inclined by his perspective to emphasize the scope of personal attitude; the way I assume my situation transforms much of the "given" into a "chosen." Suppose as I grow up I become aware of being slightly fat, by temperament laconic and slow, and that I have by upbringing all the forms needed to think, look and act like a typical Brooklyn drugstore cowboy. Should I actually become aware of these things, I may reinforce them and unify them into a style by the very way I accept "what comes naturally"; or I may revolt against some of them.<sup>3</sup> I can even revolt against what I cannot change; I can champ at the bit in frustration at being a Puerto Rican.

However, there are limits to our capacity for "revolt." Can I refuse to accept my human nature? There are those, Kierkegaard warns, who try to be a self the wrong way. But even our very refusal to accept the responsibility of selfhood is a way of exercising it; my nature asserts itself even in my efforts to deny it.

This primordial, brute givenness of "nature" as inherited common ground of all possibility of becoming tends to be lost sight of as the existentialist concentrates his gaze on "*Existenz*" conceived as Self constructed by previous projections and thus, as personal history, directing future projections. Indeed, in such a philosophy, all the other givens in our catalogue tend to be subordinated to the dominant reality of the *Ur-entwürfe*. A kind of integration is indeed thus achieved; but, alas, it is not without serious problems of its own, problems threatening to endanger the sense of the very freedom the existentialist thinkers would crown. Even granting that much of the game of liberty is played, not in the bad faith deliberations masking the true roots of my reaction to given circumstances, but rather in the fundamental choices which created and keep creating the life-style governing

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<sup>3</sup> Should I for some reason become most distinctly and unpleasantly aware of them.

such a pattern of reactions; still the freedom of these fundamental choices itself poses problems. The more we concentrate on the kind of "givenness" I have given myself in the dialectic of my own fundamental projections with a history, the more the following dilemma becomes apparent.

Once I am caught up in a way of projecting my existence, will I not then necessarily go to the encounter of every experience with my interpretations already set through the conceptions, habits, and acquired dispositions that thousands of acts have accumulated through years of my carrying-out in the concrete my own fundamental projections? In other words, does it not seem that the weight of that very self-given history becomes crushing? How can I break out of the chains cast by the accumulations of my own acts, how can the groaning camel metamorphize himself into the raging lion? Such a change would require both an awareness of the limits of my present situation, and an imaginative grasp of the possibilities opened to me. Which raises a second, correlative aspect of the problem. How fully must I know myself to be an authentic self at all? Is it an essential part of my attaining an *authentic* self-development that I become master of my historical destiny by coming to know the sense of my historical situation? When we read Heidegger we wonder about the simple folk whose education will never permit of much historical awareness; are they all consigned to a limbo of inevitable inauthenticity?

One kind of answer to the problem of our coming to know ourselves individually, concretely, is suggested by the religious existentialists—I am thinking of Marcel and Buber—who have insisted that the quest for self-knowledge can be achieved in dialogue with other selves. An *engaged* encounter with others, it is argued, somehow provides the perfect *Anstoß* for the discovery of my concrete temperament, personality, and possibility, so that I can know, at least on a certain level, exactly what I am and can become.<sup>4</sup> Might we not see in such a suggestion a possible

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<sup>4</sup> The morbid curiosity of a collector of psyches lacks engagement; such a spectator can make out of the "Other" largely what he wants, so that the Other always manages to incarnate just his own perspectives. The Organization Man sitting on a committee is *engagé* the wrong way; he is interested in the Other, not as authentic incarnation of human possibility,

solution to the problem of whether everyone can and must work to dominate his historical situation? A simple soul, it might be argued, could perhaps be led by someone more sophisticated to escape the most critical dangers of certain aspects of his historical situation.

Such a position is very appealing to common sense. But what does it obviously *presuppose*? It supposes a depth of human nature conceived as fundamental possibility for self-realization, transpiring through all the layers of acquired otherness which somehow, though they mold and direct it, never destroy its power to transcend them. There would be no point in another's appealing to "me" to change if I were not in some way more than my own history; which suggests, too, that my possibility for becoming must have a sense that is deeper than that history, though the other person can, and in a sense *must*, use my history to appeal to this reality beyond (or below) it. Such a position suggests that my freedom, rooted in a nature that underlies and supports (commonly in every man) the possibility of all history, is somehow neither the agitated and empty pure possibility of a Sartrean negativity, nor just a self-enchaining ego caught totally in the web of its own constructions; rather, as a dynamic reality with given structures of its own, recognizably similar in all men, this human freedom provides a real basis that can be counted on for intersubjective appeal. Even though one would have to go through a person's history—speak to him in his language, think

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but as a possible opening to be exploited, or as an *Anstoss* with which to compromise. Genuine encounter, however, seeks out the possibility for becoming; it is a seeking in the other what is essentially human in him. Suppose that a wife begins pouring out to her husband her fear of becoming a contented slave to the daily routine. Suppose theirs is a Gabriel Marcel type marriage. We can easily imagine the ensuing dialogue leading both, *together*, toward a deeper and more real discovery of themselves. The fruitfulness of this aid is in part due to its not being *imposed* from without; each wants it and seeks it; the ground is prepared by the individual's hope; he believes in himself enough to know that he can change, that he can, with help, find his way beyond present difficulties. But cannot help also come crashing in from the outside when it is much less solicited than this, through admiration, hatred, desire, fear? No one can absolutely force another to see himself in essential respects which he may not want to see—but is not the very way he turns away from an unwanted vision the beginning of an admission of its truth?

with him in his concepts, deal with his "personality"—still we might, in favored circumstances, be able to get at the real *person* who is *possibility* to learn to think in other horizons, to change gradually and painfully aspects of his personality; who is *possibility*; not formless, natureless, structureless, explosive power of pure becoming, but rather *human* possibility.<sup>5</sup>

I find such a suggestion frankly attractive; I suspect it is basically true. That is why I would put it forward as a guide for phenomenological description, in the sense which Paul Ricoeur in his article of 1953 in *Esprit* has developed out of Husserl's notion of "phenomenological guide."<sup>6</sup> But let us note this at once: between a position offered as guide for description, and a position supported by description sufficient to make its full sense and its integral coherence apparent, there is a yawning philosophical abyss.

An article cannot even begin to fill up the abyss. But it can make it yawn more impressively. What is needed is phenomenological description of that basic power which the common sense position is convinced transcends all the historical acquisitions and inherited particularities which mold and direct it; it will, of course, have to answer the question, what it means for this power to *transcend* them. The conviction that all men move out to confront the world with common capacities and common needs, and that the structure and limits of our fundamental power is essentially the same throughout history, may suffice to found a

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<sup>5</sup> An intellectual, who approaches things armed with an ideology in which he believes implicitly, can perhaps be helped to greater self-awareness only through dialogue on the ideological level that might neutralize the effect of erroneous ideas. But in contrast to the intellectual, we could imagine that someone raised in loving contact with persons who pass on to him a concern for what people feel and want and even need, would somehow, through this intimate experience, be in direct contact with the reality of the human drama on a level more fundamental than that of culture and all that changes with the epoch. And while his solicitude itself would not permit that he should turn away from what history and temperament have made different in a friend, one would hope that his fundamental, rich, concrete experience of people on this deeper level would help him understand the essential in these differences, that is, what there is in them that might serve as a block to his love.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Paul Ricoeur, "Sur la Phénoménologie," *Esprit*, XXI, No. 209, December 1953, p. 837.

realistic philosophy of man; but the mere conviction that these broad principles are true is not yet that philosophy achieved. The tendency to mistake a statement of an initial position for an adequate philosophical description is a common failing among realistic philosophers. A guide, however true it may prove itself to be, is not a substitute for the phenomenology it is supposed to direct. What is required in the present instance is a full, accurate description of the asserted common human capacities and needs, and of the source of their unity. The difficulty of such an enterprise should not be underestimated. The just complaint is often lodged that "phenomenologists" perpetually talk of the need for one or another kind of description but actually *describe* very rarely. The reason for this, far from discrediting the project of phenomenological descriptions, actually points up the fact that phenomenology is serious philosophy and not a do-it-yourself philosophy kit. Only a genuinely originaive philosopher with gifts akin to literary sensibility can actually make significant progress in holding up before us visions of our own intimate reality. However, we can at least venture a procedural suggestion.

I do not think that one can proceed directly to the intuitive description of a nature, beyond the laying down of a broad guide. Rather I think the phenomenologist will have to play off dialectically all that appears to be historically acquired against all that does not reveal any apparent historical variation. If so, then we can see the extreme importance of developing carefully each subtly distinguished grade of those "othernesses" in our quick catalogue. The subtler the range of kinds and levels of historical *acquis* we can distinguish, the more revealing will this antithesis prove of the exact reality of the non-acquired, non-particular *nature*. In what sense is such a procedure dialectical? In this explicitly defined sense, that any element of givenness or otherness that proves either to be acquired at a moment in a person's life, or to be inherited but not universal to all men, should then throw the inquirer over to the question, what must there be in the person as ground of this possibility of reception and variation? Each element described thus has its sense circumscribed and its implications developed through contrast with a contrary feature—the acquired is given its sense by contrasting it with the non-acquired,

and vice versa. For example, discovered variations in languages, and studies in the individual's acquisition of linguistic accomplishment, can be forced to throw light on the underlying, unacquired linguistic capacity, adequate to explain the possibility of this development, and fundamental enough so that it is common to all languages and hence to all men. Success in this immense enterprise would constitute a beginning of the process of putting meat on the scrawny bones of the notion that man is "rational." Armed with this success, one would push bravely back to the arena of the historical "acquired," and seek to discover lines of universality in parallel spheres of activity, from art to politics.

As a measure of how far such a process would have had to have progressed before a serious question could be answered, and as further evidence of the importance of exploring all up and down the range of "othernesses," let us see now what would really be at stake in a question we earlier asked rather innocently. We asked whether an explicit "liberation" from our historical tradition is necessary for authentic self-direction. At once we are plunged into the whole problem of our cultural alienation; we think of Heidegger's frightening picture of the *Seinsvergessenheit* into which our tradition has fallen; we think of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre wrestling with the problem of the mediating socio-economic-political Other in Marxist theory—our self-alienation in the class, in the system, in the products of our work of which we are divested; we remember the hair-raising descriptions of Jaspers and Marcel, showing how the technological forms of contemporary society impose narrowly closed-in horizons on modern man. As evidence of the need for the full program of phenomenological description proposed here, I would like to indicate briefly why such a problem should not be treated in isolation from the full range of consideration we are proposing.

Ultimately, the question cultural alienation raises is whether, as a necessary part of a program of authentic self-direction, I must be prepared to discover an essential part of my self already caught up in an intersubjective cultural world, forming a kind of "otherness" which I cannot simply will away at this point, but must either agree to go along with, or oppose in pitting the force of my action against the other wills in the society. An even more

perplexing suggestion has been added to this. And that is, that a person's essential reality may conceivably be one so fully alienated by a cultural situation as to frustrate his chances of leading a full human existence until the whole objective situation undergoes a revolutionary dissolution. We are haunted by the Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness (*das unglückliche Bewußtsein*), and by the Marxist insistence that the Proletariat, having been divested of the fruit of that human labor by which alone they can transform the world into a habitation for man, now find their intersubjective relationships mediated through the impersonal and de-personalizing element of money; these are notions which must not be dismissed with a wave of the hand simply because common sense strongly suspects that the fundamental human situation is never caught up exclusively and hopelessly in just those chains. Yet the common sense reaction can again legitimately serve us as a *guide* here, by urging us to look for the grounds of any possibility for communication, and to seek the cause of any intelligibility that might actually inhere in cultural things in the common essence of all the subjects projecting, acting in and sharing one intersubjective world. Instead of accepting uncritically the suggestion that we owe what we are to the inter-subjective world, with its corollary, that we might become separated from what is essential to our being human, the realistically guided phenomenologist will attempt to elaborate a full description that will show rather than the intersubjective world owes what it is to us in virtue of a *fond* of nature which forms in us the essential and the *inalienable*. He will seek to give a precise and full sense to, and look for evidence to support, the suggestion that this inalienable *fond* is capable of surging up through all historical accretions, and that *there* lies a person's chance for freedom beyond all the limitations of class, nation, and epoch. This demands, of course, hypersensitivity to any evidence of a level of common humanity at work in the most primitive circumstances.

Laying down the details of the guide in this dogmatic fashion makes acutely obvious the abyss separating such a phenomenological guide as principle for a proposed program, and such a program really carried out and fully self-justified. We can appreciate the exasperation of those devoting their lives to pointing out

that half of mankind lives in conditions which make meaningful human existence objectively impossible. We can also feel the exasperation of those with a good logical sense, who by this time are rolling their eyes and wondering how in heaven's name we don't see that we are baldly assuming that we know what a *meaningful* human existence is, when in all probability our conception is quite empty.

I not only concede the point; it is the main point I wished to make in this paper! I concede further that taking up any phenomenological guide is dangerous precisely because it does *direct* inquiry, and thus might also, if it is false or woefully inadequate, provide it with blinders. But this is no weakness of the project of systematic description; it is simply an expression of the weakness of human inquiry. We must have something to look for before we can concentrate our gaze and follow a rigorous path; we have only our good common experience to suggest a guide to what we should look for. Husserl's contention, that we must seek a presuppositionless guide, even if one can believe in such a thing, clearly applies only to the ultimate phenomenological quest for the essence of consciousness with which *Ideen I* is concerned, and could not apply in a case of phenomenological psychology, that is, the sort of pre-epoché kind of endeavor with which we are concerned in this essay. Here, we can only rely on our experience, and working with a will to operate against the backdrop of the fullest possible range of the problem of the self, plunge ahead, until the dialectical playing-off of one kind of "otherness" against the others begins to fill up the notion of the self, and with it, the conception of human nature. I believe that the more we work at confronting each kind of givenness with the others the more we will realize the hopelessness of trying to deal with these fundamental aspects of the self in isolation from one another. A great security from error will arise from this effort at mutual illumination of nature by project, project by thing, thing by an encountering nature. The philosophers who insist that man can alienate himself essentially, just to take the case of the sensitive problem we have considered today, would be less secure in this alarming position if they were to meditate, on the one hand, upon the givenness of human nature as ground of possibility for an intersubjective

world; and on the other, upon the oppositions to our projects which arise, not just from cultural objects, but from natural ones, aspects of a certain reality which I neither create, nor essentially deform, and which, therefore, I cannot alienate nor even, in certain circumstances, resist. The more sensitive the philosopher working from the perspective of freedom becomes to the necessity of holding tenaciously on to every shade and degree of resistance, determinacy, independence, "objectivity," structure, and form, in things that can be made to stand sustained descriptive scrutiny, the better are his chances of filling up the conceptions of self, human nature, and freedom, which in the beginning of his quest are obviously rather thin.

### *Conclusion*

By way of conclusion, I would cast a glance backward along the forest trail over which we have just wandered, in order to explicate a few implications and reemphasize a few major points.

1. I did not begin either by defining a concept of the Self, or by engaging in an analysis of its "significant use in common language." Obviously, some notion of the Self is operative in fact from the first line. But a so-called common-language analysis might tend to dissipate such a notion before the gaze of its solar eye; for this conception is of an essentially dialectical reality. Any one common, or even philosophically inadequate, usage of it will lead the analyst straight to confusion, because in no one isolated usage is the reality capable of disengaging itself meaningfully against the backdrop of an adequate *Anstoß*, the full range of "othernesses" against which it must be seen.

2. An adequate statement of a notion of the Self, if it is not going to lead to all the worn antinomies that gather around the conception of personal liberty, will have to describe the liberty, not just as "self-transcendence" (which is dangerously unclear), but will have to show all the aspects of what it is that the liberty transcends, how they interact on one another, and what it *means* to transcend each of them. Defining self-hood as liberty, and

liberty as self-transcendence, obviously begs the question until it is established what is transcended and how.

3. In view of this, I have attached the greatest importance to distinguishing all the kinds of given otherness; that is, every sort of determination, structure, and limit with which a forward-push of liberty must contend. There are many sub-species which should be distinguished with great care; the self dealing, for instance, with its cultural *acquis*, meets in different ways the challenges of language, laws, customs, and religions. Study of each one of these challenges will throw light on its relations with the others. Our way of living a language, for instance, is hardly irrelevant to the challenge represented by the religion we have grown up in; and each and all will reveal another facet of the underlying possibility of genuine personal realization.

4. How does one "prove" that each of the evoked species of otherness forms an essential part of the explanation? Negatively, by playing inadequate philosophies of the Self off against one another: the strong points of one can be used to show up the frustrating dilemmas of the other. On the positive side, I regret that I do not have, nor do I believe in, any simple, unmistakable criteria or sure-fire methodological gimmicks—the kind of do-it-yourself philosophy kits that we have already condemned; however, I am convinced that the effort to seek out in experience and describe the formation, development, and influence of fundamental projections, to explore them as expressions of the given limits and possibilities of a human nature, to see how they must interact with the cultural givens, etc., can slowly and painstakingly gather up the light of the lived reality itself, and thus manifest the fruitfulness of these notions through the illumination they throw on the different aspects of these interacting phenomena. Serious description is slow, difficult, but most exciting work. It requires genuine talent. The laying down of long-range goals and guides, as we have been doing here, is mere propaedeutic, however necessary it may be. The real work of philosophizing, the self-justifying work, begins here.

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## METAPHYSICAL EXPERIENCE

WILLIAM BOSSART

**A**RISTOTLE TELLS US that metaphysics is the science of being *qua* being and I can find no reason to quarrel with his definition. But we should remember that first and foremost it is the object investigated which serves as a clue to the nature of any scientific activity. Thus if we agree that metaphysics is the science of being as it is in itself, we have not agreed to much until we have some idea what being is like. By "being" I mean that principle without which particular beings—chairs, men, ideas, chemical reactions, and so forth—could not be. I shall call an experience of being "metaphysical." By "being" I do not mean God, substance, or a first cause. These are ontological interpretations which are made on a different level of inquiry. "Ontology," as I am using the term here, means the investigation and classification of various kinds of beings with a view to relating them to being itself. Hence ontology presupposes an experience of being. The present paper is not concerned with ontology, but with metaphysical experience in its own right. It will argue that we do experience being, and the greater part of what follows will attempt to elucidate that experience.

1. I should like us first to engage in what Kierkegaard was wont to call a "project of thought"—to make the movements of having a metaphysical experience without giving any thought to the actual reality of that experience, just as the novice boxer makes the movements of attack and defense before he enters actual combat. Let us assume, then, that we do experience being. What would we expect being to be like and how would we experience it?

Any inquiry into the nature of being begins by distinguishing being from those particular beings which it grounds. Particular beings are contingent and hence could also not be. Yet they are. In rejecting particular beings as the first principle of reality, we are led to the realization that they must have their ground in some

thing else—that they stand in being over and against nothing, to paraphrase Heidegger.<sup>1</sup> Once we have this distinction clearly in view, the task of metaphysics appears to be quite simple. We need only direct our attention away from particular beings and toward being itself. Yet this is easier said than done, for the distinction is always made from the side of particular beings. We cannot first apprehend being and then distinguish it from particular beings, for apprehension, in the usual sense of the term, is always the apprehension of a determinate object. But to expect being to reveal itself as a determinate object would be to turn being into a particular being, and the original sense of our question would be lost. Short of identifying being with the most general kind of particular being—with space, time, mind, or matter—or of falling into some kind of negative theology, is there anything we can say about being as it is in itself?

We can, of course, draw certain general conclusions about its nature. Since everything which is has its ground in being, being must be a unity. Furthermore, as the ground of all particular beings, being is valuable. It is a terminal value and the highest of terminal values, since we cannot go beyond it except to nothing. In addition, a cause or ground of its existence is inconceivable, since that cause or ground would first have to be. Hence being is self-caused and opposed to the contingent totality of particular beings as the necessary. Finally, if being is necessary, the content of metaphysical experience cannot be the product of my subjective imagination; it must be "objective" insofar as it has its source in being. But such a description of the nature of being is as abstract and devoid of concrete significance as the term "being" itself. I should suggest that this is because we cannot divorce the content of metaphysical experience from an understanding of how this experience takes place. Let us ask, then, "What occurs when I question being?"

Each time that I question being I am, in a sense, swallowed up by my question. If being is the ground of all particular beings, it is the ground of my own being as well. Hence in dealing with being I am never confronted by a problem to be solved, by a set

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<sup>1</sup> *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen, 1953), pp. 21-22.

of data whose successful manipulation and control promises to bring forth a solution; for I cannot stand apart from the data of my "problem" and view them independently of my involvement in the problem. In questioning being I already presuppose it. Thus I am involved in what appears to be an endless regression. Yet in recognizing it as endless, I transcend it in a certain way. As Gabriel Marcel points out, "I see that this process takes place within an affirmation of being—an affirmation which I *am* rather than an affirmation which I *utter*: by uttering it I break it, I divide it, I am on the point of betraying it. . . . It might be said, by way of an approximation, that my inquiry into being presupposes an affirmation in regard to which I am, in a sense, passive, and of which I am the stage rather than the subject. But this is only at the extreme limit of thought, a limit which I cannot reach without falling into a contradiction. I am therefore led to assume or recognise a form of participation which has the reality of a subject; this participation cannot be, by definition, an object of thought; it cannot serve as a solution—it appears beyond the realm of problems: it is *metaproblematical*."<sup>2</sup>

How, then, are we to understand the *metaproblematical*? Does it involve the total suppression of the individual, and can we call such an experience "objective" when it appears to transcend the opposition between subject and object? The terms "subjective" and "objective" are commonly applied to different attitudes which we may take toward particular objects or events. Let us call these attitudes the "pragmatic" and the "scientific." In the pragmatic attitude, objects are experienced as useful or useless for the pursuits of an individual or a group. Hence the object is seen through the veil of subjective need, and only those properties which interest the subject appear to have any significance. In contrast, the scientific attitude aims at total objectivity, for it seeks to grasp the object as it is in itself. Hence it requires the elimination of all subjective influence insofar as this is possible. Objectivity is attained when we have isolated those properties without which the object could not be what it is. We need go no

<sup>2</sup> *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Manya Harari (London, 1954), p. 8.

further than Descartes' *Meditations* to see this ideal in operation. The triangle, he points out, has an objective nature which exerts certain demands upon our thought. It demands that we conceive of its three angles as equal to two right angles; of its greatest angle as subtending the longest side; and so on.<sup>3</sup> To be sure, I am free to conceive or not to conceive the triangle. But if I choose the former alternative, I do so under conditions which are imposed upon me by the nature of the triangle itself. An "objective" experience, then, is one in which the object imposes its nature upon the subject.

Metaphysical experience is distinguished from pragmatic and scientific experience by the fact that it is not an experience of a particular being. Yet it also shares certain characteristics of these experiences. It shares the objectivity of scientific experience, but, since we can no longer speak of subject and object, let us speak instead of the total *content* of the experience. In an experience of being that content is imposed upon me; it dominates me and I am unable to alter it at will. But metaphysical experience also resembles pragmatic experience, for it is personal. In a sense, of course, it involves a depersonalization, for we never experience the metaproblematical when we are confronted with problems to be solved, when we are engaged in any sort of practical activity. Hence it is only when I am detached from the practical aspects of my self that the possibility of experiencing being becomes real. Yet since an experience of being is an experience of my own being as well, it also touches what is most real in me. Without the content of the metaproblematical, what I call my *personality*—those aspects of myself which have been shaped by and further shape my life in the world—would be fragmented and incoherent. Thus it is the case that my own being is the best entrée into being itself. But it is equally clear that this is not the being of a subject. Such an interpretation would result in the most radical kind of egoism; it would cut me off from that very being which I seek to disclose. The self in question is not the ego. It cannot be located, for in the metaproblematical we have transcended the oppositions of subject

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<sup>3</sup> "Meditation V," *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Haldane and Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), I, p. 180.

and object, inner and outer, here and there. My own being is a privileged access to being because I *am* that being. To assert this priority is to recognize that metaphysical experience does not have its source from within or without. It invades me from within and without as a sieve might be immersed in water from above and below, breaking down all distinctions of place. That this is not wishful thinking, idle chatter, or bad poetry will be borne out, I hope, when we examine the concrete manifestations of this experience.

2. If metaphysical experience is an excursion into the meta-problematical, we must adjust our usual manner of interpreting propositions about being. In the first place, we should note that all propositions are hortatory; they all require that we understand them in their proper context. Yet we are seldom made aware of their exhortations because we are generally familiar with the contexts in which most propositions take on their significance. The metaproblematical, however, is a context which we rarely take seriously, so dominated are we by the pragmatic and scientific attitudes. Hence propositions about being are obviously hortatory, for they require us to direct our attention to a context which we often ignore.

One consequence of our adjustment to the context of the metaproblematical is that we can no longer identify the necessity of propositions about being, or of being itself, with any necessity we might ascribe to propositions of a different order. Hence ontological necessity, the necessity of being, cannot be identified with logical necessity for several reasons. Given any concept as a premise, everything which we cannot deny that concept without falling into a contradiction is said to follow with logical necessity from that concept. But this necessity is always *conditional*, for it never justifies the necessity of its premises. All logical proof starts from premises which are based upon evidence which is external to the proof. Thus logic presupposes evidence, assuming of course that it is to be of any importance. But what shall we admit as evidence? Certainly all evidence is found in experience. Yet in dealing with being we are concerned with necessary truths and not probable ones. Hence, if logic is to serve as an instrument of metaphysical inquiry, it will have to presuppose certain necessary

premises; and these premises will not be derived from logic, but will precede it and be grounded in experience. Metaphysics is the search for just such premises. It is not deduction, but rather the attempt to disclose the fundamental evidence as to the nature of being. The necessity which it seeks is not a necessity imposed by thought; it is a necessity imposed by being itself. Hence metaphysical propositions are either self-evident or they are not metaphysical, and the evidence they seek to report is the basic presupposition upon which all understanding rests. In addition, logic is the logic of discursive thought, and discursive thought is only one kind of thought. It is just as much a particular being as a chair or a horse. Thus to equate logical necessity with ontological necessity is to confuse one particular kind of being with being itself. Furthermore, if we were to identify these two necessities, we would still have the problem of choosing among the various logics. Whose logic is ontological? Is it Aristotle's, Hegel's, Mill's, Whitehead-Russell's, or Carnap's? Clearly the choice would have to be made on ontological grounds, on grounds external to each of these logics themselves. Finally, metaphysical inquiry is essentially circular. It is *alogical* because discursive reason is dependent upon a participation in being for which it can never account, since it continually presupposes it. It is in the recognition of the alogical character of the metaproblematical that we realize that this circular process takes place within an affirmation of being which forces itself upon us. Ontological necessity makes itself felt in the unfolding of any metaphysical question.

But we must beware of certain dangers inherent in any discussion of being. These are the dangers of language itself and of our natural inclination to objectify the non-objectifiable. The nature of language forces us back into the dichotomy of subject and object, for it names me as the writer, and being as the object about which I am writing. Thus we must keep the two-fold nature of metaphysical propositions constantly in mind. From within metaphysical experience they are metaphorical, evoking what lies beyond words yet which is given in concrete experience. From without metaphysical experience they are hortatory; they urge the individual to turn back upon himself and his participation in being. Only on the basis of such a reflection can these proposi-

tions become significant. In the end all propositions about being find their justification in the experience of the individual, for self-evident truths have no other court to which they can appeal.

By way of illustration let us examine one "classical" inquiry into the nature and existence of being. The ontological argument parallels rather closely the lines of our discussion. We should note first that the argument rests upon a distinction between being and particular beings. Thus Spinoza's formulation of the argument, which for my taste is the clearest, begins with a distinction between mode—"that which is in another thing through which it is also conceived"—and substance—"that which is in itself and is conceived through itself."<sup>4</sup> The distinction is at first merely a distinction of thought. It answers the question "what kinds of reality are conceivable?" And the argument attempts to show that the actual reality of substance emerges with its conception.

The next step consists in establishing the objectivity of substance by establishing the objectivity of essences in general. In this connection we should recall Spinoza's distinction between *idea* and *ideatum*. In thinking about the circle we must distinguish the act of thought from the circle itself. The act of thought, the *idea*, is the *idea of* the circle, but it is neither circular nor spatial. The circle has its own kind of reality which is independent of the psychological act which thinks it and which imposes certain conditions upon our thought. Yet while the object of thought is independent of the psychological act which thinks it, it may or may not be dependent upon other essences. The circle is essentially dependent upon the essences line and plane. Substance, however, as that which is in itself and conceived through itself, is essentially independent of any other essence.

These considerations also affect the actual existence of the essences in question, for the order of existential dependence follows the order of essential dependence. Since the essential circle is essentially dependent upon an essential line and plane, the existing circle will be existentially dependent upon an existing line and plane. In the case of substance, however, there can be no question

<sup>4</sup> *Ethics*, ed. James Gutman (New York: Hafner, 1955), p. 41. See also William Earle, "The Ontological Argument in Spinoza," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XI, 549-554.

of existential dependence, since there is nothing on which it can depend. Hence substance necessarily exists. The objection which immediately comes to mind is, of course, that while nothing may hinder substance from existing, merely thinking about it cannot bring it into being. But the objection misconceives the argument, since Spinoza would hold that thought does not affect its object at all. The most thought can do is elucidate the nature of its object. Hence we must be clear what Spinoza means when he applies existence to substance. The existence of substance, he tells us, is eternal. Only a being which endures in time can pass in or out of existence, and duration in time is characteristic of the existence enjoyed by contingent beings. Substance, as absolutely independent, cannot begin nor cease to exist.

Thus formulated the argument agrees in part with what we have been saying about metaphysical experience. But is it also correct to say that the ontological argument is hortatory, self-evident, and not a demonstration? There are two ways of reading the argument. If we fail to heed its exhortation, we treat it as a logical demonstration and it is reduced to a *mere* tautology. As a mere tautology the argument is logically necessary, provided of course that we grant its initial premise. But its initial premise is not necessary, since, logically speaking, the existence and non-existence of being are equally possible. If, on the other hand, we enter into the experience which the argument elucidates, the adjective "mere" must be dropped. It is true that the argument is a tautology, and it is also true that it assumes at the outset what it is trying to prove. What becomes clear in thinking through the argument is that this assumption itself is necessary, for it is the context in which all thought and activity are first able to take place.

Nor are we reasoning about a determinate object. Spinoza does argue that we can know two attributes of substance, thought and extension. But this positive determination is the consequence of an ontological interpretation of being in the light of certain scientific theories of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, Spinoza characterizes substance as absolutely infinite. Attributes, which are infinite in their own kind, can be characterized negatively as well as positively; but nothing can be denied of sub-

stance and, short of some sort of ontological interpretation, nothing determinate can be said about it either. Hence the argument is not a demonstration, for nothing determinate is given from which anything can follow. Existence does not follow from essence; it is essence. The argument is an elucidation rather than a demonstration. It permits the necessary existence of being to emerge with the experience provoked by thinking through the argument. Hence the existence of substance does not appear as a conclusion. It appears, as Kierkegaard points out, by means of a leap. "And how does God's existence emerge from the proof? Does it follow straightaway, without any breach of continuity? Or have we not here an analogy to the behaviour of these toys, the little Cartesian dolls? As soon as I let go of the doll it stands on its head. As soon as I let it go—I must therefore let it go. So also with the proof for God's existence. As long as I keep my hold on the proof, i.e., continue to demonstrate, the existence does not come out, if for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving it; but when I let the proof go, the existence is there."<sup>5</sup> So long as I consider the argument to be a logical demonstration, its necessity remains conditional. If I relinquish the demand for a logical demonstration, I enter the metaproblematical, and the necessity of being comes over me in the realization that being has been with me all along as the source of my own thought and activity. Marcel has said that this break-down of subject and object occurs only at the extreme limit of thought and of course Spinoza agrees; for the Spinozistic hat-trick is to see oneself under the aspect of eternity—to realize that the being which is God is also my own being, without being wholly swallowed up in the realization.

3. Our project of thought is now at an end. Yet the question remains whether there actually are any concrete manifestations of metaphysical experience. I shall maintain that we experience being in certain moods. But can a metaphysic based upon mood be talking about the same thing as a rationalist like Spinoza? The essence of rationalism is the subjection of mood, passion, and desire to reason. Yet Plato, Spinoza, and Kierkegaard, among

<sup>5</sup> *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. David Swenson, 6th ed. (Princeton, 1957), pp. 33-34.

others, have insisted upon the passionate character of reason itself. The difficulty does not lie in the superficial dichotomy between reason and passion, but in the distinction between subjective and objective; for the passions are held to be properties of the subject which drive him deeper and deeper into himself, except for reason which, as the passionate desire for truth, is always directed toward its object. Hence we must show that there are moods which are objective in the sense in which we said metaphysical experience is objective. We must distinguish first of all between those moods which are aroused by a particular object and which I am aware of having, and those moods with which I am one *whether I am aware of it or not*. An objective mood would be one over which I could have no control. It would invade my being and render me helpless. To recall Marcel's phrase, I would be the *stage* rather than the subject of such a mood.

What, then, is the relation between reason and mood? If "reason" refers to any objective experience, these moods would be rational. If, on the other hand, "reason" means discursive reason, they must be distinguished from reason as those predispositions which determine the fundamental attitudes which we take toward the world. They give shape to the context in which discursive reason first functions, for reason alone cannot account for the radically different results of its inquiries into the nature of being. If these moods are objective, they cannot be the products of the subjective imagination; and if they are metaphysical, they cannot be attitudes which we take toward particular beings. Hence their nature must be determined by the nature of being itself. They are nothing more than the various ways in which certain aspects of being are disclosed to us.

There seem to me to be at least three such moods, and the first of these has been dealt with extensively in contemporary thought. Dread, of course, must be distinguished from fear. I fear an object which approaches and threatens me, and my fear arises from the uncertainty as to whether it will strike or pass me by. Hence fear arises on the level of the problematical, for it involves a relation between my self as subject and a threatening object. Like any experience on the level of the problematical, fear can be controlled—at least in principle. If I can eliminate the

threatening object, or if I can get out of its path, I can eliminate my fear. Dread, however, has no object; no matter where I look I cannot locate its source or cause. Nor is the practical aspect of my self threatened in dread, for an experience of dread takes place outside of the context in which any exchange between my subject and other particular beings can be effected. For this reason I cannot control dread nor can I escape from it. It invades me from no particular place, and wherever I run I draw it along with me. To experience dread is to experience the metaproblematical.

As long as we are actively engaged in carrying out a particular project, we never experience dread. And when we are seized with dread, our interest in particular things is dispersed. The whole totality of particular beings recedes; things become mere things, giving off at most a comic appearance. My plans, my desires, the objects which surround me are all revealed as intrinsically absurd. And as particulars slide away from my attention, I am left with nothing. The object of dread, as Heidegger insists, is precisely nothing. But dread is also an experience of being, for being is no particular thing.

This experience has all the marks of an experience of being. It is an experience of unity, for the absurdity which we experience extends to everything we can name or imagine. It is objective and necessary in the sense in which we have applied these terms to metaphysical experience, for it forces itself upon me and I play no active role within it. Dread, then, is an experience of what the world would be like without being. The individual possessed by dread has lost his sense of reality. The world and his life in the world appear empty and devoid of continuity and coherence. Life is understood as a mere succession of moments which arrive and pass away without the historical continuity of the person. But this does not mean that in dread we are explicitly aware of the emptiness of our lives. As Heidegger points out, when we experience dread and ask ourselves what is the matter we can only answer "Oh, it is nothing." And an experience of no particular thing cannot fail to appear insignificant to an individual who is continually involved with things.\*

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\* *Was ist Metaphysik?*, 7th ed. (Frankfurt A. M., 1955), p. 24.

Finally, dread operates as one basic predisposition in the history of human thought, for it is the source of nihilism. As Nietzsche clearly understood, discursive reason alone can never legislate the fundamental decision between an affirmation and a denial of life. Yet nihilism is not to be ignored. Its basis is a fundamental experience of being—negative as that experience may be. That aspect of being which is brought to light in dread is its difference from particular beings. We touch this difference when we become aware of the radical contingency of the totality of particular beings.

Boredom is a second concrete manifestation of metaphysical experience. Here we must distinguish again between two similar experiences. When I say that I am bored, I usually mean that it is some particular object or activity which bores me. In this case boredom is not based upon a negative attitude toward life but upon a positive one. It is like the restlessness of the child who is led from one activity to another in a chain of continual discoveries. Boredom in this first sense remains within the problematical, for it is always a reaction of a subject to a particular object or event. Hence boredom is theoretically capable of being controlled. I can eliminate my boredom either by removing the boring object from my presence or by turning away from it to something which interests me.

There is a second kind of boredom which we do not ordinarily distinguish from being bored *with* something. Here boredom has no particular source—although the opposite may appear to be the case—and there is no hope of alleviating the mood. I may even express a desire for change—"Oh, if I could only travel to Italy this year, I would be refreshed!"—but in my heart I know there is no escape. Wherever I run I will drag this mood along with me. The distinction becomes clear when we contrast the expression "bored with" and the *ennui* of Baudelaire which forces his soul to demand that he transport it "anywhere out of the world."<sup>7</sup> In metaphysical boredom I am goaded on to seek relief in ceaseless activity until the emptiness of all these diversions comes over me.

<sup>7</sup> *Œuvres complètes de Baudelaire* (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1951), pp. 347-348.

I am bored! Bored with the world and its illusory diversions and, most of all, bored with myself. Each dimension of my personality appears to me as one more role that I may choose to play. The grey cloud of *ennui* settles over me and I experience the vanity of this world and of everything in it. This experience is objective and necessary because it controls me. It is an experience of unity since boredom taints the whole world and everything in it.

Like dread, boredom is an experience of the radical contingency of the world considered in itself and apart from being. But unlike dread it is more akin to indifference than to fear. It contains a concealed affirmation of something of value—of my own self in the face of things and events to which I am indifferent. Hence boredom touches only one aspect of my self. I who am bored, who am I really and what am I behind and beyond all these masks? These questions push the individual deeper into himself. Boredom bears within itself the stubborn hope of finding something of value, something which lies beyond words and images, yet which is at the same time what is most real in me. Boredom forces the individual back into his own being, which is an access to being itself. As a retreat into the self, *ennui* is the fundamental predisposition toward life which finds its philosophical expression in Stoicism.

For a positive encounter with being we must turn to a third mood which underlies Nietzsche's celebration of life and the great metaphysical systems of the Greeks, the Scholastics, Spinoza, and Hegel. It is in joy that we experience the wonder that there is a world and that we are alive in it. Yet if joy is an experience of being, it must be distinguished from similar moods which have their source in particular objects or events. Hence we must not confuse joy with the pleasure or satisfaction which accompanies the acquisition of a desired object or the successful completion of a project, for here the mood can be controlled by manipulating the objects or events in question. We must also distinguish joy from the happiness afforded us by human love and friendship. In a sense, love and friendship are analogues of metaphysical experience, for I can never stand outside my participation in these experiences in order to analyze them. To ask *why* I love, is to suspend my love in favor of an objective evaluation of my lover's

character. Yet since it is possible for me to treat a friend or a lover as an object, love and friendship can be controlled—at least in principle. Metaphysical experience, however, can never be controlled, for being can never be objectified. We may confuse some other kind of experience with metaphysical experience, but we can never distort an experience of being as we can distort love and friendship.

How, then, do we experience joy, and what is the content of this experience? Joy is present in our lives as an inexplicable feeling of well-being. In joy everything we encounter takes on new significance and beauty. The drab city street becomes "picturesque," the glaring sun "radiant," and the depressing rain takes on a "refreshing" quality. Hence joy is more difficult to isolate than either dread or boredom, for, instead of turning us away from the world, it makes our experience of the world and everything in it more meaningful. Thus it is only upon reflection that we become aware that this feeling of well-being has no specific origin. Is it my improved health, the weather, a recent professional success, or a successful love affair that makes me feel so well? I have experienced all these things before, separately and together, and yet, at one time or another, they have all seemed so commonplace. The fact that no particular thing or event is the source of joy becomes evident when we attempt to control this mood. No matter where we direct our attention we cannot produce the mood at will. Like boredom and dread, it siezes us and lets us go.

What, then, is it that dissolves boredom and dread, that replaces the feeling of the commonplace by wonder at the extraordinary fact that the world is? It is a positive experience of the unity of being. In dread this unity is experienced negatively as the contingency of all particular beings. In boredom we experience unity as contingency, but we are thrown back upon that deeper aspect of ourselves which promises some hope of discovering a source of stability and meaning in life. It is in joy, however, that the individual and the world regain the meaning lost in dread and boredom. The world is no longer a bad dream and the self is no longer a futile passion. The world and the self *are* over and against the possibility of their not being. The unity of

being is the context within which our experience of the world takes on coherence and meaning. But, apart from this vague feeling of well-being which I have called joy, that unity is never experienced directly, for being is never a determinate object. We encounter the unity of being as it manifests itself in those basic assumptions which underlie any positive attitude toward life.

There have been many philosophical expressions of the unity of being, and I shall mention only three. The first is the doctrine of substance which underlies and gives meaning to the world in the face of change. The second is the principle of causality which gives meaning and coherence to the changing itself. And the third is the principle of identity which is a fundamental assumption of conceptual knowledge. Yet these philosophical doctrines are really nothing more than ramifications of a basic assumption of unity which makes its appearance on the most unsophisticated levels of experience. As Spinoza points out, particular beings can never be understood in and through themselves. If we are to understand them at all, we must understand them through one another. Hence it is not surprising that one of the most effective techniques of ridicule is to describe things out of the context in which they become significant; for apart from its place in a coherent scheme of things, no particular being has any *raison d'être*. This context cannot be arbitrary—it cannot have the unity of a mere aggregate. Unless its unity is real and organic, the world and our life in the world is reduced to an idiot's tale. From the point of view of the individual, the unity of being makes itself felt in the assumption that I am an historical being; that I have my roots in the past and my projects in the future. Seen in this way, my being is not empty but full, for it is linked with the whole of the world through the historical unity of the person. The unity of being, then, finds its most general expression in our conception of a "world."

Finally, we should note that these assumptions are not mere hypotheses from which certain conclusions follow and which may or may not coincide with actual fact. On the contrary, they are the bases of all hypotheses and of all affirmative judgments. It is only in the absence of a positive experience of being that we can treat these assumptions as "mere" hypotheses. But if we examine

them closely, we see that they are fundamental. To reflect upon these fundamental assumptions, to think through them and seek to disclose their ground, is to think metaphysically; and in such thought the necessity of being imposes itself upon us. Joy, then, is an experience of the full as dread is an experience of the empty. It is the fundamental predisposition which underlies any affirmation of life, and it finds its expression not only in the great metaphysical systems, but also in Hume's doctrine of belief, in Santayana's "animal faith," and in the conviction that man and the world will endure.

4. It may be objected by partisans of metaphysics that we have said too little, or even that we have left nothing for the metaphysician to do. These objections are not entirely without warrant, nor are they entirely well-founded, for there remains the task of ontological interpretation. Such interpretation is not a mere appendage to metaphysical inquiry, for without it we can never give any concrete significance to the unity of being. Ontological interpretation is an elucidation of the structure of the world in the light of the unity of being. Since this unity is experienced differently in different moods, we can expect ontologies to differ. Yet ontologies will differ for an even more obvious reason, for, in the end, they can be no more than penetrating studies in philosophical autobiography. The individual may set out to give concrete significance and content to the unity of being as it manifests itself in the world, but the world whose structure he attempts to delineate is essentially his own. It is the world as experienced by one individual in one particular culture at one period of history. Hence it is only a single slice of the whole of human experience which we call the "world."

Yet this is no reason to ignore ontology. In elucidating his world, the individual may perform a three-fold task for us. First, he may introduce us to the nature of metaphysical experience. He may arouse wonder in us. Secondly, depending upon the degree of social-historical proximity between himself and his audience, his interpretation may elucidate certain aspects of our world. Finally, his interpretation may give us some insight into the diversity of being as it manifests itself in particular beings and particular worlds. But ontological interpretation is also fraught

with dangers, for the more we articulate, the more we cover up the basic experience of being itself. Unless we are careful to keep in mind the fundamental nature of metaphysical experience, we may lose our way in confusing the limited scope of ontology with the necessity of being.

Finally, the objection persists: "After one has experienced being there is really no place to go and nothing more to do. There remains only the relatively unimportant job of interpretation. But how can this compare in importance with the fundamental experience itself?" How indeed, and why should it? Where should we want to "go" using metaphysical experience as a point of departure? Apart from the valuable insights of ontology, metaphysics has done enough if it introduces us to an experience of being and remains at that point which was never the beginning of a quest, but always its end; for being, of course, is an end in itself.

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## METAPHYSICAL TRUTH AND THE DIVERSITY OF SYSTEMS

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**W**E FEEL DISMAY when a new treatise on metaphysics appears, for we sense that if it convinces ever so little it will bring some havoc to a dozen others. Our discomfort seems well-founded, for so much is at stake. But is not this worry in excess of the facts? Are we justified in believing the work of a new philosopher to constitute a new system, not simply more of a creed outworn, its language refurbished? And must we hold that the new set of doctrines, seemingly opposed to any old ones, in fact cancels them? This essay will confront the question whether the materials of which philosophy is made, and the methods by which it is made, permit more than one true system; and, if they do, whether these systems are of equal rank.

1. To begin with, if metaphysics is a science at all, it must be so in a sense quite different from that in which we understand the remaining sciences, empirical and mathematical, to be what they are. The metaphysician is indeed a man rich in observations, a man who wears a knowing smile about the world's sad intricacies. Yet he seeks not so much to show facts or even to demonstrate to us that their causes are necessarily such and such, as he seeks to illuminate the facts at a further remove by disentangling the many senses in which facts and their causes—and the relations between them—can be said to exist in the first place. To the very limits of human reason and inquiry, metaphysics is an account, patterned roughly with the sciences, of the conditions of being and the kinds of beings.

Philosophical propositions in their most restricted sense are intended to affirm truly. One may commence by selecting and even betting on false hypotheses, but after relabeling them or proving them false, one eventually assigns the right truth-values to them, placing them, or their contradictories, among the positive contributions to exact thought, or dismissing them to the dialectical

sidelines. And because one intends to find the truth, any distinctions, any contradictions between which one cannot choose, must be dropped from the system. (One cannot hold a yes-and-no attitude in metaphysics forever, if only for the reason that ultimately there must be a commitment decisively to adopt the yes-and-no procedure.) So a metaphysics is primarily the affirmative parts of the arguments put forward—those portions affirming reality in some direct way, classifying kinds of beings, stating the grounds of our knowing when we do know; the preliminary, protreptic, and refutative materials which do none of these are incidental. To make a photograph, much destruction must be wrought on the negative, much cropping, blocking, spotting; the positive print shows the little, perfected remainder.<sup>1</sup>

Any plurality of philosophical systems, then, should be estimated in terms of their affirmative, categorical parts, not the hypotheses they debate and maybe discard. A negative proposition has force in any deductive scheme; but because it leaves all relevant features of the universe vague and indefinite, it lacks power as a statement of what is. At bottom, I suppose, there is no clear disagreement between two negative propositions; the question of diversity of systems would go unanswered as long as we could reckon with statements of this sort only. This, however, is all the docking we can do when comparing systems—all else must count. Metaphysics, at least, aims at completeness, even if what is presently written by a man is merely representative of what he might have written, granted longer time. Each theory may have its own criterion of completeness, to be sure, and there is no standard list of metaphysical topics; but for this very reason it is wrong to omit any sections of a positive doctrine when we compare the work of two men.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is evident that I am here opposing Hegel, who says: "The life of God and divine intelligence, then, can, if we like, be spoken of as love disporting with itself; but this idea falls into edification, and even sinks into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative." Preface to *The Phenomenology of Mind* (Baillie translation), p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> It should be obvious that I take metaphysics as being what various men (Aristotle, Leibniz, or Whitehead) have actually written—or lectured—on the subject, rather than an ideal, never-uttered set of doctrines toward

2. We pass on to the place that metaphysical theorists occupy in a system, after which we can examine the nature of their truth and putative diversity. Awkward phrasing results, but we should avoid coupling the word "system" with "metaphysics," reserving the first word for the collection of a number of sciences (all of them philosophically conceived and worked out), so related that whatever propositions serve as the principles of one science may be taken as subordinate truths in another, albeit they are still necessary truths.<sup>3</sup> The exception to this is that the principles of logic and metaphysics, if they enter the system, as they unquestionably do, shall not appear as deductive conclusions in any other sciences in that system; these principles serve as deductive premises, while other principles serve in both deductive and inductive arguments. (Whether logical or metaphysical principles can be inductively established within their own sciences is hard to say; surely there can be no strict proof of them in others, yet if observations and reasonings in these others, such as physics and biology, are not the leading psychological stimuli for discovering metaphysical principles, then what is?)

A true proposition may be primary in one science, though not in all the companion sciences in the system. No single deductive line of argument can run through more than one science at a time; thus there can be no single true proposition, the establishment of which will necessarily lead to all others. You may object that I fall into paradox here: that I take what has just been said

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which these men ought to have striven. Metaphysics, like the arts and other sciences, is what men have made it; and however much they may fall into error or leave their work raw and incomplete, it is false that the songs unsung are ever the fairest.

<sup>3</sup> G. K. Plochmann, "A Theory of Systems: A Rough Sketch," in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (September 1959), pp. 46-47. In that essay I have adopted a view which seems quite opposed to the reductive theories of those positivists who look forward to a unity of science—as the writings of Reichenbach, Carnap, and so many others express that hope, and also the theory of Kant, who says: "By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason—of the form of a whole—in so far as the concept determines *a priori* not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another." *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kemp Smith translation), A832=B860.

as a true proposition, holding for all sciences. Yes indeed. But from this one the rest of the propositions of science are not generable; from a description of a science one cannot get to falling bodies, numbers, or toads.

Here we note that "metaphysical principles" is vague and equivocal. Should we not distinguish, at least functionally, between principles of metaphysics, those enabling us to discourse metaphysically in the first place; and principles *in* metaphysics, those which that science subsequently talks about and eventually clarifies but which are most used, and properly so, in the other sciences? Occasional principles such as the law of contradiction which fall under both heads do not blur this distinction. A principle of metaphysics (such as a definition of that science, or of science in general) leads to other propositions in metaphysics itself, and these in turn can serve as principles of certain other sciences—logic, chiefly, and physics. A principle *in* metaphysics (such as the priority of the whole over its parts) can take its place in physics, say, and be useful in discovering or proving statements there. In accordance with the peculiarity of systems, though, let us add that when such a principle is also used in the arts, it will hardly mean the same there, and although it will be true still, it will be so by virtue of extension or contraction of its terms.

3. What, then, is truth itself? This can best be answered, I think, if we take truth as belonging to propositions, not terms, still recognizing that propositions contain subjects and predicates, or relate the relata which are terms. Most narrowly, a scientific, hence a metaphysical, proposition must contain two univocal terms, giving the proposition clearness—you can know what it is about, and you know too that it should be about that thing, because what is designated by the subject term is set apart from all other things, by its own nature, and what is designated by the predicate is similarly distinct but can be conjoined to the subject. So the proposition in this sense is true regardless of suspension of the judgment needed to interpret it—though factual "verification" may be needed to convince this or that interpreter of its truth.\*

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\* I shall not address the seeming paradox that although a proposition is a set of symbols to be grasped by the mind, we still have as yet to judge it to be true or false. Can we suspend judgment, knowing the proposition?

The truth of this proposition arises out of the combined meanings of the terms used, so it cannot be true unless the terms are related as they are, one the subject, the other the predicate, not the reverse; but this disposition hinges in turn upon the kinds of things (and their properties and relations) which they designate. The proposition is by no means a picture of the world or its parts, except in a few quite coincidental cases, as where the object X is to the left of Y and the terms naming these in a written language are disposed in the same spatial relation. The proposition is true, not by a point-for-point correspondence with some thing, but rather because what its predicate designates attaches—or is detached by a negation—with the degree of certainty indicated within the proposition, to what is designated by the subject term.<sup>8</sup> This meaning is not a matter of projection, picturing, or mirroring, but of creating a concept (which is probably accompanied by some image, though this is inessential) in the mind, the concept to be understood as such by its juxtapositions with other concepts rather than through the pictures which may be found with it. When these juxtapositions (i.e. predications) are proper, the concept is univocal; it designates no more nor less than the nature of things requires—it is neither too narrow nor too broad. Doubtless one cannot frame a proposition having one term univocal, the other not; indistinctness, impropriety of either term will straightway render the other so.

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I say offhand that we can, in the broad sense of "knowing"; the reason being that the primary grasp of it is not of its truth at all, but of its sense; that is, the individual meanings of the constituent terms, and the way one is predicated of or related to the other. Only after this does the mind move to the choice between judging it true or false. There may, at this rate, even be a provisional grasp of an absolutely necessary, self-evident proposition. If the terms of some proposition are as yet equivocal, we must forever suspend judgment (assuming we wish to avoid traps), and wait for additional propositions which will distinguish alternative cases and satisfactorily refine the original terms. The first equivocal proposition will not then become true, nor can it be used to prove true statements, but at least it will have been useful dialectically in the search for truth.

<sup>8</sup> Certain propositions of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, such as 2.161 and 3.21, make it seem as if Wittgenstein held a view diametrically opposed to mine. But a simple picture theory should not properly be imputed to him; for if it were, we would not hear of his hesitations in matching picture to pictured, as in 3.322.

The proposition is what is true. Truth and validity differ from each other, because an argument relates at least three terms, not two; it follows that a valid argument is by no means necessarily true, however often such arguments may start or finish with true propositions. Again, a science may be described as true only in a derived sense, as when we call it a collection of true propositions—a rather unsatisfactory description. And if a science cannot be called true, how much less can we term a system, which includes many sciences, true? Truth, then, hitches primarily to propositions—to principles and conclusions.

4. A system, then, is not true. But can truth itself possibly be a system?<sup>6</sup> If it were, it would contain parts, and these would be either true or false. True truth is as repugnant as the notion of false truth.

Again, if a system consisted of true parts (the propositions), yet truth were itself a system subject to expansion and diminution, this would imply two systems set beside each other, the philosophic containing propositions and the one known as truth, the truth which is a whole—a silly duplication. We may indeed say that truths form a system, but this is elliptical for asserting that it is formed by true propositions. Macbeth and his two truths told as prologues was a bad philosopher, doubtless given to reading too many British idealists.

Finally, if truth were a system, in anything like my sense of "system," then every truth would be of unequal weight. Different propositions in a system are of vastly different degrees of necessity and evidence, with many sources. But if you could also have weights of truths as well as weights of the propositions that are true, then the adjustment between these sets would either be perfect, in which case again you would have duplication, or it would be imperfect, and further tinkering — perhaps with the help of some third system—would be needed.

Again, if truth itself were a system, if all truths were some-

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<sup>6</sup> I am here thinking of—and opposing—the later British idealists. Joachim says that logic as a system is "a single truth gradually emerging and expanding as a development, or growth, which in all its stages is self-adjusting, self-correcting, and self-fulfilling. . . ." *Logical Studies* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 8.

how indissolubly allied together so that they lost their edges and became a single whole, it would follow that there could be no real diversity in philosophic thought, except as men succumbed to error and abandoned philosophy.

We now look at philosophical conflicts. Were truth a system, I should expect all true propositions to be drawn into it with no more ado—it would be impossible to say anything true which was not both part of the system and also methodologically systematic. Indeed, it would be impossible to say anything intended to correct part of the system yet at the same time false.<sup>7</sup>

But this seems wrong. We can contradict portions of a system without our statements thereby becoming parts of it, because the tightest criticism of the system requires that we adopt univocally its leading terms and then deny the propositions (and prove these denials!) in which they appear, or else—and this is frequently easier—show that the terms as originally introduced were equivocal. Indeed, criticism of these two sorts is our only way of ascertaining that we shall *not* be absorbed into the original system. Unless we counter its propositions clearly, there is danger of being slipped into one of its crevices or of being tacked onto the end.

If a proposition is literal and true, a second one having the same subject and predicate, but different qualitatively, is false in a certain way. There will be other propositions, a third and a fourth, perhaps, having the same subject and quality as the first, but possessing contrary predicates; and these latter propositions will be false in a manner different from the second one, and in degrees different from that and from each other. Even so, this need not imply degrees of truth. The literally true is always opposite to the false, yet we need no precise grades and hierarchies

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<sup>7</sup> What I have in mind here is the many illuminating—but I think somewhat mistaken—remarks of Paul Weiss, in his monument to metaphysical inquiry, *Modes of Being* (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958). Thus he says (p. 384): "All denials of a philosophic system in effect say that there is an experience outside the philosophic system. Thus far they are not in error. They become erroneous when they are made to contradict what the system says, for then they become part of the system and lose whatever power they had to make it possible for them to stand outside, and there oppose the system."

of both together. If truth were health, which is the same everywhere in type and definition, falsities would be various diseases, each unlike the other, all unlike health. Or if truth were the one thing which is equality, then falsity, like inequality, would have many degrees. Thus with a given subject and predicate, there is one true proposition and there are several false ones, all opposed to it in being false, some more, some less remote from the true. The truth of this true proposition—here we come to the crux—is independent of the value of other propositions brought against it, opposing it. Inferences from premises *within* the same system can make the truth more evident, but only *that kind* of inference. But comparisons with truth within the system also make the falsities more apparent. Opposition or agreement from outside may change the fortunes of an idea in intellectual history, but they do not alter its intrinsic adequacy. Hence a new proposition does not itself become true merely by being now included in a system to which it was earlier foreign. Again I say that it is the proposition which is true. If it lacks this value already, inclusion in no science, no system under heaven can confer truth upon it.

Since the more and the less do not belong to truth simply, then one and the same proposition cannot become more true no matter how much it is dialectically manipulated. It can become more *evident*; that is, the parts can be related inferentially to other propositions better known. But it cannot gain in its degree of *necessity*—in the formal relations between subject and predicate based upon the degrees of coincidence in what they signify. But subsequent discourse, referring back, may confer greater *clearness* upon the original; this clearness lies in the recognition of whether the terms are univocal. This has an indirect bearing upon the truth of the original proposition.

If, then, truth does not deepen, intensify, or expand (though propositions can be rephrased, their falsity made less damaging, or obliterated, it follows too that once a true proposition is settled upon, the discovery of further true ones will connect it inferentially or will help confirm it, but that is all. Inference brings out the truth, but does not make truth, does not alter truth-value. And confirmation is relative to this or that knowing mind.

Again, if truth does not expand we cannot say that a proposi-

tion, though true, is at the same time false, defective, solely because of some important deficiency of the whole system into which it fits. The true proposition is not true of any whole but of that of which it is stated.<sup>8</sup> Nor is it true of its proper object yet somehow false in a larger context. What we *ought* to mean in saying that the proposition is only true in the light of the whole, needs the whole, yet suffers because it is not that, is this: the properties of the thing described cannot all be univocally named in one subject and one predicate; the simplest subject can have a variety of predicates, none of them, the predicate "complex" included, using up all possibilities of description. Nor is it correct, of course, that of two contrary predicates both must be successively affirmed to give truth to the dialectical chain. It may be an error to make a certain predication, but this is not a defect of all predications. You say that a man is bad-tempered, and this needs not dialectical supplementing with its contrary or with some more inclusive term, but merely correction by saying instead that he is mercurial, or that he is distraught, or the like.

Error shows itself, principally, not in saying what is self-contradictory, but in saying what is clearly false; and here arguments, either one's own or those of one's opponents, are of use in making evident the falsity. If a predicate admits one of a pair of contraries, and if we pick the wrong one, then the proposition will represent the greatest mistake, for it is farthest from what should have been affirmed. If, instead, the true proposition is contradicted (and we retain the univocal terms of the true one), the error is less, for much more can still be true in this case than with a contrary. But if, in a third case, a proposition unclear to begin with is denied, then from the standpoint of what is clear—some third statement—both of these are of relative value, both figurative, hence in need of literal rendering. A proposition literally true—i.e., having univocal terms and true—may be called true simply, true without qualification. One having figurative expressions is true relative to the literal statements into which it can be rendered. Now there is not just one figurative meaning

<sup>8</sup> For a statement of the opinion here opposed, see F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic* (Oxford: At the University Press, 1922); especially the terminal essay appearing at the end of Vol. II.

to each term, hence just one proposition containing a given pair of figurative terms; rather there is a whole raft of them; another raft contains their negations. But could any astronomer tell you whether the moon is or is not the queen of night?

5. We have been talking about propositions in general. There is nothing really peculiar about the truth attaching to metaphysical ones, they are just as true or false as any others, yet they are hardly cut from the same cloth. Their distinctive mark is that their framers hold them as self-evident, justifying them not by examples or demonstrations but by describing their self-evidence. It is self-evidence of a rather special kind, not what we find in such trivial oddities as "All tables are tables," or even "A is A." It springs from the grasp of terms as such, not in their capacity as designs or events, rather in their function as concepts. As these concepts refer not to specific objects, nor yet to kinds of objects, we say that the propositions containing them are true because the kinds of being which they differentiate or unite are clearly exemplified, in the manner stated, in every object. Such propositions join terms which, because perfectly general and hence most independent of imaged associations of special experience, are most capable of being understood univocally. Because of this, a metaphysical proposition must be true when it joins univocal terms in a pair whose connection is dictated, not by the conjunction of traits in an object of experience, but because the traits would neither be nor be known were the conditions of their being and intelligibility otherwise. This holds, I believe, for principles both *of* and *in* metaphysics.

A metaphysical theory composed by one man could contain just such propositions, all of them presumably made evident by others. Whether *all* of his metaphysical propositions were done in this sense would be another matter. Certainly I discern no *a priori* reason why they should be. But even so, the amazing thing is that there could ever be the slightest hint of a plurality of these theories, assuming that the very first one aimed at (representative) completeness. Two partial expositions could of course fit end to end, but two opposed ones claiming to be complete would instantly collide. We cannot merely aver their difference and incommensurability; this latter could arise only if no propositions, ever,

employed univocal terms, hence talked about things in a fashion preventing us from knowing that they were not common. But the demand for univocation—legitimate enough because based upon the very character of all terms used in metaphysical discourse—induces us to believe that all unliteral statements have little more than protreptic and heuristic value. In serious metaphysical analysis we attempt to pick exactly the right terms—here, if anywhere, we avoid settling for the arbitrary. It follows that we try to oust every other proposition opposed to our principles and conclusions.

But this effort to declare a unique *science* of metaphysics, to which none can be opposed, is one extreme, the other being that all sciences of metaphysics are indistinguishably composed of propositions true after their own fashion. To both of these viewpoints I am opposed, and stand upon a middle ground. It appears to me unthinkable that sense in one system makes nonsense of all else, but it is always wrong to assume that choice between systems is merely personal, a question of convenience, sympathy, or taste. Instead I hold that a system whose principles were truly compounded of univocal terms would be adequate simply; and others, clearly shown to have different degrees of figurativeness, would not be false in the worst degree, but could be only relatively true at best. What makes this situation historically complicated, unfortunately, is that it cannot be assumed a priori that every system falls gently into one of these two classes.

6. Philosophic systems show a tantalizing mixture of the common and the peculiar; and in what is peculiar, of course, we meet the different, the diverse. We might distinguish between what is different from *some* other systems and what is different from *all* others; but this would be slim and accidental, based upon the luck that one system had features which as yet had no close counterparts in others.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, it is unreliable to draw up a list of common features of systems, for we could only hope that

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<sup>9</sup> In Stallknecht and Brumbaugh, *The Compass of Philosophy* (New York: Longmans Green, 1954), the view is upheld that there are four general types of systems, blends of which give rise to the philosophies that have appeared in the West. It is this sort of classification (which is, so to speak, a mixture of the a priori and the historical) that I am opposing here.

the very next system matched these. Either we must find what is common to all systems in their generic distinction as systems, not in some list of marks inductively discovered; or else we must somehow arbitrarily cut off this list so we are not forced to maintain its entries, in the face of numerous counter-instances, by constantly altering the meanings of our terms. Can a metaphysician be *certain* that nothing is known? Can a metaphysician say that nothing is comprehensive? As list-makers we trap ourselves.

We do have before us a definition of systems which suggests their common amplitude and complexity. All the rest is peculiar—including the methods and historical circumstances. Regarding the diversity of *doctrines*, let us remember how elusive is the decision whether a given theory in one man's system is identical with what seemingly corresponds in another. If the terms (not the words, of course) are really the same, then sameness and difference of doctrine can quickly be measured by reference to quality and quantity of the propositions. But *any* ambiguity as between formulations renders a decision hazardous, for one must trace multiple related terms to find whether equivalence is finally reached when their differences iron out contrasts in those originally compared. Comparison must be made in a series of insertions of relevant terms, any judgment of real identity being made at last when some univocal terms are uncovered, in respect to which the figurative ones can now be revised. This, of course, gives us identity between pairs of propositions, not systems.

In asserting that two philosophers say the same thing we obviously do not mean that their words come from the same place, at the same time, and with a single sound, as if "same" meant here same in number, one-and-the-same. Less obviously, "same" must be taken in more than the generic sense of the sameness of cats and dogs—they are both mammalian. Rather we mean that every object or thought mentioned by either philosopher receives or can receive the same definition, estimation of value. We mean that whatever inequivalences there are between the two are in words only, are not logical. It requires a nice philosophic judgment to decide just when differences between propositions make for differences in their respective systems. At first blush it would

appear that a system is so tight that any change in one proposition would of itself produce an indefinite number of changes in others, like a penny on edge whose slightest roll is transmitted to contiguous pennies down a row. But not every proposition is a principle, and not every method, by which we progress from one proposition to another, is the same as every other method.

Thus to make method the sole criterion of a system, to judge method independently of doctrine, and to assert that basically all philosophic method is the same, would be to reduce all diversities of doctrine to questions of inadvertency and mistake. Validly derived systems are not all alike because of their consistencies, or because of their like inconsistencies.

7. We have assumed many persons to have been at work on systems of philosophy—a homely assumption. If all the systems turned out to be the same, this would not change it. But if we are to show that there is not one system, but many—that is, if we are to show that there is at least one system and then unassimilable propositions outside this which themselves have systematic interconnections with each other—then the historians are right, we have had a diversity of systems on our hands all along.

The easy way to show this would be to take Thales, then demonstrate that Anaximander differed significantly from him, and then add more instances of the sort. There is a better way. Contradiction is not an epistemic matter; there is no proposition, however clear and necessary and true, that cannot be contradicted, not only in words but in meaning. Framing a proposition opposite to one that is thought or known to be true can be independent of our estimate of the second one. Had there existed but one philosopher in all history, and he correct in all he said, an entire system contradicting his thoughts could still be constructed, however slight its worth. The truth-value of clear and necessary propositions changes promptly from true to false, for by adding a mere negation the terms would not thereby become equivocal; in place of those that might have been false determinately, new truths would spring up; and where the original propositions were equivocal, the new ones would be equally unclear, epistemically, however their constitutive character had been altered through negation.

But it is one thing for me to deny in words what you have said, to reverse the truth-value of your declarations, and quite another to know the reversal to be true, when you have spoken falsely; and it is still another to be able truly to assert the contrary or contradictory of a proposition which you have yourself asserted truly and evidently.

I cannot, first of all, really construct a system merely by going through yours and commenting, "This is wrong," because by this nothing is affirmed of the real world. We would get not a system from this but an anti-system, a dialectical mish-mash, perhaps stimulating but never scientific.

Second, can I ever deny univocally and truly what you assert in the same way? If our two propositions differ perceptibly in meaning, so that at least one of them contains an equivocal term, then the answer is plain. But does this failure to contradict in such a case indicate really that two philosophers *never* hold the same terms, differing only in the quality and quantity of the leading propositions containing them? Put it another way: merely by denying your proposition, do I of necessity change the meanings of the terms in such fashion that I am not denying it univocally? I answer in this way: if univocal discourse were simply a matter of my arbitrarily deciding to use a word in a certain way, and of your then agreeing to let me have my head, there could be no real, epistemic contradiction; I would have to let you have *your* head about terms too. But if, on the other hand, and I believe this is the proper account, univocation is not an arbitrary agreement between us, but grows out of the comprehension of things and the *consequent* definitions of terms, then when I tell the truth in my system, using univocal terms, you deny my propositions on pain of being either dead wrong or of equivocating. You will have unwittingly adopted meanings for the same old words that cannot clearly designate the nature of things.

There are, of course, degrees of equivocation, like degrees of falsity; degrees of distance, to speak metaphysically, away from the meanings which terms should have if they are to be univocal. While one statement, and one only, is simply true, the others may be figurative by differing degrees. You and I both truly use the same subject and the same predicate, one affirming, the other

denying. But if one of us uses his terms univocally, and at the same time affirms when he should affirm, then the other man—let us suppose it is you, not I—cannot deny truly and still speak univocally, but can speak truly only in the sense that his terms reflect figurative relations. Thus the moon seems more like the queen of night than it is like the sluttish scullery-maid of night, and this not solely because of old poets and their conventions.

Assume there is thus more than one true system, each internally consistent (by whatever rules of logic you accept for both, it makes little difference), but offering divergent explanations of the world; then in order to show them both true, we should have to show that one part of each was necessarily true, and all other parts were entailed by it. But this of course denies one essential feature of system, which is that no matter how necessary and clear one principle in it may be, there will be other true, necessary principles not following from it, and not related to the same subject matter. The consistency of the system is not a flat and evenly-distributed deducibility, but is in a way episodic—it holds within sciences, no doubt, but not always from science to science. What binds the participant sciences together and makes the system what it is and no mere aggregate, is the dialectical adjustment which can take place between interpretations of principles as they crop up in the sciences. A task of metaphysics is to supply such principles as are needed for this adjustment.

8. To conclude: it should be easy now to show that philosophies are not actually infinite in number, not because we reckon that only finite numbers of men have created systems (this smells strongly of the historico-empirical), but because we know that each proposition cannot have an infinity of contradictories or contraries; and internal consistency, in its strenuous demands, would pare off most permutations and combinations. If truth were some whole, one philosophy would be all that we could have. If a system were merely some deductive scheme from a unitary principle, then we could have an infinite number of choices between systems, no one of them substantially better than any other, simply more convenient, appealing, or tidy. Incontestably, there is a plurality of systems; but they do not share equality of worth, a parity of truths—or falsehoods. Systems oppose other systems; yet all

cannot be equally and simply true, even though their terms and methods are different.

There is a further question: could all systems be wrong—could falsity attach necessarily to the great preponderance of their principles? What we have noted about univocation in the terms of metaphysical reasoning, the necessity by which metaphysical propositions assert what they assert of reality, should furnish clues enough to this: metaphysical propositions can indeed be false, but not all of them (and they can be true, but not all of them, if they contradict each other). Systems cannot all be *equally* false, one with another, for each false univocal proposition has its own degree of remoteness from the truth, and each figurative one can be rendered in univocal terms. Nor can they (the systems) be *unequally* false; because this would imply that they are known to be such, hence measured by the truth to be false; hence at least one set of true propositions would necessarily exist.

And lastly, is not all metaphysics nonsense? This question, tangential to the main purpose of this essay, should yield quickly enough: if propositions in and of metaphysics—and propositions in the rest of the systems having metaphysical foundations—are true simply or relatively, then they must say something significant, and are not vacant and absurd. I do not for a minute suppose that all statements that have been served up to the public as metaphysical are true, or even that they make sense; but if a fair selection of them, that is enough to keep our science quite safe. To make this fully explicit, however, is another story, a long one.

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THE CRETAN PLATO

LASZLO VERSÉNYI

NO WORK OF PLATO'S is more intimately connected with its time and with the world in which it was written than the *Laws*.<sup>1</sup> While other dialogues deal with perennial themes which transcend local and historical boundaries, the *Laws* portrays a city whose establishment was a practical possibility only in fourth century Greece and whose constitution must be illuminated and justified within a fourth century Greek framework. "With the passing away of this people for whom it was intended and the substitution of other horizons for those within which they lived, the *Laws* has tended to become a closed book. . . ."

With the above opening statement, a recent study on the *Laws*<sup>1</sup> sets itself the task of considering "Plato's Cretan City" within its own geographical and historical context. This is a task well-conceived and well-executed; the study provides a wealth of information concerning Cretan, Spartan, Athenian, and in general Greek institutions, and thus enables the reader to see how Plato utilized and transformed these in constructing his state.

Invaluable as this contribution already is, it does not exhaust the writer's aim; for asserting that an understanding of the *Laws* is absolutely necessary for an understanding of Plato the philosopher, Morrow proceeds from purely historical to philosophical considerations. Does the *Laws* repudiate, or rather develop and exemplify, Plato's earlier principles? he asks; and the last part of the book is devoted to answering this question. The answer is positive; Morrow's conclusion is that the *Laws* represents an elaboration of, rather than a break with, Platonic philosophy; indeed, an elaboration which in spite of the limited horizons of the work makes it relevant not only to fourth century Greece but to all men at all ages. Since "the Greeks were such universal men,

<sup>1</sup> Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton, 1960), p. vii.

the ideal of a Greek city can never be merely a Greek ideal" (p. 593). It is to these conclusions that the following critical remarks are directed.

In order to see to what extent this dialogue develops Plato's earlier principles, and to what extent Plato's Cretan City is either universal or ideal, we shall briefly examine the *Laws*' constitution with special reference to educational theory and to the relationship between philosophy and law.

Education, as Plato defines it in the *Laws*, is training in virtue. This definition is nothing new either in Plato or in the whole of Greek tradition, for, as Morrow rightly points out, the Greeks traditionally held that the aim of education was "to develop in the child the qualities of mind and character that most fully express the ideal of human nature" (p. 297). So the question before us is, to what extent the concrete educational institutions Plato sets up in the *Laws* fulfill or even aim at fulfilling this ideal demand. Contrary to Morrow, both of these questions seem to me to call for a negative answer, as a brief consideration of what virtues the *Law's* education aims at and what methods it employs for reaching these aims will show.

Virtue is teachable. This Socratic principle is as firmly held in the *Laws* as in the early and middle dialogues. The method, however, whereby virtue is imparted here, is as un-Socratic as possible. Disregarding for the moment the so-called higher education of the members of the Nocturnal Council, education in the *Laws* boils down to nothing but simple habituation, indoctrination, and non-rational persuasion of the citizens. From early childhood on, music and dance, choral and gymnastic exercises, not only mold the "soul's opinions and feelings," train the sentiments of pleasure and pain, and habituate the child to automatic discipline and willing obedience, but they even influence the posture, gestures, and bearing of the child in accordance with the prescribed pattern. Common meals and state-supervised festivals confirm and reinforce the sentiments inculcated in childhood, and link the citizens together in common emotional and devotional loyalty to their state-sanctioned ideals. Education in letters—reading of state-censured poets—further affirms their convictions, and religious practices and beliefs, which are of "tremendous

importance . . . for the molding of character and training of sentiments" (p. 468), proceed to secure their "virtue." With the exception of mathematics (which is in part serviceable in household management, civic administration, and war; in part irrelevant for morals; and in part theologically directed), the whole of the educational processes of the city train character rather than intellect, and impart right dispositions, opinions, and convictions, rather than knowledge.

Nor does "education" end here; for the laws take over where childhood education leaves off and join their voice to the already deafening chorus of the grown citizen's persuaders. After all, the laws too aim at the moral perfection and virtue of the citizens; and to that extent they are not only concerned with legislation concerning education but are educational in their own right. So, like any legal set-up, Plato's laws too direct, warn, and deter by the sheer force of prescription joined with the threat of punishment, and to that extent they are merely another non-rational incentive toward "virtue." The novel feature of Plato's legislation is, however, that it contains more than the actual text of the law, for it adds to such "despotic prescriptions" informative, admonishing, and persuasive preambles or exhortations. Thus the laws not only command but "school" the citizens, and thereby become educational even in the strict sense (at least in Plato's and Morrow's eyes).

Unfortunately, even though this sounds as if for the first time enlightenment and rational instruction reared their heads in Plato's city, the impression is deceptive. The preambles simply add "persuasive prescription" to "despotic prescription" (722 E), "compulsion tempered with persuasion" to "untempered force" (722 C), and not rational instruction to the force of either mere persuasion or brute violence. Plato's comparison of the doctors' method with those of the legislators is apt. In answer to the children's begging to be treated gently (720 A), the kindly doctor sweetens the pill, and talks with his adult patients till he gains their willing consent and secures their continued docility by means of persuasion (720 D). Likewise the legislator aims to ensure the quiet, well-disposed—and since well-disposed, docile—acceptance of his laws (723 A); and this is what the preambles aim at. In

view of this aim it is hardly surprising that they too consist almost entirely of non-rational persuasive material rather than reasoning. Although Plato speaks of the "sacred and golden cord" of reasoning, this cord is obviously too tender to support any strain. Consequently education by the preambles is strictly comparable to general education in Plato's Cretan City.

What then is the essential nature of this education? Παιδεία becomes παιδεία not merely because education is "conjoined with play" (p. 317) in order to mold the character and cultivate the feelings and dispositions prescribed by the state, but mainly because this educational system as a whole trains the citizenry at the lowest level of intellectual development. To use one of Plato's favorite expressions in the *Laws*, education becomes "epodic"; it is enchantment rather than enlightenment, incantation and training in orthodoxy (literally, correct belief) rather than a leading of men out of darkness to light.

Plato's adoption of "enchantment," and of "this art of enchantment as his fundamental procedure in the *Laws*,"<sup>2</sup> is especially revealing if we keep in mind the Gorgian origin of both the word and the art. In his Encomium of Helen, Gorgias speaks of incantations (ἐπωιδῆς) which "uniting with the sentiments of the soul soothe and persuade and transport one by a kind of magic"—the non-rational power of the word which "drugs" and "bewitches" the soul—and he approves of such enchantment because, owing to man's lack of insight, non-rational persuasion is the exclusive means of ψυχαγωγία. In Gorgias' treatment, λόγος itself becomes a non-rational force; not reason and argument opposed to brute violence, but merely a superior βία whose power is no less for not being rational. All this is significant because this is precisely what happens in the *Laws*; general education—whether in the strict sense or by the laws and the preambles—degenerates into little more than a general enchantment, training, influencing, and persuading of the non-rational part of the soul, strictly comparable to the "enchanting of snakes and tarantulas and scorpions and other beasts and nuisances" (as Plato still

<sup>2</sup> Morrow, "Plato's Conception of Persuasion." *PR* 62, 1953, p. 239. This is a point much less emphasized in *Plato's Cretan City*.

characterizes such methods in the *Euthydemus*). Plato's and Gorgias' common use of the term would hardly matter if it did not point to their common use of a method of education: sophistic persuasion rather than Socratic enlightenment. If anything, the Plato of the *Laws* surpassed his predecessors in devising a more thorough-going method of indoctrination than any sophist ever dreamed of.

Morrow himself admits that "to a reader nourished on the liberal traditions of later thought there is undoubtedly something appalling" (p. 558) in this type of education; yet he goes on to excuse Plato by saying that "these forces of persuasion are used for instruction" (p. 559), and that, "furthermore, the methods he advocates for moral instruction . . . are precisely those used in all ages by teachers who take seriously the training of character" (*ibid.*). There are two objections, however, to this argument. The first is that it is by no means only the modern reader who would be appalled by the exclusive domination of this type of moral instruction. What Socrates, whose maieutic method served as foundation for all truly "liberal traditions of later thought," thought of sophistic enchantment is too well known to need repetition. The second objection is that although the Plato of the *Republic* would have approved of such methods for the indoctrination of those who were incapable of absorbing true education, there is a significant difference between the *Republic* and the *Laws*: in the *Republic*, such imparting of opinion to those who cannot be taught in another way is advocated with complete safety because the educators themselves have the knowledge (of the Good) which guarantees that they will impart right opinion only. Yet is there anything in the *Laws* that ensures that these sophistic practices will be based on knowledge? The briefest considerations of the education of the *Laws*' "Educators" shows the lack of such guarantee.

The Educator who supervises the whole of education, appoints and controls educational officers, selects what is to be read in literature classes, censors poetry and perhaps even music and dance, is the most important officer in this monolithic state. Yet what are his qualifications? He must be a guardian and the father of legitimate children, preferably both sons and daughters. Now

since in order to be a guardian he need not have had any education other than the one we just described, it will be a minor miracle if this supreme Educator will have any knowledge—as distinguished from opinion—of any subject whatsoever. His election, by equally ignorant men, to guardianship, and then to this high office, will hardly ensure anything more than that he possesses the state-approved moral character; so that his supervision of education will most likely be a classic case of the blind leading the blind. Although after his election the Educator automatically becomes a member of the Nocturnal Council, the only institution where a man might still get a kind of higher education in Plato's city, this education—even if it amounted to something, which, as we shall see later, is rather dubious—would follow upon, rather than precede, his becoming Educator. And as Morrow himself admits, "It is hard to imagine how any citizen subjected for thirty years or more to the strictly supervised regimen we have described could retain the critical power and freedom of mind required"<sup>2</sup> for higher study. In view of all this, the Educator's wisdom can hardly be taken for granted. The only consolation is that at times it seems as if Plato never really meant to give the highest officer in his state any real power: "... As far as possible the law should leave nothing to him, but to explain everything so that he may be a (mere) interpreter and tutor" (809 A). If so, we can forget about him and the question as to what guarantees the wisdom of the Educators becomes a larger one: what guarantees the wisdom and rationality of the laws themselves?

The Cretan City's constitution deals at great length with the executive and judiciary machinery of the state; the election, supervision, and functions of officials; and the duties of citizens and government alike. All this is prescribed by the laws. Yet when it comes to legislation we find no more than a handful of vague and often contradictory remarks. Who then legislates in Plato's Cretan City?

Individually, all citizens are brought up in strict orthodoxy; they cannot question, let alone propose to reform, the laws.

<sup>2</sup> *PR* 62. 1953, p. 248. This is another point less emphasized in Morrow's book.

Gathered in the Assembly (of all citizens) elected to the Council (360 members) or to magistracies, they still cannot propose any legislative changes. It is only the guardians (37 in number) who can in some cases initiate a revision or supplementation of laws; and yet even their legislative powers are so curtailed as to be virtually non-existent. For, in the first place, the laws can be modified only in the years immediately following their establishment; "after a period of ten years (772) the legislation is to be fixed and immutable."<sup>4</sup> In the second place, the only suggestion the *Laws* contain for legislative changes—presumably during the first ten years—is that amendments to the laws must be referred to "all the officials, all the people, and all the oracles of the gods, and if all agree the law may be changed, but never otherwise; and whoever objects to the change shall prevail" (772 D). Whether "objector" here means any individual or any group (the people, the officials, the oracles), the requirement of such unanimity makes any change virtually impossible. And should any changes nevertheless take place, the rationality of the new law is still nowhere guaranteed. The people and the officials (with the exception of the few who receive a somewhat dubious kind of higher education in the Nocturnal Council) have had nothing but the general education we dealt with, an education designed not to give but to suppress even the slightest bit of philosophic insight; and the rationality of the oracles is certainly less than patent. In view of this it may not have been such a bad idea to give these groups virtually no legislative powers. If so, however, the rationality of the laws depends entirely on the rationality of the original Legislator whose fixed and immutable laws will rule the Cretan City now and forever. What guarantees the rationality of this Legislator?

Plato's Legislator in the *Laws* goes by the name of the "Athenian Stranger"; and if he can be shown to possess the wisdom of the guardians in the *Republic*, the rule of philosophy is assured in the *Laws*. Yet this has to be shown, and cannot simply be assumed in the manner in which Morrow states: "The laws under which the citizens live are the work of a philosopher;

<sup>4</sup> PR 62; 1953, p. 245.

for the Athenian Stranger is a personage so like the author of the *Laws* that we are justified in regarding him, if not as a spokesman for Plato himself, at least as some like-minded member of the Academy familiar with the disciplines required for philosophic legislation" (p. 573). That the Athenian Stranger is a personage very "like the author of the *Laws*" or a "member of the Academy" is completely beside the point, unless we can show that the author of the *Laws* and leading spirit of the Academy proves himself a philosopher in and through his legislation in the *Laws*. And instead of showing this, Morrow simply supports his blank assertion with another that we are called upon to accept on faith: "The Athenian Stranger in formulating the laws to be accepted either employs (in the conversational passages) the dialectical methods made familiar to us in Plato's other dialogues, or relies upon insights which these dialogues arrive at through philosophical enquiry" (ibid). Let us see now to what extent the Athenian employs dialectic, and relies upon Socratic and Platonic principles.

If by dialectic we mean the Socratic method of conversation which, through skillful questioning, elicits from the learner the truths to be arrived at and leaves him no peace until he can give reasons for what he believes to be true, there is obviously no question of dialectic or anything resembling maieutic questioning here. The Athenian's method of lecturing is by and large thoroughly in line with his principles of general education; instead of enlightening, it merely gives opinions and beliefs. Indeed, at times it denies even the most elementary principles of the art of persuasion; it simply bullies and browbeats the interlocutor and requires his assent tyrannically (e.g. see 965C). How far this method, requiring uncritical acceptance of opinions on alien authority, is removed from the ironic, maieutic teaching of Socrates hardly needs to be emphasized.

If by dialectic we mean the art that enables a man to acquire knowledge by ascending beyond unexamined hypotheses to an intelligible first principle, and then descending to and organizing, step by step, the whole complex in view of the One (*Rep.* 511), we find that though this art is mentioned and even advocated in the *Laws*, its employment is almost totally neglected. But is it not true that this work offers actual legislation directed at the un-

educated and uneducable masses, and that this consideration dictates the use of the not too philosophical method? The Athenian Stranger could still be considered a philosopher to the extent that "he relies upon insights which (the other Platonic) dialogues arrive at through philosophical enquiry" (p. 573).

The problem, however, is to find exactly what these insights are. The equation of virtue and knowledge, of wrong-doing and ignorance, although at times wistfully remembered, is in fact abandoned; and the doctrine concerning the inseparability of virtue and happiness is announced with a greatly diminished confidence. The unity of virtues is asserted but never shown, and the treatment of virtues qua traits of character, and of education qua training of character, anticipates Aristotle's ethics more than it recalls Plato's. Even the *Laws*' rather vague description of higher education resembles the *Republic*'s treatment of the subject only very imperfectly; and Morrow can defend the hypothesis that the dialectic still occupies the highest place in this scheme of education—above mathematics, astronomy, and theology—only by assuming that Plato's refusal to elaborate further on higher education is due to the fact that he has already dealt with the subject in the *Republic*. But this is a mere assumption, not a proof. If we take Plato's remark that this scheme of higher education might be explained elsewhere as referring, not backward to the *Republic*, but forward to the *Epinomis*, obviously we arrive at an entirely different interpretation. Regardless of how Morrow chooses to decide the controversy over the authenticity of the *Epinomis*, his disregard of this dialogue is inexplicable; especially since he admits that "the *Epinomis* describes at some length the higher studies of the Nocturnal Council," adding, "this is probably not Plato's work, but at least it shows what Philippus thought he intended" (p. 507, fn. 17). If Philippus, an academician very close to Plato, the editor of the *Laws* and literary executor of his master, put down in writing what he thought Plato intended, it is surely unwise simply to disregard his writing in favor of an unsupported theory with which it happens to disagree.

Our last resort for showing the supremacy of philosophy over law, or at least the philosophical nature of the Athenian's legislation, must now be to investigate this legislation and show that it

itself is based on the principle of the rule of philosophy over law.

The rule of philosophy implies the rule of general principles formulated by the philosopher, and thus it entails a kind of rule of law. Yet from this it does not follow that the rule of law necessarily entails or guarantees the rule of philosophy. It is true that the rule of philosophy is opposed to the anarchy of lawless, licentious life, in individuals and states; yet such rule—and this is what Morrow fails to emphasize—is equally opposed to the despotism of fixed and unchangeable particular laws, legislated possibly without knowledge, and accepted generally without criticism. In his discussion of the different aspects of "mixed constitution" (mean between despotism and freedom) in the *Laws*, Morrow does not seem to be aware of the absence of the most important mixture: the mean between the despotism of unchangeable law and the anarchy of lawlessness.

In line with the Socratic principle that the written word should not take the place of living thought, the *Republic* emphasizes and exemplifies the dialectical search for general principles, ultimately directed toward the one thing needful: the knowledge of the Good. Consequently it opposes particular legislation as too constricting, too trivial, too much a matter of detail, and thus safely to be left to the rulers who will legislate as the need arises. The *Laws* does the reverse; although the *Phaedrus*' principle—that it is idle to lay down too rigid regulations in detail—is once again wistfully affirmed (968 E), it is all too obviously disregarded through the dialogue. Nothing seems too trivial, too particular, or detailed to escape the legislator's care. Even the *Politicus*' insight, that the rigid legislation of particular laws is not good in principle because these laws are like a "stubborn and ignorant man who does not allow anyone to do anything contrary to his command" (294 B-C), is completely forgotten. This disregard for the principles of the *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Politicus* certainly does not testify either to the philosophic acumen of the *Laws*' legislator or to his reliance on the insights of earlier dialogues. The emphasis on the particular reveals the writer of the *Laws* to be more the teacher of Aristotle than the disciple and heir of Socrates. The *Republic*, assuming the rule of reason, subjects law to philosophy; the *Laws* subjects all men, no matter how rational,

to the rule of unchangeable law: "... when the law is despot over the rulers and the rulers are slaves of the law, then, as I see it, the state will be saved" (715 D).

Not unlike other interpreters of the *Laws* who tried to present it as consistent with the principles laid down in the *Republic*, Morrow rests his case on one of the most controversial sections in the *Laws*, the few pages dealing with the Nocturnal Council at the end of the dialogue. The Nocturnal Council, he argues, is to be the "head" of the state in the Cretan City, with the Nocturnal Councillors the counterpart of the philosopher-kings of the *Republic* (p. 573).

But as was observed earlier, the "philosophic" rather than merely mathematical-theological nature of the Councillors' higher education is questionable; and Morrow, disregarding the *Epinomis*, assumes rather than proves that dialectic plays an all-important part in this education. Furthermore, even if we grant the members of the Nocturnal Council the greatest possible philosophic insight, we must either take the twelve books of the *Laws* seriously, (in which case the Nocturnal Council becomes as good as power- and function-less), or we take the institution of the Nocturnal Council (and especially 969 B) seriously, where Plato proposes "handing the state over" to the Nocturnal Council, and suppose that the entire twelve books of the *Laws* (with the exception of the last few pages), with all their particular legislation, their violent opposition to change, and their insistence on the sovereignty of positive law, have to be abandoned.

Morrow sees well enough that the latter alternative, representing in fact a return to the position of the *Republic*, "would indeed be a complete repudiation of the substance of what Plato has been laboring to establish in all the previous work" (p. 512); and so he rejects it. Plato, he asserts, did not mean to give the Nocturnal Council any power to override the law. In this case, however, no amount of ingenious suggestion as to how the Nocturnal Council can influence legislation and policy, can suffice for establishing the rule of philosophy in the *Laws*. For the whole legal and educational setup of the Cretan City is directed toward leaving as little as possible, indeed "as far as possible nothing at all" (809 A) to men, but rather making the law truly a "despot over the rulers

and the rulers the slaves of the law" (715 D). And if we take Plato at all seriously, we must admit that he accomplished his purpose to an extent that even a despotism of persons leaves more room for the rule of philosophy than this despotism of law. For in the case of personal tyranny there is always a chance—however remote—for an enlightened despot ruling philosophically. The tyranny of unchangeable law excludes such chance forever.

This ultimate shift from the rule of philosophy to the rule of law can no longer be excused or explained away by saying that the *Laws*, or at least the institutions of the Cretan City, were directed at and designed for the unphilosophical masses rather than the enlightened few. For in Plato's Cretan City there will be no philosophers and no philosophy. The "elaboration"—as Morrow is pleased to call it—of the Republic's philosophical principle has resulted in its complete abandonment. And this makes us conclude that the *Laws*' constitution—contrary to Morrow—is by no means a universal ideal. It is not even second- or third-best.



Lest the preceding review seem all too negative, some qualifying notes must be made here in order to put the thing in its proper perspective. In the first place, our remarks were directed not at Morrow's historical study as a whole but only at its concluding, philosophical part, which seemed to us less persuasive than the rest. Thus even if our criticism met with acceptance, the value of the major portion of the book would remain untouched. Morrow's painstaking analysis of the *Law's* regulations concerning property and family, government, education, religion, and the administration of justice, as well as his careful parallels between these and traditional institutions, are an invaluable aid for interpreting the dialogue—all the more so as such an historical investigation of the *Laws* has not been available until now.

It must be noted, furthermore, that there is very little that is original in our interpretation of the *Laws* and objections to Morrow's evaluation. Most of these points have been raised repeatedly by Plato scholars for over a hundred years; and this does not necessarily testify to the weakness of Morrow's position.

For while one might expect of a new study that it should at least answer old criticisms, the fact that, in spite of the persistence of these criticisms, the type of view Morrow presents has also been advocated with tenacity indicates that these objections themselves seem less than persuasive to a great many readers of the *Laws*. And this is due not so much to the short-sightedness of such readers as to the peculiar nature of Plato's philosophical work, which seems to promote rather than assuage controversy. Those who are intent on regarding all of Plato as one consistent systematic whole will always be able to discount the early dialogues as too tentative or negative, and to bring the later ones closer to the middle group by placing the emphasis on the similarities rather than the differences between them. And this approach leads to conclusions obviously different from the ones that result from emphasizing Plato's philosophical development even at the price of overall consistency. Advocates of the latter method, while still seeking to preserve an unbroken line of development, will be free to recognize different, and perhaps irreconcilable, stages in Plato's thought, and to take a negative attitude to some dialogue or groups of dialogues—early or late—as not quite up to the standards of the Plato they admire. Whatever attitude one takes here will necessarily affect one's interpretation of the *Laws* as well.

Whoever adopts the first method—and Morrow might be loosely classified here, in spite of the fact that he recognizes some development in Plato's thought—will emphasize those passages in the *Laws* which seem to be written in the spirit of the *Republic* (e.g., 961-969); while his opponents will regard 961-969 as an afterthought, and point to the differences. The first group will ask how their adversaries account for Plato's supposed repudiation of earlier principles, which not only sacrifices overall unity but even constitutes a break in any line of development; the second group will deny the existence of a break and, explaining all differences as the result of a gradual change in Plato's outlook over decades of philosophic activity, will reproach the opposite camp with trying to reconcile or explain away too many irreconcilable elements in the dialogues. One group may regard the *Laws* as a great dialogue, and not altogether unjustly, for it undoubtedly contains many brilliant psychological and political theories; while

the other may look upon it as a work of old age, showing occasional lapses into brilliance, yet on the whole also a narrowing of horizons and a hardening of outlook. And with justice, too. Yet if so much of our attitude toward Plato, and especially toward the *Laws*, is a matter of our own temper and individual preference, who can reject Morrow's analysis altogether? A reviewer can at most attempt to present the opposite side of the argument, while at the same time welcoming rather than deploring the addition of a new contribution to an old controversy.

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## PHILOSOPHY AND REFLECTION: BEYOND PHENOMENOLOGY

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**I**T IS AN INTERESTING and, perhaps, unique feature of Twentieth Century philosophy that it has developed along divergent and opposed lines in Great Britain and in Europe. Whereas European philosophers have persisted in their concern with metaphysics, ontology, and philosophical system, their British colleagues have, on the whole, repudiated such endeavour as senseless and futile. And their respective contributions to the literature of philosophy testify to this difference in basic orientation. The Continental thinkers have provided us with a variety of systematic treatises in the mode of phenomenological ontology and existential metaphysics; the British, on the other hand, have supplied us with analytic expositions of a variety of topics. European philosophers have, for the most part, neither read nor considered the writings of their colleagues across the Channel. They are as little concerned with British "analysis" as their British counterparts are with existentialism and phenomenology. There are exceptions, of course. The author of the present work, for example, makes one reference to Lord Russell to illustrate a point about communication. It is the only reference in the book to any recent British philosopher—and even this reference makes no mention or use of any of Russell's philosophical doctrines. This instance is, I fear, symptomatic of the present state of communication, or the lack of it, between the two countries.

In the case of existential philosophy the division is understandable. The existentialist philosophers are clearly engaging in a program which has long been regarded as disreputable by the British. But in the case of phenomenology the divergence is an odd one, indeed. For what is phenomenology if not the "presuppositionless" reflection upon that which is "given" to consciousness? And what is "analysis" if not the unbiased and non-

speculative examination of experience? If phenomenology is actually "presuppositionless" and, further, if "analysis" is free of doctrinal commitment, how can they be either different or opposed? If there is or has been a difference between them, has it not been of necessity more accidental than essential, more a matter of choice of subject matter than of method or philosophical doctrine? The fact that some British philosophers are now beginning to dip their toes in the waters of French phenomenology, and even to make use of such phenomenological categories as "intentionality," suggests that this is the case. But to the extent that there have been unavowed "presuppositions" in phenomenology and implicit doctrines in "analysis," the differences have been genuine and substantial. They do differ, as a matter of fact, with respect both to what is "given" for analysis and what is involved in analytic reflection itself.

Hans Wagner's book<sup>1</sup> has the merit of both specifying what are alleged to be the necessary presuppositions of any adequate program of phenomenology, and defending them with dialectical skill and vigor. Philosophy, he argues, is *reflection*; and the a priori conditions of reflection must apply to any philosophical program whatever. If analysis is reflection (and, if not, what is it?), it falls directly within the purview of Wagner's investigation. By implication if not by direct confrontation, Wagner has subjected all "presuppositionless" philosophical programs to a searching critical examination. It is difficult to imagine that either orthodox phenomenology or analysis could emerge from an "*Auseinandersetzung*" with Wagner without undergoing an internal transformation. Where his argument is not compelling, as it often is, it is persuasive. A work which matches conceptual clarity with depth of insight, Wagner's book demonstrates that the German philosophical mind has not been lulled to sleep by Heidegger and Jaspers. Standing at the center of the German philosophical tradition, Wagner incorporates many of the best insights of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Cassirer, and Heidegger, while avoiding eclecticism. In formulating a systematic philosophy

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophie und Reflexion* (Ernst Reinhardt Verlag: München/Basel, 1959).

that clearly surpasses the neo-Kantian idealism and Husserlian phenomenology to which it is so heavily indebted, he asserts his independence as a thinker. While never so original or so exciting as Heidegger and Jaspers, his writing is more balanced, more soberly and meticulously argued. In clarity and analytic power it is comparable to the work of Bertrand Russell—whom I suspect that Wagner has read and admired. It is difficult to find a single unclear statement in Wagner's treatise. This is not because he has restricted himself to a nontechnical language or reduced experience to its simplest terms. It is due, rather, to the precision with which he has established his often highly complex doctrines.

The task which Wagner has set for himself could hardly be more ambitious. Profoundly influenced by both Kant and Hegel, he has undertaken to overcome the antitheses between them by incorporating their valid doctrines in a higher synthesis. From Kant he adopts the method of "transcendental reflection" with its critical examination of finite subjectivity, and from Hegel the method of "speculative reflection" with its concern for absolute consciousness. To achieve this reconciliation Wagner appropriates relevant materials from the neo-Kantians, the phenomenologists, and the existentialists. Although he adopts the Kantian critical philosophy in outline if not in detail, he interprets it in the light of Husserl's phenomenological method and expands it in the direction of Hegel's speculative examination of the absolute subject. He remains, finally, within a more or less Kantian perspective by employing Heidegger's notion of "fundamental ontology" for the reinterpretation of Hegel. From Hegel, Wagner adopts the notion of the "absolute subject" which he re-interprets as a finite absolute. Although it has much in common with Heidegger's "*Dasein*," it goes beyond it as a speculative concept. Wagner's argument in support of an absolute though irrevocably finite subject as the foundation of all human experience is, in many respects, the most interesting and important thesis of his book. Many philosophers who regard Hegel's analysis of the ultimate subject of experience as both brilliant and, on the whole, sound, are unwilling to follow Hegel in his identification of finite consciousness with the absolute subject—whether in time or in principle. We have been left with the unhappy opposition between Kant, who failed to analyze the

"I am" which accompanies all experience, and Hegel, who sought to identify it with the whole of reality. Or, more recently, we have been confronted with the opposition between Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" and Hegel's philosophy of the absolute subject. Wagner is correct in regarding this opposition as calling for reconciliation. Whether or not he has succeeded in effecting it, he has offered an attractive proposal for mediating the opposition.

In establishing his case, Wagner begins with a fairly orthodox phenomenological method. Although he makes admirable use of Husserl in interpreting and supplementing Kant, Wagner is mistaken in attributing to Husserl the distinction between the empirical/psychological and the transcendental analysis of experience (p. 20). In spite of the fact that he sought to repudiate Kant's idealistic philosophy, Husserl adopted Kant's notion of the transcendental a priori, and made it the basis for his entire philosophy. The difference between Kant and Husserl on this point is that Husserl sought to extend the transcendental a priori to all elements within experience. There can be no doubt that Husserl's doctrine of intentionality is far stronger than Kant's. Whereas Kant was fundamentally dualistic and Platonic in his view of the relation between mind and body, understanding and sensibility, reason and inclination, Husserl was basically monistic and Aristotelian. Although he never used the term so far as I am aware, Kant employed something like a doctrine of intentionality in his analysis of experience. The purposes, rules, and principles of reason and understanding are constitutive and regulative factors in experience. Apart from its relation to the subject of thought, volition, or feeling, human experience would be unintelligible.

Hegel had, of course, rejected what he took to be too abstract and formal a view of reason in the Kantian philosophy; he sought to demonstrate that reason is present even in sensuous immediacy, that there can be no real separation of rational form and empirical content. Husserl follows the lead of Hegel rather than Kant in insisting upon the unlimited constitutive function of mind in experience. Whatever is or can be given to consciousness is, on Husserl's view of it, intentionally constituted. Not just some more or less abstract features of experience are to be attributed to the constitutive function of mind, but all intelligible features, how-

ever concrete or empirical. Husserl would and, in fact, did provide a noetic-noematic analysis of perception with respect both to its sensible and conceptual features. This poses for Husserl the same problem that it posed for Hegel; namely how to save the empirical factor in knowledge, how to account for what seems to be the pure "givenness" of sense data. Husserl actually painted himself into a philosophical corner by adopting the stronger doctrine of intentionality in Hegel (the complete permeation of experience by thought) while insisting upon an ontological "reduction." Husserl bracketed out the "otherness" of the object which alone could have saved his position from complete subjectivity. Quentin Lauer has, I think, shown that Husserl's "bracketing" together with his doctrine of intentional "constitution" leads him head on into an unqualified subjective idealism (*The Triumph of Subjectivity*). Wagner recognizes this danger and seeks to avoid it by holding on to the doctrine of intentionality without the Husserlian "bracketing." It is in Wagner's conception of "speculative reflection" that he seeks to go beyond Husserl's type of phenomenology. Although Wagner provides for only a weak intentional dialectic between subject and object, he does provide for one. Though constituted with respect to its noematic meaning, the object is not, for Wagner, constituted either in its *existence* or in its capacity for determination. He thus provides for a realistic pole in knowledge and valuation.

Wagner's ultimate goal in this work is to formulate the valid principles of fundamental logic and ontology. To this end he begins with the concrete data of experience. Although the ultimate goal of philosophy is reflection upon the pure form of thought itself, one cannot possibly begin there in analysis. Where one does and must begin is with the empirical subject as oriented toward this or that "*Weltstück*." The empirical given is neither sense data nor self-contained mind, but mind in relation to an object. We can never, so he argues, come upon a datum of experience which is not the terminus of an intentional act of consciousness, any more than we can discover a moment of consciousness which is without relation to an object. An object is always an object-for-consciousness, even as consciousness is always "consciousness of." "To all consciousness, whether original or derived,

immediate or mediated, must be attributed object-relatedness, intentionality, determinability in relation to an object. The original name for that sort of consciousness is: "Thought" (p. 23).

Since all consciousness is intentional in character, and thought is the name for consciousness in so far as it is object-related, it follows that thought is co-extensive with consciousness. Whether in the mode of knowing, perceiving, willing, feeling, or acting, consciousness falls within the province of thought. Within human experience, at least, Wagner agrees with Hegel that "the rational is the real." This is not to say that Wagner regards thought as identical with consciousness. It is rather "a moment common to all of these [varieties of conscious acts] which identifies and structures them" (p. 23).

Without attempting to provide an independent demonstration of it—and there is no reason why he should—Wagner reiterates Kant's fundamental thesis of the Transcendental Deduction, that every moment of consciousness participates in the unity of consciousness, and thus necessarily conforms to the conditions of consciousness in general. "They [concrete intentional acts of perception, feeling, willing, etc.] belong to consciousness and they can be modes of conscious life only in so far as they participate in the fundamental characteristics of consciousness" (p. 23). If, then, one can establish the a priori characteristics of consciousness as such, one will, by the same stroke, have established those conditions which govern particular conscious acts. It is on this premise that Wagner must ultimately rest his case for a fundamental logic and ontology. The doctrine itself is, I think, incontestable. For anything to be a content or an object of consciousness it must submit to those conditions which are necessary for the possibility of any consciousness whatever. Wagner is, I believe, thoroughly justified in assuming the validity of Kant's argument in the *Analytic* and moving on to establish the ultimate conditions of consciousness via his speculative reflection upon subjectivity. It might be argued that consciousness is possible without thought, or that there are no ultimate conditions of thought, either or both. To hold that consciousness is possible apart from thought is, in effect, to assert that we can be conscious without being conscious of anything—or, to put the matter differently, without our con-

sciousness having determinate structure or meaning. Although we may, on occasion, approach the limit of complete indeterminacy in our consciousness, to reach it would be equivalent to becoming unconscious. Failure to recognize that thought is a necessary constituent of consciousness, and hence of all human experience, has led to some fairly disastrous bifurcations in epistemology and ethics.

Curiously enough, Kant has been partly responsible for this development. He failed to subject empirical intuition and inclination to the same penetrating scrutiny which he applied to claims for intellectual intuition. An adequate empiricism, either in ethics or epistemology, must examine the conditions of immediate awareness. It follows from Kant's argument in the *Analytic* that a completely unstructured awareness, devoid of all rules and principles, is impossible. Consciousness is always and necessarily the consciousness of a subject, and hence reflects in an immediate or sophisticated way the ultimate concerns of the subject, whether in cognition, volition, feeling, or action. An empiricism which begins by cutting empirical data off from the perceiving subject not only begins with a false representation of the initial situation, but deprives itself of anything more than a tenuous and artificial connection between data and theory. Continental empiricism takes quite a different direction from British empiricism in its view of experience, and hence gives quite a different account both of knowledge and valuation. In so far as phenomenology is devoted to the meticulous examination of the conditions of immediate awareness it operates within the empirical tradition established by Kant and Hegel, a tradition which finds its roots in Greek philosophy. American pragmatism conceived of experience in essentially the same way. It is unfortunate that revisionist pragmatists like C. I. Lewis have rejected Dewey's conception of experience in favor of a Humian view of consciousness. It is more than a little ironical that Lewis' pragmatic principle should serve to relate elements which are regarded as altogether disparate from one another. Employed in that fashion, the pragmatic principle negates all that was essential in orthodox pragmatism.

In delimiting the major areas of experience, and thus

specifying the avenues of reflective analysis, Wagner follows (and is, I think, misled by) Kant. He distinguishes sharply between the spheres of theoretical and practical reason, and also between cognition and other modes of experience. This prompts him to divide the noemata of phenomenological analysis into two initially exclusive groups, the theoretical and axiological (*thelematisch*); and to subdivide the latter into the ethical, aesthetic, and social-economic noemata. In order to follow out independent lines of reflection on these areas Wagner is forced to exclude feeling and volition from cognition, and to treat ethics and aesthetics as having no cognitive import. The fact that all avenues of reflection culminate ultimately in a supervening "*Geltungsreflexion*" fails to compensate for the arbitrariness of the initial dichotomy. As I hope to show, this separation of the theoretical from the practical introduces a crippling limitation in Wagner's theory of cognition. It prohibits him from transcending the perspective of *observation* and accepting a genuine dialectic between subject and object. Having registered this *caveat*, we may turn to a closer inspection of Wagner's theory of cognition.

Theoretical reflection is concerned with the immediate and mediate world-relatedness of the subject. Its object may thus be termed, in the Kantian sense, "experience." "That is in essence the Kantian meaning of the intrinsically ambiguous term experience. Experience is thus to be understood here exclusively as a mode of theoretical thought (in other terminology one may speak of ethical, aesthetic, religious and other varieties of experience), and indeed as an unambiguous correlate of theoretical reflection (in other terminology one may regard reflection itself as 'experience, which consciousness has of itself,' a use of the term which one finds in Hegel)" (p. 89). This view of experience is interesting both in what it includes and what it excludes. It differs radically, on the one hand, from the British empirical tradition in including both the immediate and mediate object-relatedness of the subject within experience. And, on the other hand, it differs from the Hegelian and pragmatic conception of experience in excluding feeling and volition. Within the theoretical perspective, Wagner designates four elements which stand in a relationship of reciprocity to one another: 1) the theoretical subject,

2) the object, 3) the act of knowing, and 4) the result of the knowing act. "Our four elements are thus inseparable from one another and belong irrevocably together, even as they are clearly distinguishable and distinguished from one another" (p. 18). He follows Hegel in regarding the object of knowledge as that which stands over against (literally a *Gegen-stand*) the subject. An object without relation to a subject would be, for Wagner, as unthinkable as a subject without an object. "However wonderful and powerful an entity (*Seiendes*) may be in itself, by itself alone (*bloß durch sich selbst*) it is neither subject nor object" (p. 99).

An object is thus not merely an entity which exists in and of itself, but "is that which has been posited (*gesetzt*) by thought." Wagner proceeds very cautiously at this point, trying to mediate between the Kantian thing-in-itself and the Hegelian or Husserlian object. "The object is accordingly neither a pure posit nor simply a thing-in-itself (*bloß Seiendes*); it is rather a posited thing-in-itself and an existing posited (*seiend Gesetztes*)" (p. 99). Although it is posited ("constituted," in the language of Husserl), its meaning is not exhausted in that mode. "It is posited as that which is not merely posited, but is independent of the act of positing" (p. 100). It is precisely with its independence (*an-sich-Sein*) that the object is posited. This means, if we follow Wagner, that it is the intentional relation of subject to object in thought which establishes the object in its independence. The object is, if you like, *for-the-subject* a *being-in-itself*. Since to be independent or *an-sich* is possible only as a categorial determination of an object, the independence of the object is only relative. "Positing [constitution] is the identity of Being and being posited." This is, Wagner maintains, the primordial meaning of the principle of identity which underlies all cognition. Identity is a relation between different and differentiated members; it is a speculative or synthetic identity.

Wagner thus agrees with Hegel and Husserl that the relation of subject and object is internal, while insisting upon their relative independence. As we have noted previously, the constitution of the object by the thinking subject is total for Husserl. This entails, so Wagner argues, that Husserl is not in a position to consider the

*validity* of thought. If the object in which an act of thought terminates (the noema) is identical with the act itself, truth and falsity cannot be accounted for. It is only if the act of thought may be related to the object-in-itself that its validity may be determined. In addition to the noematic reflection of Husserl, which deals only with the object as constituted by thought, we require a reflection which can estimate the validity of noemata (*Geltungsreflexion*). This means, in other words, that we require principles for judging the adequacy of noemata to the objects to which they refer. Although the noema is a conceptual determination of the object, it may not answer to the intrinsic character of the object-in-itself. The object might be judged to be blue when it is in fact red—in which case the noema simply doesn't apply. Wagner attempts to provide for a correspondence principle in cognition while avoiding the dilemma of traditional realism. It is not two objects with which we are concerned in perception, one within and the other beyond consciousness, but one object in two modes. He agrees with Kant that the object as known is not the object as it is in-itself, while refusing to regard the latter as a second or independent object. (Kant never meant to regard it as a second object, I am confident, although his language sometimes allows and encourages such an interpretation.) Thought can transcend the distinction between appearance and reality because it has first posited the distinction. Although it is never determined independently of thought, the object-in-itself is determinable in and of itself. We cannot correctly judge an object to be red if it is in fact brown; we cannot correctly judge a cow to be a horse. An object has cognitive meaning only in relation to conceptual judgment; but it has an intrinsic capacity for meaning which limits the intentional acts of thought. "The object is therefore distinguishable from our knowledge of it (*Wissen*) in the final analysis only because it has determinacy independently of our knowing" (p. 94).

The question is, of course—and it is, in many respects, the most important question raised by Wagner's book—whether he can thus succeed in mediating between Kant and Hegel, between realism and idealism. He wishes to hold, with Hegel, that thought mediates between the appearance and the thing-in-itself so as to guarantee the identity between them. It is, on Wagner's view—

as also on Kant's—the thing-in-itself which appears. But whereas Kant saw no defensible or productive way of accounting for the nature of appearance in terms of the thing-in-itself, Wagner hopes to do so. Even though thought cannot constitute the *existence* of the object, it can still determine its ontological meaning. Thought is, he maintains, sufficiently absolute that it can establish a fundamental ontology which is valid for both the subject and the object. The contention that finite subjectivity can function as the absolute foundation for knowledge is the final and most ambitious thesis of Wagner's book. Before we can evaluate this claim we need to look more closely at his procedure in establishing the principles of his logic and ontology.

Wagner begins in sound phenomenological fashion with the specific world-relatedness of the finite subject. If we are to analyze thought or consciousness, we must begin with empirical consciousness. Wagner thus affirms the empirical principle that all knowledge begins with experience, though he does not understand experience as mere sensation. "Initially and for the most part consciousness is occupied in its willing, knowing, feeling, planning, and acting with one or more items in the world (*Weltstücken*)" (p. 35). The correlative of this assertion is, he adds, that "initially and for the most part consciousness is forgetful of itself, is not conscious of itself, does not know itself, and pays no attention to itself." Self-consciousness occurs only through reflection upon what Wagner terms a "secondary-constitutive a priority" (p. 160ff), which corresponds roughly to Kant's empirical consciousness. It follows from Wagner's analysis that empirical concepts (noemata) are both a priori and constitutive, though in a secondary way. This means simply that in its function of "secondary a priori constitution," thought follows the principles of the "primary constitutive a priori." In Kantian language, this is equivalent to the claim that empirical procedures necessarily conform to and illustrate transcendental laws.

The difference between Wagner and Kant is that Wagner regards empirical rules and concepts as a priori. Although Wagner's treatment of the "secondary a priori" appears to be in opposition to Kant's analysis of empirical concepts, I am not at all sure that this is the case. I am persuaded that Kant cannot

consistently hold to the sharp division he seems to adopt between empirical concepts and a priori categories. If the Categories of the Understanding are to be genuinely constitutive of experience, as Kant argues, it would appear that they must be expressed in and through empirical concepts. The whole argument of the *Analytic* seems to be designed to show that all psychological and empirical processes of cognition, including sensation itself, are subject to the legislation of the Understanding. If this is not the case, I cannot see how Kant can offer any sort of "Transcendental Deduction" of categories. (Cf. my article in *Kantstudien*, Band 49, Heft 3, 1957-58, "Kant's Theory of Concepts"). It is clear, I think, that a distinction is required between a priori laws (categories) and empirical rules (concepts). The question is simply how it is to be interpreted. Wagner is, I think, correct in making it a distinction between types of constitutive a priority. Although, as I see it, Kant actually operated with such a distinction in holding that transcendental laws govern the empirical processes of perception, Wagner makes the doctrine explicit and states it with greater clarity.

The concept of intentionality, which is so basic to all phenomenological theories, is, I believe, largely derived from Kant. This is not to deny, of course, that it was formulated and employed by previous philosophers, or even that it may have been a fundamental doctrine among the Greek philosophers. I mean only to maintain that it is the Kantian version of intentionality, namely the doctrine that thought is legislative and constitutive of experience, which serves as the point of departure for German idealism and phenomenology. The genius of Hegel was that he converted it into a doctrine of multi-centered and dialectical constitution. The phenomenologists, especially Husserl, strengthened the Kantian notion of intentionality by including both the transcendental and the empirical within its compass. But for them, as for Kant, it has been primarily a unidirectional affair. It is always a "*Gerichtesein auf*" the object; an act whereby the object is constituted, and never a constitution of the subject by the object. One might object by saying that for Husserl the subject is constituted by the same act in which it constitutes the object, such that object and subject are constituted by what is essentially

an internal relation. This would be, I think, a legitimate rejoinder. It should be noted, however, that when the subject and object are viewed as contained within such a tight constitutive relationship, the independent existence of the object is lost altogether. As both Lauer and Wagner recognize, Husserl is ultimately forced to choose between finite subjectivism and absolute knowledge, between the early Berkeley and Hegel. To avoid subjectivism he must extend the brackets so as to include existence—and that is equivalent to removing them altogether! Heidegger gave up the bracketing in order to embark upon his own version of "phenomenology." He thus reverted more to the Hegelian conception of "phenomenology." Wagner follows Heidegger in rejecting the bracketing of existence as a valid or essential feature of phenomenology. Moreover, on Wagner's view of it, to maintain the Husserlian brackets around existence is to surrender any possibility of assessing the validity of thought. Within the self-contained phenomenal world from which genuine transcendence has been excluded, there can be no ultimate truth or error. It is only, so Wagner argues, when we consider the adequacy of thought to its object as it is in-itself that the question of truth can be put or answered.

In reply to those who might wish to hold that truth is essentially coherence, and thus does not require the relation of thought to a transcendent object, to a genuine "other," Wagner appeals to the nature of thought itself: "Thought for itself is fully empty and undetermined, nothing. Thought is something only in that it moves beyond itself to relate itself to something different in order to determine itself through the reflexive relation (*Selbstbeziehung*) to the other" (p. 129). Although thought, like the object, has its own intrinsic capacity for determination, this potentiality can never be realized by an act of pure self-diremption. "Thought is positing (*Setzung*), though the positing of an existent entity: thought is "transcendence in immanence," to use an expression of Husserl's: self-relation to an entity in the positing of it" (p. 129). Although "thought is transcendence," as both Wagner and the post-Hegelian idealists maintain, it is a genuine transcendence-to that which is independently real.

Wagner's point here is characteristically subtle and refined.

He means to assert that the transcendence of thought requires and presupposes the genuine otherness of the object as an ontological condition, and yet that thought "posits" the otherness of the object. What it posits is, as we have noted above, the reality of the object as "other" or *an-sich*. He is not, as it might seem, going about in a tight circle here in explaining the transcendence of the object by reference to the transcendence of thought and the transcendence of thought by reference to the transcendence of the object. If thought had no capacity for transcendence, were not essentially a mode of self-transcendence (intentionality), it could never recognize an object, and hence could not establish it as genuinely independent. Thus, the capacity for transcendence is presupposed as a condition for a meaningful realism. Yet (and here he departs from Husserl and some idealists) without an independent object to transcend to, thought would never be able to exercise its capacity for transcendence. It would remain always latent, potential, undeveloped. And even if it could be developed under its own power it would not achieve genuine self-transcendence. It would be caught up forever within the horizon of its own projects—as the idealists have consistently maintained. It would remain forever within the confines of subjectivity—whether absolute or finite.

An otherness which is only an otherness of the subject to itself is a *relative* otherness which permits only a Pickwickian transcendence. Reality might have been constituted on that principle, in which case a more radical otherness would be excluded. Wagner does not demonstrate that that is an ontological possibility, nor could he demonstrate it. A mode of thought in which the absolute is always thinking itself, and at the same time and by the same act, creating itself, is surely conceivable. The fact is, however, that it would not be thought as we know, employ, and experience it. Wagner's claim must be, then, a more modest one, namely: a) that the thought ingredient in human experience is finite and, hence, requires an other which it does not create or constitute in an absolute or unqualified sense; and b) that finite thought cannot be transformed into absolute thought. Instructed and tempered by the anti-Hegelian polemics of the empiricists, positivists, and existentialists, Wagner never forgets that he is a

finite individual, carrying out his reflections in Würzburg. He is fully persuaded—and rightly so—that there is no dialectical device by virtue of which he can shake off his own finitude. He assumes personal responsibility for what he says and, happily, addresses his analysis and his argument to other finite subjects. In analyzing thought he is not concerned with an abstract ontological possibility, but with an activity which transpires in the world of things and men.

It is, then, because of its finitude that thought requires an independent object. No matter how ambitious the claim that is made for the truth of a philosophical system, someone must make the claim and be prepared to defend it. It is the small though crucially important matter of the identity of the thinker which makes it impossible to sever thought as we know it from its finite connections. Any man, be he philosopher or street-cleaner, who believes that he is absolute, that he either creates or is identical with the whole of reality, is simply mad. The fact that it may be a "divine madness" hardly changes the situation. The demonstration of the finitude of human thought is incredibly simple. It depends upon the inescapable fact that the most absolute of thoughts must be expressed in human language and with the risk of poor style and grammatical error. But a proof of the impossibility of absolute knowledge is hardly called for in so positivistic an age, and Wagner can scarcely be criticized for failing to provide one. What may require explanation and, even more, justification is Wagner's claim that thought is absolute in spite of its finitude.

Philosophy is, as Wagner defines it, reflection. Initially it is and must be reflection upon the concrete world-relatedness of the reflecting subject. It is through reflection and reflection alone that the subject returns to himself from his preoccupation with objects in his world and becomes self-conscious. Only as we reflect upon our empirical consciousness do we become aware of the principles which have been employed in the structuring of this awareness. We move, thus, from the "secondary constitutive a priori" in which consciousness determines the specific objects in its world, to the "primary constitutive a priori" in which consciousness determines itself. The procedure proposed by Wagner is essentially the same as that set forth by Kant in the Introduction to

his Transcendental Logic. Kant had insisted that we can never know what principles have been employed by the Understanding until we see how it has manifested itself in experience. In formulating a Transcendental Logic we begin, not with pure abstract thought, but with experience. As Wagner puts it: "Consciousness can return to itself because it turns back from that by which it is initially and for the most part, namely from the object" (p. 36). It can return to itself only because it was first by the object. "Being-by-itself (*Beisichsein*) is possible only as a return, that is a reversal of the natural direction and intentionality of consciousness (*als Rückwendung und Umkehrung*)."<sup>1</sup> It is this return from being outside itself (*Außersichsein*) which is termed Reflection: "*Dieses Beisichsein im Modus der Rückkehr aus dem Außersichsein nennen wir Reflexion*" (p. 36).

As we have noted above, Wagner employs the stronger doctrine of intentionality and the corollary constitutive a priori of Husserl in carrying out what is more a Kantian than a Husserlian type of reflection. It is, I think, more Kantian because it attempts a) to arrive at ultimate explanatory principles, and b) to formulate a theory of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl had, of course, his own version of transcendental subjectivity, and even of absolute consciousness. The difficulty was, however, that he did not have an adequate theory of the finite subject as a legislative power. For Husserl the transcendental subject is identical with the most abstract and general features of the empirical world. Wagner's refusal to bracket existence enables him to carry out a reflection which establishes the subject as a relatively independent power to structure the world in accordance with its own laws. It is the mode of "*Beisichsein*" which Wagner finds lacking in Husserlian phenomenology. To oversimplify matters greatly, one might say that Wagner accepts Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a sound procedure but seeks to go beyond it. Wagner's doctrine of the "secondary a priori" enables him to avoid Kant's division between the Aesthetic and the Analytic, between Sensibility and Understanding. But his method of arriving at a priori principles is essentially the same as Kant's. Whereas Kant seems to have been riding two different horses in his Metaphysical and Transcendental Deduction, Wagner integrates the two modes of reflection. There

is no alternative, on Wagner's conception of reflection, to beginning with a transcendental deduction of categories. Although derivative in reflective analysis, the metaphysical deduction is logically and ontologically prior. To formulate an adequate metaphysical deduction one must begin with the results of transcendental reflection, since that is the only manner in which the principles of thought can be discovered. But one cannot proceed indefinitely with a transcendental method of analysis.

Wagner rejects Husserl's attempt to carry through an unlimited phenomenological (transcendental) reflection which culminates in a doctrine of absolute consciousness. Such a purely descriptive procedure cannot establish the subject as a being in and for itself, and hence cannot provide a proper foundation for cognition. It succeeds only in the ever more complete articulation of experience. Wagner agrees with Kant that the transcendental method has its necessary limitations and, further, that only speculation could provide an ontological explanation of experience. Fortunately, however, Wagner has available a mode of disciplined speculation which Kant had not envisaged, namely the dialectical reflection of Hegel. It is at precisely this point that Wagner attempts to mediate between Kant and Hegel and, at the same time, to move beyond the confines of phenomenology. He accomplishes this, interestingly enough, via Heidegger's program of "fundamental ontology." Wagner attempts to establish the finite subject as the absolute ground of knowledge through a dialectical or speculative reflection upon cognition. Like Heidegger, he adds the missing ontological dimension to phenomenology, namely the reference to being itself; and in this regard, he follows Heidegger in the exploration of the Kantian "I am" which accompanies all experience. But he employs the Hegelian method of phenomenological reflection in exploring the relation of *Sein* to *Dasein* or, if one prefers, the Being of *Dasein*. Heidegger succeeds in showing that ontological categories are exhibited in and presupposed by the transcendental a priori, but he does not attempt to justify his ontological categories. Although Heidegger considerably enlarges the sphere of phenomenological description by including Being itself, he does not go beyond description to *explanation*. Wagner, on the other hand, attempts to close the

circle, as it were, by rendering the ontological subject thoroughly intelligible. It can, so he believes—in contra-distinction to Heidegger—be made completely transparent and intelligible to itself through self-reflection. Whereas the being of the *object* can be made intelligible only through reference to the knowing subject, the *an-sich* or factitious character of the *subject* can be eliminated. For Heidegger, the self is thoroughly contingent; it just happens to be. It understands itself and its world on the foundation of its own being; but its existence remains ever somewhat dark and mysterious. Although Wagner agrees with Heidegger that only a "fundamental ontology" is possible, he proposes to show that the subject is its own foundation. He interprets the Kantian "I am" and the Heideggerian "*Dasein*" in terms of Hegel's absolute subject. If successful, Wagner's program would obviously answer many of the criticisms that have been levelled at both Kant and Heidegger while avoiding Hegel's absolutism. We may profitably skip over the detail of Wagner's analysis of cognition to examine his ultimate claim as to the absoluteness of the finite subject.

We need not examine the considerations which prompted Wagner to look to the knowing subject as the only possible absolute ground of knowledge. It is evident that he accepts the Kantian critique of traditional realism, and hence despairs of establishing the absoluteness of the object. Whether one agrees with this conclusion or not, one must, I think, agree with Wagner that any absolute foundation for knowledge must be the ground of that which is known as, also, of itself. If not the latter, then we have only a relative and proximate foundation—as in the case of Kant's Transcendental Ego, or Heidegger's *Dasein*. Wagner accepts the Hegelian argument that the absolute must be a subject. "The Absolute is thus essentially the relation of a self to an other (*Anderes*) which it has itself established and which it has distinguished from itself in order, in this reflexive relation (*Selbstbeziehung*) to the other, to determine itself with respect to this other" (p. 128). The fact that it is finite, and thus stands in relation to a genuine "other," in no way disqualifies the subject as an absolute ground. "The fact that the Absolute is different from the non-absolute which it establishes (grounds) in no way annuls the absoluteness of the Absolute" (p. 128). To be abso-

lute, the subject must be "positively infinite," so that it "has nothing outside itself." The trick is for the Absolute to determine itself in relation to its other, and thus to encompass the "otherness" of the object within its own horizon. "Thought is the absolute" because it is unlimited transcendence. Since thought posits both subject and object it includes both within its horizon, and hence may be regarded as the absolute ground of both.

This argument will doubtless strike many skeptically inclined readers as an act of conceptual slight-of-hand, of dialectical prestidigitation. If the subject serves as the foundation of the object only in this fashion, what right has it to the sublime (or ridiculous) title of "absolute"? If to be a cognitive subject at all, a thinking subject, is necessarily to be the foundation both of oneself and all objects known, the term "absolute" and the term "subject" would appear to be synonymous. If not, then it would appear to be sensible to retain the distinction between a finite and a possible (conceivable) absolute subject. To show that a meaningful absolute, that is one that could serve as the ultimate foundation for knowledge, must be a subject, is not to demonstrate that a subject is necessarily absolute—and yet, that is the way in which Wagner seems to argue. And his case is all the less plausible, on first inspection, because he recognizes the finiteness of the subject. Wagner does not, in other words, wish to prove that the finite subject embodies transcendent and eternal principles by virtue of which it might be termed absolute. It is, he argues, absolute in its function and capacity as finite knower. Though incapable of creating its object, it posits its object and mediates between itself and the object known. It is this capacity for the unlimited transcendence, on Wagner's view of it, that entitles the subject to be regarded as "absolute." Nothing that is beyond the reach of human thought; no question about the existence or the meaning of any being can arise save within the context of thought. The subject as thinker is thus a necessary condition of the possibility of all knowledge and experience. Since it is thought which establishes and sustains the distinction between appearance and reality, it has the power to judge and is the ultimate arbiter of all claims to truth. Contrary to the claims made by some skeptics and subjective idealists, thought has the power both to

establish and maintain genuine otherness. At least among the candidates which are available for the office, the finite subject has the best claim to be regarded as the ultimate foundation of human knowledge.

We are, Wagner acknowledges, indebted to phenomenology for its investigations of the facticity of the subject. It is, in fact, the historical merit of phenomenology that it has developed the theme of facticity with conceptual clarity. Unfortunately, however, phenomenology fails to provide an adequate foundation for the facticity which it has so carefully and exhaustively described. "It is somewhat tragic that the same phenomenology did not at the same time understand that it must anchor its investigations to a foundation on which it might have been able to come to an absolute stopping point: on the absolute foundation of '*Geltungs-reflexion*'" (p. 335). Apart from such a ground, the entire a priori structure delineated by phenomenology remains contingent and no movement is possible from description to explanation. As Wagner sees it, even Heidegger and Sartre fail to make good this deficiency in phenomenology. Neither of them attempts to validate or justify the structures which they attribute to "*Dasein*" and the "*pour soi*" respectively. A philosophically adequate reflection must, so Wagner argues, provide a critical reflection upon and a justification of the conditions of human facticity. This can be done only through a speculative reflection which moves beyond phenomenology.

Wagner's excursion into speculative reflection is strikingly Hegelian. He attempts to show that facticity (Heidegger's *In-der-Welt-Sein*) can be explained only in terms of the subject as it is in and for itself (*Beisichsein*). "Now we see that it is not otherwise for the subject in its facticity: An *In-der-Welt-Sein* can be a fundamental mode (*Grundzug*) of the determinate subject only in so far as we recognize the mode of being-for-itself of this subject as at least equally fundamental" (p. 342). To put it in other terms, self-consciousness, which is a necessary condition of all awareness, is essentially the reflexive relation of the subject to itself. The temporality of the subject is the "personal inner history" of its "spiritual development" (*geistigen Entfaltung*) (p. 343). The original project of the subject which gives unity

and structure to its world is determined by an original project of the subject (*ursprünglichen Selbstentwurf*) (p. 343). "The original project of the self is the reality of the freedom of the subject." Facticity is thus founded upon the reality of human freedom. Since it is oneself and one's own world which one is called upon to understand and explain, the task is by no means impossible. Because of the original identity of subject and object in the person of the inquirer, we can become transparent to ourselves. Wagner would not assert with Hegel that "spirit is all reality," but he does maintain that spirit is the foundation of all reality. Since, on his analysis, the original project of being a self is possible only through the agency of thought, it can be made thoroughly intelligible. I do not, then, simply understand the objects in my world in relation to categories and intentions which themselves remain unintelligible; I can examine and understand how these intentions give expression to my being as a self. The subject thus conditions both itself and its world and may be properly regarded as a kind of *causa sui*.

Although it is the individual subject which is absolute, genuine individuality is, he maintains, possible only in relation to other subjects. "As we have said, individuation and intersubjectivity stand in the strongest correlation to one another; they imply one another reciprocally" (p. 357). Our being-in-the world is a common being in the world with other subjects. The individual subject constitutes itself only in the "medium of this intersubjectivity" (p. 361). Objective spirit is "living intersubjectivity," and every expression of inner subjectivity is "objective spirit." Our self-consciousness implies the consciousness of others; our being-by-ourself, a being-with-others. At this point Wagner appears to affirm with Heidegger that *Mit-sein* (being with others) is a constitutive feature of *Dasein*—though not simply as a matter of fact. It doesn't just "happen to be the case" that we are concerned about others; we can be conscious of ourselves as individuals only in relation to other subjects. Intersubjectivity is thus a necessary condition of individual subjectivity; I require the other in order to be myself.

The phenomenologists all have trouble in dealing with intersubjectivity. Since they are committed to remain always with

consciousness, and since apparently there is no access to the consciousness of another person, any description of the relation of one consciousness to another becomes exceedingly difficult. It would appear that either a) one consciousness must somehow include the consciousness of the other within itself; or b) appeal must be made to a higher consciousness which includes in whole or in part the consciousness of the two (Hegel). Wagner is clearly moving in the direction of Hegel's analysis in arguing that the subject is together with other subjects not only in the world ("*das Man*" of Heidegger) but in its individuality. Man is, in other words, a social being who is partially constituted by his relations to others. But Wagner does not want to go along with Hegel in positing a super-individual consciousness. His view seems to be pretty much that of Karl Jaspers, who argues that man is a social being in the mode of *spirit* but solitary with respect to *Existenz*. In becoming a genuine individual he transcends his social involvement in a common world, and establishes his own individuality as well as that of others. His choices are, then, "unconditionally valid," though only "relatively true." Although we share a common world at several levels, in the last analysis we stand alone as more or less absolute individuals. We might, I think, describe Wagner's position in similar terms as affirming the relative absoluteness of the individual subject. He is the ultimate foundation of all of his projects, of his world and of his own history; but these projects and this history can be realized only in a world with other subjects.

In spite of his stress upon intersubjectivity, Wagner departs from both Hegel and Sartre in holding that the subject can be its own foundation. Hegel argued that a subject must be grounded in the subjectivity of another if it is to achieve its own truth and reality as a subject. It is only the community of subjects, and ultimately the absolute subject as the inclusive community, which can establish and justify the individual. Sartre deals with the same problem, though he comes to a more pessimistic conclusion. Since the individual cannot be his own foundation, cannot justify himself, he attempts to achieve a complete justification of himself through other persons. In love, so Sartre argues, the individual seeks to be justified by being loved by another. If the other exists

only to love him, his existence is justified by the other; he exists for the sake of the one who loves him. But, alas, the other inevitably seeks the same end; and hence neither of them can achieve what he wants and needs. Man remains unjustified and fails to transcend his own facticity. It is, I think, a serious weakness in Wagner's discussion that he fails to deal with this problem. Although he considers extensively the way in which the subject posits and serves as the foundation of the *object*, he does not examine the peculiar problems that are involved in the "positing" of another *subject*. Yet, on his view, all thought is "positing." How, indeed, do I or can I "posit" another as a *subject*? Can I be my own foundation and justification apart from my relation to other subjects? It is significant that Wagner finds no place for God in his system. If an individual can be the foundation of his own facticity, he has no need either of human love or of a relation to God. The subject as Wagner represents it is much like the ethical man as described by the Judge in Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*. In his absolute choice of himself (his *Selbstentwurf*) the individual can justify himself absolutely.

Wagner's argument seems to be as follows: a) facticity may be completely permeated by thought so as to become thoroughly rational and intelligible; it may be developed within the total project of the subject as structured by thought; b) thought is both reflexive and potentially infinite. It can reflect upon, criticize, and validate itself. It is in this sense absolute. "Because the subject is a subject it is necessarily absolute" (p. 415). In so far, then, as thought is absolute and serves or can serve as the foundation for human facticity, it renders the subject "absolute," and thus justifies him unconditionally. It should be noted that Wagner does not claim that the *existence* of the subject must be necessary in order for it to be absolute: "The absoluteness of the subject does not involve the necessity of its existence, the impossibility of its non-existence." We must rather say that: "If a subject exists, then it exists as absolute" (p. 415). The subject recognizes that it does not carry this sort of necessity within itself, that it has had a beginning and will come to an end—in short, that it is finitely absolute. Nonetheless, *while* it exists it is absolute; for that is its nature as subject (p. 416). Unlike the

finite subject which, though absolute, is not absolutely (necessarily) existent, the ultimate metaphysical ground of existence must exist necessarily, and thus be the foundation of its own reality. The finite subject is its own foundation—once it exists; it is the foundation of its existence even though it cannot produce itself from nothing. It is evident, then, that Wagner does not in fact eliminate the sort of facticity which both Hegel and Sartre were concerned about. Although he does not attempt to provide a complete ontology, and thus to present a speculative proof of an absolutely absolute, "the highest subject," such an ultimate and unconditioned ground of being would necessarily be a subject. Wagner seems to believe both that such a speculative proof is possible, and further that it would be necessary as a validation of religion. "The highest question of the philosophy of religion is answerable only to the degree that metaphysics has progressed as a philosophical science."

As was noted earlier, Wagner follows Kant in separating cognition, volition, and feeling. Like Kant he regards the good will as the unconditioned and autonomous will. "The ethical lies, as we have made clear, only in the determinate *how* of volition" (p. 258). The idea which informs ethics is that of a will which determines itself. The only point at which he appears to differ from Kant is in his insistence upon a theoretical validation of the principles of ethical volition. We discover the principles of ethics through phenomenological reflection, but we do not and cannot justify them in that fashion. The problem of ethics achieves a speculative completion, and the questions of moral conscience their rest, in a first theoretical reflection upon the validity of ethics" (p. 262). Wagner rejects the notion of a metaethics for the valid reason that "ethics is possible only as a philosophical enterprise," and hence that philosophical principles are constitutive of ethics. What happens, rather, in the case of theoretical reflection on ethics is that the interests of theoretical and practical reason converge. The idea of the self-constitution of an unconditioned will combines with the idea of the self-constitution of thought. "They unite characteristically in a theoretical undertaking of reflection" (p. 263). In other words, when the question is asked as to the validity of the principles of ethical volition, it is

impossible to separate the practical from the theoretical. Since thought was involved all the while in the processes of volition, the reflection upon volition only makes the role of thought explicit and self-conscious. Since, on Wagner's analysis, all spheres of human life are constituted by thought, no matter where it begins, whether with science, ethics, art, or religion, reflection converges at a point, namely theoretical "*Geltungsreflexion*." It is thought alone which can validate the principles which are operative in each of these areas, and the ultimate principles of thought are the same for every activity. Wagner thus makes explicit a point that is not developed by Kant, namely the role of "pure reason" in relation to cognition, volition, and feeling. His contention is, in effect, that truth, goodness, and beauty are possible as legislative ideals only because of the absoluteness of the human subject. Each sphere expresses in its own form and manner the unconditioned nature of the subject; each represents a special province of thought. If this appears to grant unqualified primacy to theoretical reason, we must remember that each of these areas has its own relative autonomy, and further that it is only through reflection upon each of them that we are led to the discovery of the ultimate principles of thought itself.

My chief difficulty with Wagner's procedure in thus separating theoretical from axiological reflection is that, as I see it, he denies himself the possibility of a satisfactory dialectical progression in knowledge. By separating—until the point of speculative reflection, at least—cognition from volition, feeling, and work, he cannot advance beyond what Hegel terms the vantage point of "observation." Wagner misses, I think, one of the most important turns in Hegel's philosophy, namely Hegel's argument that it is only through *involvement* with the object—through work and struggle—that we penetrate beyond its being-for-us. It is only, on Hegel's analysis, in so far as we are *dialectically involved* with objects that they may eventually *reveal* themselves to us as they are in and for themselves. There is, as I see it, no real possibility on Wagner's theory of cognition for a dialectical relation between knower and object known. The positing is an unqualifiedly one-way affair, and hence Wagner really does not succeed in establishing a multidirectional intentionality. In this respect he does

not advance beyond Kant or the phenomenologists. Is ethical volition really so separate from cognition as Wagner supposes? Does knowledge of an object or another person not require our *acknowledgement* of him, and is this not a moral rather than a purely cognitive task? Is love, for example, a non-cognitive relation of subject to subject? Apart from love, and other of the moral and emotional relations which obtain between persons, how can they conceivably know one another as subjects? Is perception actually devoid of feeling tone, and has beauty no cognitive significance? Was Hegel totally in error in regarding art as a supreme example of the self-disclosure of reality to man?

It is a serious limitation of Wagner's metaphysics that he has not considered these questions. He has a unified metaphysical subject with intentions in terms of which both the unity and differences of experience may be understood. But he has no unified object. He not only fails to provide for the object's appearance *from the side of the object*, and hence for a positing of the subject by the object, but he cannot unite the cognitive, ethical, and aesthetical conception of the object. If we must ask: how is it possible for a subject to intend objects in these modes? we must inquire also: how is it possible for the same objects to be apprehended in these modes? To say that the object is determinable in itself is not to give a sufficient answer to the latter question. This difficulty is all the more serious in that it has implications for ethics, aesthetics, and politics. How, for example, are we to arrive at adequate standards for acting toward animals, other persons, and the world in general? To validate principles within a self-referential "*Selbstentwurf*" is not to provide justification from the perspective of the other, and hence not to justify the "*Entwurf*" itself. Wagner's ethics suffers from the same humanistic limitation that plagues the ethics of Kant. To correct his position, Wagner would need only to inspect more closely the original world-relatedness of the subject, taking note of the manifold ways in which the subject is determined by the object. Absolute knowledge in the Hegelian sense might thus be employed as a regulative principle. Without it, Wagner cannot get far beyond Kant.

In spite of the limitations to which I have alluded, Wagner

has, I think, provided us with a remarkably stimulating and instructive work. He has, on the whole, appropriated the best insights of continental philosophers from Kant to Heidegger. Moreover, they have been included within and carefully subordinated to the authors own *systematic* reflection. He has the great philosophical merit of always providing an *entré* for his readers—even where they might be in strongest disagreement. Unlike some phenomenologists, Wagner never regards the method of phenomenological exhibition as enabling one to dispense with *argument*. His book brings together in a thoroughly systematic fashion the positive contributions of recent Continental philosophy, and thus prepares the ground for further reflective and speculative ventures. To my knowledge, it is the most comprehensive, coherent, and systematic work to emerge from post-War Germany. In restricting my discussion largely to his treatment of cognition, I have hardly suggested the riches to be found in his examination of ethics, art, politics, and culture. Few philosophers succeed in a life-time in achieving an integrated metaphysics of the scope and depth of Wagner's.

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## DREAMS

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**T**HERE IS A CONTINUOUSLY GROWING LITERATURE on psychological concepts—emotion, motive, intention, unconscious wish. Here much light is shed on our meaning and claims when we describe and explain people's behavior and what goes on in their minds by making use of these concepts. Various puzzles and paradoxes which arise out of our natural inclinations to say what kinds of description these are, or are not, are often eased or resolved as a result of this treatment. Prof. Malcolm's book<sup>1</sup> is a valuable addition, as it introduces new material into the work shop—not only new, but also having peculiarities characteristically different from those of the rest. (What he says naturally leads to the question of whether dreams are "mental phenomena" or not. The unique peculiarities of dreams—at the point this question arises—make Malcolm say something like, "Say what you will as long as you do full justice to what has been brought to your attention.")

There is a difficulty about past emotions, motives, etc., especially if they are in the distant past and I have forgotten what I then felt like, or if I was not aware of my feelings at the time. In the case of physical objects or events in the past I need not be the only witness; but in the case of past mental phenomena the corroboration of the supporting evidence is characteristically different. No doubt, here too we can have the evidence of diaries and of other people's testimony; but *the subject's report today* plays a peculiar role, this peculiarity varying according to the case in question.<sup>2</sup> E.g., I remember now that I was in love with Mary in my youth. I can see now, for the first time, that as a baby I felt envious of my mother for what she could give. The difficulty in grasping properly the detail that is brought together in talking about other people's past unconscious phantasies, the difficulty in

<sup>1</sup> Norman Malcolm, *Dreaming* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. vii, 128.

<sup>2</sup> See my article, "The Unconscious" (*Mind*, Oct. 1959).

grasping how we distinguish between the case of a person finally assenting to such an interpretation because he has genuinely remembered and that of a person who assents under suggestion, have led some people to say that *in these cases we only seem to remember, and what we experience belongs solely to the present.*

The case of dreams is even more peculiar, and perhaps, as Malcolm suggests, there is a break altogether between the logic of mental objects and that of dreams. We learn about the existence of dreams only afterwards from the waking reports of other people, or from certain impressions we have after having been asleep. In this respect dreams are in a position somewhat similar to that of past thoughts and feelings. But, in addition, dreams by definition belong to our sleep.<sup>3</sup> This makes them different even from feelings or thoughts we had in the past though we were not aware of them at the time—familiar in psycho-analytic literature. In the case of the latter it makes sense to talk of other people having been aware that the subject had such and such thoughts though he, himself, was not aware that he had them. There is no parallel to this in the case of dreams. Further, when a person in analysis finally becomes aware of what *went on* in his mind, he grasps the continuity between his past and his immediate present. But there is a break between past-sleep and the time when a dream "is recalled." These make the case of dreams rather peculiar; and Malcolm explores the difficulties due to this peculiarity.

Naturally he begins by exploring the past to which dreams belong, i.e., being asleep. This is a preliminary to the analysis of the sense in which dreams belong to it. He investigates the criteria for saying that someone is asleep. He brings out the various uses of (i) "*He is asleep,*" (ii) "*I was asleep,*" and (iii) "*I am not asleep.*" He shows that the first and third person assertions are not governed by the same criteria (p. 11). His examination leads to the conclusion that the first person present indicative, "*I am asleep,*" has no sense. This is the first step in the first part (Chs. 1-10) of his argument: One cannot assert or judge that one is asleep; knowing that one is asleep is not "an intelligible

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<sup>3</sup> I use this notion of *belonging* advisedly in order not to prejudge the issue.

notion" (p. 14). "That one is asleep . . . is not anything one can *think*" (p. 18). The next part of his argument leads him to the conclusion that one cannot make *any* assertion while asleep: whatever showed that someone was making an assertion or judging would equally show that he was not asleep. He might speak words in his sleep, but for these words to express a judgment he would have to be aware of saying them and know what he said (p. 36). Next, what is claimed about the notion of judging and asserting something while asleep is claimed of the notions of thinking, reasoning, perceiving, imagining, questioning, as well as fearing, enjoying, having illusions, etc., while asleep. In other words, Malcolm maintains that the notion of being asleep excludes those of thinking, feeling, and experiencing something. As he puts it, "Sleep *qua* sleep has no experiential content" (p. 39).

Since the concept of dreaming requires that dreams belong to one's sleep, Malcolm allows dreams in sleep: "A person cannot dream unless he is asleep" (p. 49). He says that dreams form an "exception" to his contention about (other) mental phenomena. But they are an exception by the very peculiarity of their logic, and it remains for us to see in what sense dreams are allowed in sleep, in what sense they belong to sleep. This constitutes the second and main part of Malcolm's examination or argument (Chs. 11-18).

He asks where the concept of dreaming comes from (p. 54). His answer is that it is derived from the familiar phenomenon that we call "telling a dream" (p. 55)—"not from dreaming, but from descriptions of dreams." This is a fundamental point in the argument: the "raw material" of the concept of dreaming is the description people give of their dreams (p. 89). Yet we are lured to a picture, somewhat similar to that which Socrates paints, of a man in a cave whose only contact with reality is through shadows of it. Here, we have the reports of those who have travelled and returned, and we have our own "recollections"—which for obvious reasons Malcolm refers to as "impressions"—and we feel dissatisfied because we lack the authority that comes from speaking while we are actually witnessing. It seems to us we can never have the guarantee for the authenticity of these impressions which we can for memories of, say, having visited the Louvre in our youth, or of having been in love. Malcolm suggests not only that

we want what we cannot have—often a source of despair characteristic in philosophy—but that we are misled to want what, here, is the wrong thing: “‘Subjective’ and ‘objective’ are *one* in the case of dreams” (p. 80). Thus the trouble is that we fail to grasp the concept of dreaming, that we get confused about the questions raised by dream-reports (p. 56, p. 84).

Malcolm says that the report or the impression is the *criterion* of the dream, i.e., (i) of having dreamt, and (ii) of what the dream was. Since *all* that we have *ever* learnt about dreams from are the descriptions given by others under the influence of their waking impressions, or our own waking impressions, these are what we have to look at in order to know what dreaming is—they are the “raw material” of the concept. There is nothing else from which the concept could be derived, and therefore nothing else for us to look at. “The question about the ‘real existence’ of dreams . . . is a purely metaphysical question that does not arise in the ordinary commerce of life and language” (p. 84). The interesting questions are: (i) Under what conditions is a narration a dream-report? (ii) If it is a dream-report how is it taken?

Concerning the relation between dreams and the waking conviction of having dreamt Malcolm says that “it is not easy to understand this relation” (p. 59). He says that dream-reports are such that they proceed from an impression—one tells a dream under the influence of an impression (p. 86). They are not like stories we invent, they are not tales that we make up there and then. Yet neither are they descriptions that could be checked against what they describe. “Telling a dream is undoubtedly a queer phenomenon” (p. 86). Our dream-reports are the criteria of our dreams. Malcolm is careful to point out that he is not saying that the dream is the waking impression, for dreams belong to sleep. “I am not trying to say what dreaming *is*,” he says; “I do not understand what it would mean to do that” (p. 59). But he is saying something about the character of the “impression” from which dream-reports proceed, and hence about the logic of the latter. He says that the impression is such that when we have it we think we are recalling events that we witnessed (p. 86). But this, he says, *cannot* be so, for we have not actually witnessed *anything* if we are telling a dream. Memories come from the past,

from occasions on which we did, witnessed, or felt something. Where, then, do the impressions of having dreamt this or that come from? Malcolm says that it is a mistake to look for an explanation here (p. 87); "We ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'." For Malcolm, then, after-sleep narration is a fact—it takes place. It doesn't come from somewhere, as memories come from the past; it is not cognitively related to anything in the past; it is not an invention; and it is not learnt (p. 89). What is learnt is how to take after-sleep narration. The question is not whether the impression corresponds to experiences had during the night in sleep, but whether the narrative fulfils certain conditions, e.g., that it proceeds from a genuine impression and is not a fabrication. That is how we know what we hear to be a dream-report. If it fulfils certain conditions, then we treat it as a dream-report, accepting the narrative on the speaker's say-so.

Malcolm is careful to avoid the question "What is dreaming?" (p. 59), and instead puts the question in the form "How do I know that he (I) had a dream?", "What counts for or against the truth of the statement that he dreamt?" (p. 61). We are familiar with this move in philosophy and with the reasons for such a transformation. Putting the question in the form "What are X's?" often stands in the way of a proper grasp of how "X" functions in language, tending to give the idea that X's are objects. Here Malcolm is combatting the idea that a dream is some sort of internal cinema. He directs our attention to the given that is the "raw material" of the concept, inviting us to consider what we could ever have developed our concept of dreaming from. The child hears and relates stories about, say, wolves. Upon waking up, perhaps in sweat, he is under the impression that he was chased by wolves. He thinks that this in fact happened. Gradually he begins to learn that when this is so he was not actually chased by wolves, and thus also learns how to take such stories when he recognizes them to be stories of one kind and not of another. But is this all that he learns? Malcolm says that it is all. What else is there to learn? He says:

"When someone on awaking 'remembers' certain incidents, and we know they did not occur, then we say he *dreamt* them, i.e., they occurred in a dream. There is not a *further* question of whether a

dream or the events of a dream really took place during sleep. . . . No problem remains of . . . whether anything *corresponds* to his memory of a dream. . . . There is simply no place here for an implication or assumption that he was aware of anything at all while asleep." (p. 66)

To say that someone dreamt he was chased by wolves is "merely how we label the above facts" (p. 77); the above facts are all the facts we have to go on.

This is impeccable as a piece of logic, but does it really do justice to all the detail that is covered by our concept of dreaming? I do not think so. Malcolm, himself, writes that "between the two poles 'awake' and 'asleep' there is much room for qualification" (p. 29). But is there not a link that runs through human life between these two poles? And if so, does it not throw new light on the notion of being asleep as Malcolm understands it? Perhaps Malcolm's paradigm is a hindrance rather than a help!

Malcolm advocates that we should look at the facts as they are without adding anything unwarranted to *explain* them. But surely if we take a sufficiently wide view of the facts we shall see the point of saying that human beings do have experiences while asleep. To say this is not to add anything hypothetical to what Malcolm calls "facts." I do not claim that these experiences necessarily figure as the contents of dreams. It is not easy to say what exactly the relation between the two is (cf. Freud). All I claim is that they help to locate dreams in sleep. To understand this is to make better sense than Malcolm does of our common conception that we dream while asleep.

First, about mental phenomena which take place during sleep other than dreams. I agree with Malcolm that dreams (what Freud calls "manifest content") are not identical with, nor composed of, thoughts, impressions, feelings, images, in the sense he is using these terms, occurring in sleep (p. 52). When we dream of a horse we do not see one; when we dream we are angry the anger in the dream is dreamt anger. But from this it does not follow that nothing takes place in the mind during sleep except dreams. With sufficient understanding we can see a man suffering during his sleep, and this is not in any way different from seeing a man fully awake suffer mutely. The dream he relates the next morning enlarges our understanding of this suffering, while

the signs which we have grasped at his bed side as those of suffering help to locate the dream as having taken place in the night during his sleep. Here the suffering and the dream constitute a whole; and this is what Freud had in mind when he spoke of the dream as "the life of the mind during sleep." If something can be said to take place in the mind unconsciously, that is, without the subject being aware of it, then I do not see why it could not be said that something can take place in the mind while the subject is asleep. If we think of mental objects too much as they are when they are conscious mental objects, and of sleep too much as it is at the pole which Malcolm makes into a paradigm—sound asleep—then obviously nothing mental could be said to take place in sleep except dreams. It is no wonder that Malcolm's dreams, as belonging to sleep, are so little like mental phenomena!

Malcolm considers one kind of case (pp. 38-39) which is often used in showing that the mind is active during sleep. Can it be established that a man made a judgment during sleep? (p. 37) Does it follow that he *arrived* at the opinion that Smith is talented *before* awaking? (p. 38) Malcolm writes: "It would sufficiently describe the facts to say that when he went to sleep he was not of that belief, but that he awoke with the belief. . . ." Again, considering the case where someone goes to sleep unable to make up his mind but wakes up decided, Malcolm says: "It would not follow that some time during the night he *made* the decision. It would be enough to say that he went to sleep undecided but awoke decided." He says that an inference to an intervening judgment or decision is not required, and that such an inference "would be theoretically unverifiable." I think that the reason why Malcolm claims this is that he thinks of the intervening judgment or decision too much on the model of gap-filling, as in the case where the interval between the absence of a particular object in a specific place and its presence there is filled by the event (verifiable) of, say, someone bringing and depositing it. Just as "it was not there, now it is" calls for an explanation in this latter case, so does it in the former case. What is needed here is a description which prepares the grounds for the application of a certain family of concepts which bring out what may be called in short "the participation of the subject." Such a description covers the detail which

is overlooked when we are contented to say "it was not there, now it is." The decision with which a person wakes up and the accompanying relief may bear the marks of "emotional work." Here what Malcolm finds a sufficient description of the facts is not satisfactory; for it does nothing to show the character of the decision with which the subject wakes up as *an achievement*—as *his* achievement. What we know of his problems, his agitation during sleep, the words, perhaps, we heard him utter when he was raving in the night, and the dream he relates the next morning, corroborate the statement that something was happening in his mind while he slept which led to the decision with which he woke up. Of course he may not be aware of anything other than the dream he relates. His mental struggles leading to the decision *appear in the context of the dream*, itself placed in a wider context of facts. No doubt one dreams passively; but dreaming is such that it can be integrated into the rest of the dreamer's mental life as part of one context in which his wishes and emotions express themselves.

Now about the dreams themselves which, I have pointed out, are closely connected and blend into a whole with the experiences of the dreamer during his sleep. I think that insofar as the latter is verifiable (however intricate and complex the verification may be), the reported dream with which it blends and which it locates also acquires an objective status. To say this is to look at dreaming from a different conceptual angle than Malcolm, and it helps us to make better sense of the common knowledge, ingrained in language, that dreams belong to sleep. It is this difference which makes Malcolm say, "I am inclined to agree that when Freud thought about the place of dreams in the general theory of psychoanalysis he pictured it in a way that is at odds with some of my conclusions" (p. 121).

This is a subject riddled with difficulties, and Malcolm brings them out very ably within a short space. His treatment of these is clever, and there is in it more than meets the eye, as those who are familiar with the tradition to which it belongs would appreciate. Yet, for me, this book does much more by way of raising questions than by way of settling them. In the end I feel dissatisfied with the picture of dreaming which the book develops.

I am left with the feeling that Dostoyevsky and Freud had a more profound grasp of dreaming. In short, I do not feel happy with Malcolm's location of dreams in mental life.

Does a man really have "absolute authority in saying what he dreamt" as opposed to the one he has in saying what his intention in doing this or that was? (Anscombe, *Intention*, p. 36). Does not his wet pillow and the sadness with which he wakes up take away something from this authority, i.e., limit what he could say he dreamt? Is there not evidence for the claim of an agitated night that goes beyond the subject's waking impressions? Does not the impression dictating the report of a dream often place the dream within such a context? Are we really barred from establishing any connection between the sleeper's utterances during his sleep, and the dream which he later reports, unaware of these nocturnal utterances? If we can say of a man under morphia that he is revealing the secret that has been in his mind, although he cannot, owing to his state, appreciate this at the time, why can we not say that the dream he reports reveals an emerging state of mind located by his nocturnal utterances? The interpretation of a dream reported during an analytic interview may make the patient realize something about himself for the first time, so that the realization takes place when he is awake; but what he realizes is something which has become realizable finally previous to the moment of realization. He can see and understand something of his inner struggles towards it and how the dream, as a final stage of his unconscious experience, heralds a resolution of the conflict between recognition and repression. It is not in vain that Gide has depicted such an inner struggle in his hero Bernard (*Les Faux Monnayeurs*) as a wrestle during sleep with the angel Gabriel. What makes a psycho-analyst talk of a person as knowing or finding out something unconsciously can only be grasped if we take into account the detail of his activities, the context in which they occur, and what he says about them and thinks and feels now. In taking all this into account and grasping what the analyst claims, we establish connections between the now and the then and get a completely new picture of what has been happening. This logical pattern, with some modification, applies to the notion of dreaming, though Malcolm wishes to exclude it, wherever it is

suggested, by "the distance from the paradigm" (p. 28) of the case suggesting it. Malcolm quotes Wittgenstein's saying that "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria" (p. 55), but fails to give us a sense of the richness of the outward criteria by not seeing the link that runs through the possible candidates. The result is that he reduces the significance of dreams (despite his attempt, at the end of the book, at re-establishing the therapeutic value of dream interpretation) to the extent of not feeling sure whether dreams are mental phenomena or not.

There are, indeed, difficulties which Malcolm meets boldly. Could we not meet them differently and maintain in the end, with Freud, that "the dream is the life of the mind during sleep"? I think we can. I have, obviously, done very little by way of doing this; and what I have said is tentative. Malcolm's book should be welcome to all those who feel about dreams as I do and are prepared to do the philosophical work which needs to be continued.

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## YOGA: THE PATH TO FREEDOM FROM SUFFERING

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY

**M**UCH OF THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY in Western Europe and America has concerned itself with the human condition. When it is found that the human being is conditioned by time and history, and therefore by society and culture, man realizes he is not free. Whatever one may think, do, and achieve, he is governed by the events in the cosmos—by becoming. This realization of man's temporality and historicity, and the fact of his being conditioned by his own subconscious and unconscious structurings and society, may exhaust the spirit of man and produce anxiety and despair in him. From such a standpoint as this, the most important problem appears to be: How can man achieve freedom from this anguish and suffering? How can he manage to be in the world and yet not be exhausted by time and history?

For ages one phase of Indian thought has grappled with exactly this problem. To be in the world is to be subject to limitations—conditionings—of power, of knowledge, and of freedom. So man's suffering is a result of his being in the world—of his being a link in this chain of becomings. His suffering is tied up with temporality and illusion—with *māyā*. Suffering is a cosmic necessity; it is one of the modes of reality, a law of worldly existence. If so, what are the limits of the various forces that condition man—that bind and fetter him? If we know this, then man can be deconditioned, freed from suffering and temporality and taken into another mode of existence, where he enjoys spontaneity and freedom. Thus universality of suffering need not lead to a philosophy of pessimism, for realization of it is a necessary condition for emancipation. The quest for the beyond, for transcendence, will start only when this world and this mode of life are depreciated (because they are vitiated by becoming, history, temporality, illusion, and suffering) and rejected. The quest presupposes that there is something beyond becoming, temporality, and suffering; and that it is possible for man to decondition and

free himself completely. The immemorial experience of the sages who have gone beyond and reached "the other shore," after discovering the ford and the ferry which will sail them across this ocean of suffering and becoming, testifies to the reality of transcendence and complete freedom. Such was the conclusion reached by one trend of Indian thought.

Because the modern West is preoccupied with the same problem, and because India claims that it has found the limits of human conditionings and what lies beyond these and that it can show the path to complete freedom from anxiety and despair, Professor Mircea Eliade<sup>1</sup> thinks that the study of Yoga (which is believed to be such a path) can be very fruitful at present. One may not practice or even believe in Yoga in its entirety, but it can at least show results which have been obtained by exploring the psyche through certain methods; and it can also demonstrate the possibility of a certain type of experience in which man realises himself to be fully free. Thus to have discovered that India too was and is concerned with human tragedy, time, and history, and that she too has something of value to contribute towards the solution of these and allied problems, is one of the commendable achievements of Prof. Eliade.

Besides containing a fairly exhaustive study of the origins and growth of various types of Yoga, Prof. Eliade's monumental book removes many misunderstandings entertained about Yoga theories and practices. It treats of not only the classic Pāṇjāla Yoga, but the types of Yoga found in the *Gītā*, Buddhism, and the Tantra. And at numerous places it brings in comparisons with somewhat similar theories and techniques found in Western Christianity, and in the religions of China and the Middle East. It achieves the difficult feat of being sympathetic as well as objective.

Prof. Eliade rightly describes the object of Yoga to be the emancipation of man from his human condition; to conquer absolute freedom and to realize the unconditioned (p. 95). The goal of all Yogic schools is *jīvan mukti* or liberation in life, which means a life outside time. He who achieves this loses personal conscious-

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<sup>1</sup> *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, Translated from the French by W. R. Trask (Bollingen Series, Pantheon Books: New York, 1958).

ness, i.e., a consciousness dependent on history, and wins for himself a witnessing consciousness, which is characterised by pure lucidity and spontaneity (p. 317, 363).

Prof. Eliade maintains that while ascetic methods and ecstatic techniques are found among all peoples, and while there is a continuity between older magical techniques and Tāntric Yoga, Yoga is found only in India and cultures influenced by India. He thinks it is the autochthonous creation of the whole of India, being a product of Indo-Aryan as well as pre-Aryan peoples (p. 102-3, 106). While the elements in Yoga of ritualism and speculations based on it are the contributions of the Indo-Europeans, the tendency towards the concrete in religious experience and the need for a mystical devotion to personal or local divinities are the contributions of the aborigines (p. 360). The discovery of the Mohenjodaro seals depicting ascetics seated in one of the classical Yogic postures, the presence in Yoga of trance and ascetic techniques based on the conceptions of the miraculous powers to be got by *tapas* (ascesis), the belief that conquest of the human personality which is the microcosm will result in the conquest of the universe which is a macrocosm, and the respectful place which Yogic techniques like *Dhyāna* (meditation) have in the *Upaniṣads*, in Buddhism and Jainism—all these lend weight to the contention that Yoga was an amalgam of mystic theories and practices that spontaneously arose on the Indian soil, due to the intermingling of the Aryan and pre-Aryan cultures. But it is doubtful whether one can argue from this that Yoga<sup>2</sup> is a unique creation of the Indian people and that it does not exist in non-Indian cultures, before more intensive comparative studies are undertaken of Yoga and the theories and methods of prayer, meditation, and contemplation found in the writings of the Neo-Platonists, the Desert Fathers, the Medieval European Mystics, the Taoists, and the Sūfis. And if similar or even identical doctrines and practices are found in these latter sources, before Indian origins are attributed to them, it has to be proved that they are the results of diffusion from India and that the human spirit in other lands and climes has not been so far able to discover this type of path to Freedom.

<sup>2</sup> I.e., the theories and practices which go by that name.

Prof. Eliade has been able to find classical and "Baroque" Yogas and Yoga techniques in Vedism, Brahmanism (including the *Gītā*), Buddhism, Tāntrism, and aboriginal faiths, because he takes Yoga to designate in general "any ascetic technique and any method of meditation" (p. 4). If detachment from the world, self-discipline, and unification of the spirit, which lead to another mode of being, are the essential features of Yoga, and if the renunciation of the fruits of one's acts and a *unio mystica* with God can be called Yoga—as the *Gītā* does—it is difficult to be sure that there are no elements of Yoga in St. Paul, in Benedictine monasticism, and in St. John of the Cross. What has been called Yoga by the Indians may not after all be a unique and special path to Freedom discovered only on the soil of India. *Pace* Prof. Eliade (p. 359), it would perhaps be not untrue to say that "meditation" and "concentration" were found to be necessary by the religious experience of all countries.

Prof. Eliade differs from many Western writers of books on Indian religion and philosophy, in that he has mastered the original sources in Sanskrit and has had the benefit of first-hand acquaintance with the matters on which he writes. This has enabled him to expound the exact nature of Yoga and to steer clear of misapprehensions. Thus he shows the similarity as well as the difference between Yoga and psycho-analysis, and clearly brings out the difference between Yogic insight and other types of intuition, between *samādhi* and hypnosis, Hatha Yoga and athletics, and Yoga and Shamanism. A few words on each of these points seem to be justified.

As already pointed out, Yoga is an ascetico-contemplative technique. Quite early the persons who discovered Yoga found that the greatest obstacles to the ascetico-contemplative life arise from within one's unconscious. The important role which the latencies in the sub-conscious play in life, and their resistance to all acts of renunciation and asceticism, was discovered by the Yogins long before the psycho-analysts were born. The tendencies within the subconscious are constantly on the look-out for an opportunity to manifest and actualize themselves, whereas asceticism and meditation (requiring concentration) would thwart them. So there is a conflict between the unconscious and

the ascetico-contemplative life. Unless the contents and structures of the unconscious are known *and mastered*, there can be no Yoga and no freedom for man. So the ancient Yogins have efficiently and rather thoroughly probed into the sub-conscious, and have also devised ways of mastering it. According to Yoga, the sub-conscious is not mere libido, it is the source of all egoistic intentions and acts. Any intention or act which is governed by a craving for a certain fruit is egoistic. But Yoga assures us that the subconscious can be controlled by asceticism and conquered through practices which will unify the various states of consciousness (p. XVII, 46).

Yogic meditation (*dhyāna*), Prof. Eliade points out, must be distinguished from poetic imagination and Bergsonian type of imagination, because in *dhyāna* there is a coherence and lucidity which is not found in the others. Besides, *dhyāna* is controlled by the Yogin's will, while in the others uncontrolled associations, analogies, symbols, etc., dominate. Also, whereas other types of meditation stop short with the external form or with the value of the objects meditated upon, in *dhyāna* the Yogin seeks to penetrate into the essences of things, so that he may possess and assimilate them (p. 72-3). The Buddhist *dhyāna* is also a means of mystical experimentation, which provides access to suprasensible realities (p. 169).

Enstasis (*samādhi*), which is considered to be the crown of all spiritual efforts, is, according to Prof. Eliade, usually mistaken to be a kind of hypnotic state. Ancient Indians knew hypnosis (*vikṣipta*), which is an occasional and provisional state of concentration, in which the mental flux is paralyzed. This may be emotional or volitional in origin. On the other hand, *samādhi* is attained deliberately after a plurality of mental states is suppressed. The less advanced form of *samādhi* is a type of contemplation in which thought directly grasps the form of reality, without the help of categories and imagination. The essence of the object is then revealed in itself without relations. It differs from *dhyāna*, because it is closed to stimuli and disturbances (p. 77-9). The most advanced type of *samādhi* is also not a trance where consciousness is emptied of all contents. When no objects are present to consciousness, and when the latter is saturated with a total and

direct intuition of being, *samādhi* of the highest type is achieved. In it the spirit finds itself to be free and autonomous and contemplates itself (p. 93). So *samādhi* cannot be put among trances and ecstasies obtained by intoxicants, narcotics, etc.; nor is it deep sleep. The Yogin can enter into deep sleep and *samādhi* at will and with lucidity; so it is, concludes Prof. Eliade, not self-hypnosis either. *Samādhi* is trans-consciousness where freedom is experienced, and the knowledge of unity and bliss is recovered (p. 99).

It has now become a fashion among some groups in India and the West to prescribe Hatha Yogic exercises for building up the body and curing certain diseases. Prof. Eliade makes it clear that Haṭha Yoga is not athletic or hygienic perfection. Haṭha Yoga, in order to master the body and transmute it into a divine body, does give much importance to the condition of the body and its control. It seeks to give value to one's entire life by making it an integral part of the means to achieve its goal (which is not different from the goal of all Yoga) (p. 228).

Yoga, says Prof. Eliade, should also not be mistaken for Shamanism. The Yogin's ideal is to obtain perfect continuous autonomy, enstasis, throughout life in a spontaneous way; whereas the Shaman obtains spontaneity only in and through ecstasy. The Shamanic motive to be able to abandon one's body and undertake spiritual journeys in trance is not found in Yoga (p. 339-40).

With great skill, Prof. Eliade has also shown how Tantra is "an imposing spiritual synthesis," compounded out of the legacy of Vedic cults and Brahmanism, the innovations of the *Gītā* and sectarian trends, the contributions of medieval Buddhism, alchemy, and autochthonous spirituality (p. 293). Basing themselves on the belief that the normal human condition is bondage, ignorance, and suffering, some forms of Tantra and Aboriginal faiths have sought to destroy this normality, to win freedom, knowledge, and bliss. As a result, in some of them excesses and aberrations are supposed to be effective methods of abolishing the human condition (p. 294-5).

With its notes and bibliography, Prof. Eliade's *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* is a magnificent achievement of scholarship. Along with Wood's translation of the texts on classical

Yoga,<sup>2</sup> this book constitutes one of the two principal sources of knowledge regarding this subject in English. As for understanding the relationship among Yoga, Vedism-Brahmanism, Tantra, and aboriginal faiths of India, and among the various forms of Yoga, Prof. Eliade's book has no rival in English. Prof. Eliade, however, does not seek to criticize in this book the presuppositions and logic underlying Yoga theories; and he does not question the value and wisdom of Yogic techniques and achievements. He does not, for instance, raise these questions: Are the objectives which Yoga seeks to achieve worthy and possible, and even if so, do Yogic methods achieve them? And, cannot these be achieved by other methods, which are simpler and more "natural" and "normal"? But his purpose in this book was not to raise such questions; in fact, he avoids value-judgments. His is, so to say, a masterly phenomenological presentation of Yoga in all its bewildering variety and stages of development; and a more adequate, comprehensive, and objective presentation may be hard to come by, for years to come.

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<sup>2</sup> J. H. Woods, *The Yoga-System of Patanjali* (Cambridge, Mass., 1914; Hos XVII). Dr. S. N. Das Gupta's book on Yoga is an important monograph on this subject in English.

## PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES

ROGER HANCOCK, DONALD WALHOUT, WILLIAM H. KANE, O.P.;  
CHARLES LANDESMAN, JAMES ROSS;  
DONALD W. SHERBURNE, AJIT KUMAR SINHA.

The following are some of the entries received in the contest presented in our March, 1960 issue. The starred essays were judged as winners and were awarded \$25.00 prizes.

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No satisfactory answers were received for the following questions:

1. For the most satisfactory account of the scholastic, if any, who first discussed or raised the question, "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Or, for the best account showing the time, place, occasion, and inventor, if any, of this supposed question.
3. For the best account of the meaning of "exists" in the *Principia Mathematica*.
6. For the best statement of the meaning of the expression, "value of a variable."

These questions are now re-opened. Papers should not be more than 1000 words long, and should be in the hands of the editor of this *Review* no later than March 1, 1962. Winning entries will be awarded \$25.00 prizes. Other contributions will also be published in the *Review* or returned to the authors.

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2. *For the best explication of the Kantian remark: "A hundred real dollars do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible dollars."*

ROGER HANCOCK \*

Kant's remark is paradoxical and needs explication. To begin with, it seems both obviously true and obviously false. (1) It is obviously true in the sense that when I mention a hundred real and a hundred possible dollars, I have mentioned the same number of coins—namely, a hundred. Further, a hundred possible dollars cannot become a hundred real dollars by adding coins. For if coins are added, what becomes real is the hundred possible dollars plus the added coins, and this is a larger sum of money than the original hundred dollars. (2) But the remark also seems obviously false. If I have in my possession a hundred real dollars, then I have a hundred coins (or bills). But if I have only a hundred (merely) possible dollars, then I have no coins whatsoever. In this clear sense, there are exactly one hundred more coins in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred (merely) possible dollars. Moreover, the only way to change a hundred possible dollars into a hundred real dollars is by adding coins: how could I acquire the hundred dollars I might own except by adding a hundred coins to my possessions?

The question behind Kant's remark is: what is the difference between a hundred possible dollars and a hundred real dollars? In general, what is the difference between a merely possible such-and-so and a real such-and-so? We feel that somehow a mere possibility is something less than a reality; therefore, something must be added to the mere possibility to change it into a reality. This feeling could be articulated in the following way. Of course, a hundred real dollars is also a hundred possible dollars; all real things are also possible, in any acceptable sense of possibility. But the converse seems false: not all possibilities are real, and from the fact that such-and-so is possible we are not entitled to infer its reality. The class of real things, then, seems to be a subclass of possible things, just as the class of men is a subclass of the class of animals. A human being is an animal with some

further specification or determination added; e.g., rationality. Similarly, it seems that a reality must be a possibility with something added—some further specification or determination. What is this something added? Kant's point in the remark under discussion is that *nothing* is added. For, he reasons, if something were added to a possibility when it becomes real, it would not be the original possibility which becomes real, but rather something different and larger. If a hundred possible dollars become real by adding something, X, then the hundred dollars plus X would be realized, not the (exactly) one hundred original dollars. Yet, it still seems that if nothing were added to the merely possible dollars, they would remain just what they are—a mere possibility. The heart of the puzzle is that when a mere possibility becomes a reality, it must somehow stay the same, and yet become something different; a hundred real dollars both is and is not the same as a hundred possible dollars.

Kant's answer to the puzzle can be stated in the following way. Reality (or existence) is not a quality which is added to possibilities when they become real. A hundred possible dollars do not become real dollars by adding reality, in the same way that animals become human by the addition of rationality, or in the way that a glass of fresh water becomes salt water by adding salt. We cannot turn possibilities into realities by adding reality, in the way we turn red paint into orange by adding yellow. Still, there is a difference between a mere possibility and a reality. Something is possible if it "agrees with the formal conditions of experience"; that is, if it contradicts none of the laws of experience which are known *a priori*. And something is also a reality if it is perceived or inferred from what is perceived according to "the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena." Briefly, something is possible if and only if it does not violate any of the "necessary conditions of experience." And something is real if and only if it is also directly perceived, or inferred from what is perceived. A hundred merely possible dollars become real dollars when someone perceives them or infers their existence from what is perceived. In general, the difference between a mere possibility and a reality is that a real thing has acquired the relational property of being perceived; the mere possibility does not change, but

comes to bear a new relation to our experience. Similarly, a man does not necessarily change when he becomes a father; he might become a father without knowing it. But he does acquire something new; namely, the relational property of fatherhood.

There are several difficulties in Kant's solution. (1) Being perceived, or connected with perception according to empirical laws, does not seem to be a sufficient condition for being real. Kant argues that, e.g., a magnetic field is not directly perceived, but is yet real, in the sense that it can be inferred from what is perceived according to empirical laws. But similarly, things in the past (e.g., dinosaurs) and things in the future (e.g., tomorrow's sunset) can be inferred from what is perceived. Yet, we do not want to say that dinosaurs and tomorrow's sunset are (now) real. Kant's criterion of reality does not enable us to distinguish things that are real but not directly perceived (e.g., magnetic fields and radio waves) from things that have been or will be real, but are not now real. (2) Kant's criterion of reality does not give a necessary condition for being real. Clearly, there are real things which have never been directly perceived, or inferred to exist from what we perceive plus the laws of experience. It is not meaningless to say that there is life on other planets, even though no one has perceived such life, or inferred it from what is perceived. In general, Kant makes the mistake of defining what is real in terms of what we discover to be real. But this is clearly unsatisfactory. To say that X is real cannot be equivalent to saying that X has been discovered to be real—otherwise, to say X has been discovered to be real would be to say that X has been discovered to be discovered to be real. This would be always to assume, but never to explain, what it is to be a reality. Kant's solution assumes, but never explains, the difference between a mere possibility and a reality.

*Chicago, Illinois.*

DONALD WALHOUT

In giving an explication of this statement we shall understand by explication both (a) making the meaning of the statement more easily grasped by the mind, and (b) showing how the state-

ment can be subsumed as an implication under Kant's general principles.

The first point, almost too obvious to mention, is that the meaning of the statement lies in the conceptual realm and not in the realm of physical fact. That is, Kant would be a poor financial adviser if he were telling us that a hundred physical dollars comprise no more money than a hundred possible dollars; for if we spread one hundred physical dollars before us on the table, the table is certainly laden with more dollars than if we had spread it with a hundred possible dollars, viz., exactly one hundred more. The statement intends to assert, therefore, some identity or equivalence of the two concepts, "a hundred real dollars" and "a hundred possible dollars," taken as concepts.

There is a mathematical tautology, based on the law of identity, at the root of the alleged equivalence of the two concepts. It is not the entire meaning of the statement; but it provides a clue to the rest of the meaning. The tautology is  $100 = 100$ . In the quantitative realm of pure mathematics the concept of the number 100 remains the same throughout different usages of it, so that descriptive predicates drawn from the domain of existence do not affect it. The quantity 100 is unchanged in a hundred dollars, whether it refers to a hundred green dollars or a hundred blue dollars. Likewise it remains the same regardless of modal descriptions, e.g., whether it refers to one hundred real dollars or one hundred possible dollars.

Now Kant's main point in the statement is that what is true in the case of 100 is also true in the case of every conceptual essence. No matter what the essence may be, it is not altered by existential or modal predications of it. Whether its exemplification is real or unreal, contingent or necessary, possible or impossible, has no effect upon the identity of its meaning.

This doctrine was put forward, as is well known, as part of Kant's attempt to show the ontological argument invalid. If real existence does not affect any essence, then God's existence cannot be inferred on the ground that only thus can the conceptual essence of God's perfection that we have in our mind be completed. The entire concept of his perfection and necessity is the same with or

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without his real existence. Existence does not enter into essence and therefore cannot be inferred from it.

Upon first examination, this doctrine of the alienation of existence from essence may seem to be an unusual one from the viewpoint of a commonsense, or even a philosophical realism. If man builds up his concepts through experience in the world, and if the world exists in one way rather than another, we would naturally suppose that the way the world exists would govern man's conceptual thought about it. Why, then, does Kant adhere to his view?

There are two Kantian principles which provide an answer to this question.

In the first place, for Kant concepts are not, except in their empirical content, drawn from experience. They are permanent *a priori* structures of mind which are presented to experience and not taken from it; they await only to be filled in with empirical data. They are, if it is not a contradiction to say so, relatively eternal, i.e., unchangeably a part of experience as long as human reason endures. This being so, Kant holds that conceptual essences cannot be affected by passing existence. Existence, either real or possible, bears no influence on essences because the latter are subsumed under categories which are invariable.

The second principle is Kant's phenomenalism. One aspect of this doctrine is that the real cannot be known. The only thing which can be known is the phenomenally real, a position which Kant calls empirical realism. But the phenomenally real is not, after all, so vastly different from the merely possible—at least not as different from it as the "really real" would be. With this blending of the possible and the real (meaning the phenomenally real, since the "really real" is beyond rational discourse for Kant), it follows that the distinction between the possible and the real is irrelevant to any conceptual essence in his system.

According to philosophical realism the distinction between real and possible is a pronounced and significant one. Possible existence refers to inactive, abstract, merely potential beings and occurrences that might or might not become real apart from consciousness; whereas real existence refers to active, concrete, dynamic beings and occurrences, thriving and pulsating inde-

pendently of our awareness of them. Since conceptual essences are geared to reality, they are of course bound up with and influenced by the creative, emergent character of the real. Existence is not foreign to essence, for the two are interrelated. In theistic realism God's essence is not the same with or without his existence, since his essence includes existence. This does not mean that the ontological argument is valid for realism, for other considerations are pertinent there. But the point does show the interpenetration of essence and existence in realism.

This contrast with realism helps to illumine Kant's view. His view is that the real and the possible are distinctions only within consciousness. The possible is not empirically present, while the real is: so much is true; but these are degrees of awareness within subjective consciousness and do not constitute the difference between unrealized conceptual essences and an independent field of dynamic, creative agencies. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that, in his table of categories, Kant holds that all the other categories are both subjective and objective, while the modal categories designate subjective distinctions only. If the real and the possible differ only as modes of subjective apprehension, we can readily see why Kant would regard the difference as negligible in deciding whether existence is a predicate modifying essence, and why therefore a hundred dollars form such stable currency in the Kantian bank of concepts.

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WILLIAM H. KANE, O.P.

"The real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars." (*Transcendental Dialectic*, Bk. II, Ch. III, Sec. IV.)

In this passage Kant acknowledges a distinction between the real and the possible, and does not simply identify them. By the real he means the object with its actual existence, e.g., a hundred real dollars. By the possible he means our conception of an object considered with regard to the object conceived as such, that is, with regard merely to the contents of the conception, e.g., our conception of a hundred dollars. In saying that a hundred real

dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars, Kant is not comparing a purse containing money with an empty purse; nor is he saying that a hundred real dollars are simply identical with a hundred possible dollars. He is saying that something real, e.g., a hundred real dollars, is the same in content as something possible, e.g., the content of our conception of a hundred dollars. The content of the real object is not greater than the content of our conception of the object, because, if it were, our conception would not be an expression of the whole object, but would be an inadequate conception of it.

According to Kant, my conception is merely a determination of my mental state. If I have a conception of something at first merely conceived, that is, a possible, and afterwards acknowledge that there exists a real object distinct from my conception of it, I do not increase the content of my conception, nor do I increase the content of the real object. In such circumstances I merely change my mind, and posit or affirm the existence of something real. The same content may be real and may also be conceived by me. Whether I conceive it or not, and whether I conceive it as real or not, makes no difference to the real. Nor does it make any difference to the content of my concept whether this content is merely possible, or whether there is also a real object distinct from my conception. If there is a real distinct from my conception, the real contains no more than the possible.

But when I count my money, it may be said that there is more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars, because neither the real object itself nor the knowledge that there is a real object is analytically contained in my conception of a hundred dollars, and this knowledge of the real forms a synthetical addition to my conception. From the mere conception of a hundred dollars I do not know whether the dollars are real or not; but through the experience of counting the dollars by seeing them or touching them I know that they are real and not merely possible.

A comparison may help to make all this a little clearer. From my recollection of a friend I cannot tell whether he is still alive or not, but when I shake hands with him I know that he is alive. My mental images represent objects in a way that abstracts from their presence and from knowledge of the real, and so I cannot

know from the mere image whether the object exists or not. My conceptions also express objects which may or may not exist, and so from my conception I cannot determine whether the object is merely possible or whether there is also a real object distinct from my conception of it. But in either case, whether the object is real or not, the content of the conception is the same, and is the same as the content of the real if there is a real. The real dollars include their real existence, and the conception of the dollars is indifferent to the real existence of the object. This objective reality or existence of the real object is not known through the mere conception of the object, but becomes known by a synthetic process based on experience.

Against Kant's position, it might be argued that the real and the possible are so diverse that they should be contrasted rather than compared. It is meaningless to say that the real contains no more than the possible, just as it is meaningless to say that light is not brighter than darkness. But the marvel of knowledge is its grasp of reality. Real objects can both be and be known, and can be known more or less adequately. An adequate conception of the real expresses the whole object, and so it can be said that the real contains no more than the possible, that is, the conception.

It might be argued that the real and the possible are the same in content, and so they are not comparable. But they are not the same in the same way, but are diverse modes of being which, nevertheless, are comparable because both the real and the possible can be known and distinguished, although not by mere conception, but by reflection and by other mental functions.

It might be said that there is more in the real than in the possible, because the real includes the conception itself, and this is not included in the contents of the conception. But Kant is speaking about the contents of particular objects, not of the totality of all there is or can be. However, even though the concept itself is not directly included in the contents of the conception, it is included indirectly and concomitantly; and we are aware of the concept and of the self together with the direct contents of the conception.

It might also be said that there is less in the possible than in the real, because the real contains both essence and existence,

whereas the possible contains essence only and not existence. But the possible is an expression or conception of an object as a whole, not merely of part of an object. The conception does not express essence as distinct from existence, just as it does not express a real object as distinct from something merely possible. Distinctions are not known by mere conception, but by some other mental process.

Finally, it might be argued that we know very little about the real, and so it is useless to distinguish between the real and the possible. But from the point of view of practical reason Kant found it very useful to employ this distinction, even though he admitted that we know very little about the real and denied that we know the real as it is in itself. He seems to have considered the real as it is in itself precisely as it is in itself, with its own peculiar material or physical mode of being, and in this way we do not know things as they are in themselves. In his speculative philosophy Kant does not take advantage of the fact that things which are in themselves can also be in our knowledge according to another mode of being, which might be called immaterial or intentional.

*Albertus Magnus Lyceum.*

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4. *For the best demonstration that one does or does not see stars that were in existence a long time ago.*

CHARLES LANDESMAN \*

It does seem paradoxical to say that one can now see a physical object such as a distant star that might or does no longer exist, or that one can now see a certain state of an object even though the object is no longer in that state. Where does the paradox lie? Why does the contemporaneity of the physical object with the perceiving of it appear to be self-evident?

The paradox occurs because since, as a matter of fact, the physical objects which are most prominent in our environment do exist at the time we see them, and since there is no discernible

difference between their states when light begins to be transmitted from them and their states at the time they are seen by us, we have constructed our concept of seeing so that "I see  $x$ " entails " $x$  exists." Thus, to say that we can now see a star that no longer exists is to utter a self-contradiction. Now, a logical impossibility is not quite the same as a metaphysical impossibility. Some have argued that it is metaphysically impossible to observe the distant past because to do so would involve leaping backwards in time, which is impossible. But the reason why it is impossible to see what is past is conceptual; it has to do with what our concept of seeing entails.

Suppose we become impressed with the evidence from physics and astronomy that many of the stars we say we see might well have gone out of existence at the time we say we see them. We then have two alternatives. We can continue to accept our present concept of seeing, and admit that although we thought we saw these stars we really did not see them. When we find out in the future that the stars we said we saw in the present did not exist at the time we said we saw them, then we are logically compelled to admit that our claim to have seen them was erroneous. This need not affect our judgments concerning physical objects in the immediate environment, because we are assured on the basis of the same theory which calls into question our seeing of the stars that, since the velocity of light is so great, they usually exist at the time we are seeing them even though our visual experiences are determined by events at those objects in the past. The facts that we can learn about an object when we truly see it concern the state of that object in the immediate past and (on the assumption, to be verified in the future, that that state persists into the present) the state of the object in the immediate present. It follows, from this analysis, that the claim to have seen some physical object is always corrigible.

On the other hand we might revise our concept of seeing by denying that seeing something entails its existence. This is a conceptual revision, and not a metaphysical theory. We simply reconstruct the concept so that the question of existence is left open. It then becomes a question of fact, not implied by the truth of the statement that something is seen, whether that something

exists. There is then no logical barrier to our saying that what we see does or may not exist at the time we see it. What, then, is involved in a claim that a non-existent star is seen? What is involved first is that there was an external agent active in the causal process productive of the star-like imagery in my visual field; that this agent was a star; and that I believe that it was a star. If my claim to see the star is false because I am subject to an hallucination, this means that the active agent was something other than a star. This concept of seeing does not mean that we can leap over time; to see what is past does not mean that we see into the past in a way analogous to the claim of fortune tellers that they can see into the future. It simply means that the information gained in the present about some object concerns the past state of that object. Nor does this view imply that the star-like imagery in the visual field exists in the past, for that is evidently contemporaneous with our seeing. The paradox of seeing what is past is mitigated when we remember that seeing is a complex affair involving contemporary imagery and belief. While the imagery is confined to the present, objects of belief are not so limited. It is no more paradoxical to say that we see what is past than that we can remember what is past on the basis of present imagery. The difference between seeing and remembering is that the active agent productive of the imagery is, in the case of seeing, that which is seen; but in the case of memory is not that which is remembered. To see what is past does not mean that what is past has become present. It means that from what is present in the way of data we can acquire beliefs about the agent productive of the data.

Which of the two concepts is more acceptable? This depends on our purposes, on what distinctions we want to call attention to. It is a matter of convenience and simplicity rather than of truth.

*University of Kansas.*

JAMES ROSS

The following in eight parts constitutes a demonstration that one can now see stars which, on other grounds, are assumed not

now to exist, but which did exist at some time earlier, in the same sense in which one can see the paper on which this demonstration is written.

1. It is logically impossible that there should be a veridical perception of a non-existent, if we define perceiving appropriately.<sup>1</sup>

2. Stipulating this definition, it follows that if I perceive X to be white, and X is a star, then the star exists. And it is in this generic sense that I intend to employ the term "see."

3. An antinomy results. For it is well known that I can claim to see a star, where the first three conditions of the above definition are fulfilled simultaneously with my utterance, but where the fourth is not fulfilled. It is also well known that we do treat such utterances as "I see such and such a star" as true, veridical perception statements, when we know full well that there probably is no such star. It is further evident that any philosophical interpretation of perceiving which says this star-seeing is merely phenomenal and not epistemic seeing is, *ipso facto*, inadequate, since it runs counter to our intuitive conviction.

4. If I say, "I see such and such a star," and if some competent astronomer proves that no such star ever existed, then I will withdraw my claim, saying "Well, I *thought* I saw it." (You can imagine such a conversation at the foot of a telescope in an observatory.) But if the astronomer shows me merely that the star no longer exists, I shall at most be puzzled at how I can see what does not now exist; I shall not at all doubt that I see it. Upon reflection, I will notice the ambiguity of talking about what "*now*" exists, and therein I shall discover my explanation.

5. Let us suppose that the conditions of the definition of

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<sup>1</sup> An appropriate definition:

If S perceives *x* to be F, then:

1. *x* appears F to S;
2. S takes *x* to be F;
3. S believes that *x* is F;
4. *x* is F.

veridical perception are amended to clarify the ambiguity of "now."<sup>2</sup>

The effect of the following paragraphs is to admit the necessity of such amendments, because the time of "perceiving" may not be the same as the "time of being," and then to show a way in which they can be replaced by the simple concept of "epistemic presence."

6. How do we calculate the relation between the perceiving at  $t_1$  and the time of existing of what is perceived? For, if anything is clarified by such puzzles as are in question, it is this: *the implicit time indicators of perception statements are not directly and simply related to the implicit time indicators of the existential statements which are entailed by veridical perception statements.*

There seems to be a relatively simple answer. If the difference in the time indicators of the perception statement and the entailed existence statement is not negligible, then it will be the case that the time indicator of the existential statement will differ from the time indicator of the perception statement strictly according to the degree to which the event of perception is *temporally-other* than the event perceived. That is, if what is perceived is "temporally-other" in time, because of its distance in space from the event of perceiving, then calculating (by the employment of physical laws and operations) backward from  $t_1$ , we shall arrive at a time  $t_{10}$ , at which the perceived event must have existed, if it is to be perceived at  $t_1$ . For purposes of epistemology the time  $t_{10}$  must be considered epistemically simultaneous with time  $t_1$ .

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<sup>2</sup> Such an amendment would look like this:  
 "S perceives  $x$  to be F at  $t_1$ " means:

1.  $x$  appears F to S at  $t_1$ ;
2. S takes  $x$  to be F, at  $t_1$ ;
3. S believes  $x$  to be F at  $t_1$  or earlier;
4.  $x$  is F at  $t_1$  or at some earlier time;
5. X's being F at  $t_1$  or earlier is causally sufficient (granting that S is a normal observer) for X's appearing F to S at  $t_1$ .

That is, there is some causal law according to which S's phenomenal seeing of  $x$ 's being F at  $t_1$  is the causal effect of X's being F at  $t_1$  or some earlier time, and furthermore, that the *effective* temporal distance between cause and phenomena is zero.

In order to clarify these notions, let me explain somewhat the concept of temporal otherness. If we assume the constancy of the speed of light and the special theory of relativity, there are some events which are totally-other with respect to one another in the physical universe. That is, there are some events which are so related spatially that to no observer, regardless of his position, could they both appear simultaneous and be taken by him to be causally related according to any set of consistent physical laws. It follows that some events which are taken to be causally related cannot be observed as simultaneous. It also follows that if the physical event which is the adequate cause of a pattern of sensations is beyond a certain distance from us in space, the event of this thing's being white at  $t_1$  will be temporally-other than our perceptions of the thing's being white at  $t_1$ ; there will be a built-in time lag. The event which is perceived is discriminably distant in time from the mental event called the "perception." By "discriminable," I mean that the event's distance in time is at least in principle calculable and would not, in terms of an appropriate motor response on our part to our perception, be negligible.<sup>3</sup> Since a time-lag, sometimes discriminate and sometimes not, is common to all perceptions, the perceived should be considered *epistemically present* to the perceiver if the time indicator of the existence statement entailed by the perception statement is determined *solely* by the alteration of the time indicator of the latter according to the measurement of the degree of temporal-otherness of the two events; where degree of temporal-otherness is so small as to be negligible, the time indicators are identical on both statements, as is common in most experiences.

7. *The demonstration of the theorem:* One does see stars that existed a long time ago (but which no longer exist), assuming

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<sup>3</sup> Thus, the time it takes for a table to produce appropriate phenomena for me to perceive it is not great enough to be discriminated, since I need make no adjustment in my motor responses to account for the time lag in perceiving; as a result, I do not imagine a lapse of time between the event perceived and the event of perceiving. When we are dealing with astronomical distances and speeds, however, it is immediately apparent that the distance in time required for phenomena production does matter; for instance, absolutely nothing I can do will affect its next state.

that there are such stars which are now thought to be seen but have ceased to exist.

- (a) Seeing is perceiving, for this context, and is defined in section 1 above. It is epistemic and not merely phenomenal seeing.
- (b) Perceiving is of what is a present object of experience, i.e., of what is the cause, of the phenomena which were psychologically contemporaneous with the utterance of the form "I see that  $x$  is F."
- (c) What is the sufficient cause of the present phenomena (physical laws assumed to be constant) is the present object of experience; the phenomena are the sensation pattern supposed by utterances of the form "I see that  $x$  is F."
- (d) The temporal distance between the occurrence of the phenomena and the existence of the perceived is counted zero if, under the conditions of observation, it is not physically possible that the time-lag between cause and phenomenon be less. Where the time lag is counted zero, the object is considered to be epistemically present. All perceptions involve a time-lag, since no two causally related events are, to an independent observer with unlimited power of distinction, exactly simultaneous (granting the constant speed of light and the special theory of relativity, this is tautological).
- (e) Events which are temporally-other (as are all causally related events involving physical causality) do not have identical time coefficients. Hence a perception statement never has a time indicator identical with the time indicator of the entailed existence statement. For normal perceptions, the difference in time indicator is negligible; for perceptions of spatially distant events, the difference in time indicator is not negligible, and if not noticed will lead to an incorrect interpretation of the existence assertion. In such perceptions, what is psychologically present and epistemically present in time is not physically present in time.<sup>4</sup>
- (f) There is no logical difference between star-seeing and any other sort of veridical perception; there is only a confusion if the time lag which is not discriminable in many contexts is assumed to be negligible in all. Stars are thus epistemically present in the same way that tables and chairs are.

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<sup>4</sup> It is extremely important to make the distinction between *epistemic presence* and *physical presence*, because it is not logically necessary that anything be physically present at the time of perception if there is a time-lag in the process of perception (as there is), but it is logically necessary that what is perceived be epistemically present, that the effective distance from cause to phenomena be zero. This distinction can be extended to explain the way perception can occur through artificial delaying and storage prechisms, such as phonograph records and movie films.

8. Hence, it may be said: first, that perception is always of what is epistemically present to the observer; secondly, that non-existent stars may be epistemically present to an observer, present in *exactly* the same way any other object of perception is present; thirdly, that non-existent stars can be the objects of veridical perception; fourthly, that it is always false that the evidence (classified in the definition of "perception") upon which the perception is based can *alone* be adequate evidence for the non-existence of what is perceived; since it is a fact that what is perceived is present, and existent.

To say correctly, "I see such and such a star" entails that such and such a star exists at some time contemporaneous or prior to my utterance. By adding all the relevant laws of physics and astronomy and optics to my statement and, perhaps, some further observations, the exact temporal coefficient of the existence statement is determinable. Regardless of what the proper time indicator is, the event perceived is epistemically present to the perceiver, since the time indicator of the existence statement can be deduced from the perception statement and appropriate auxiliary premises.

It follows that on epistemic grounds there is just as good reason to say "I see such and such a star" as there is to say "I see my desk," since both objects are epistemically present, and both perceptions on careful examination will be found to involve a time-lag. The important conclusion is that the temporal indicators on the existential statements which are entailed by veridical perception statements, are not a simple function of the time indicator of the perception statement, but are simultaneously a function of the causal laws which determine the relation between physical cause and the resulting phenomena in the observer. That there is a time lag in every case is obvious; that it can be ignored as indiscriminable in most, is evident; that it is crucial in events which are to a significant degree temporally-other, is certain and interesting, but no reason for anyone to stop seeing stars that used to be there but aren't any more.

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5. *For the best paper showing that motion is or is not possible in Whitehead's later philosophy.*

DONALD W. SHERBURNE \*

Three distinct types of motion can be distinguished: (1) the motion of drifting clouds and rolling stones; (2) the motion of a being acting telically, e.g., an artist; (3) the motion of a person carrying out a moral judgment, e.g., an executioner, or a general pinning a medal on a soldier's tunic. A reasoned account of each of these types of motion can be provided from within the framework of Whitehead's later philosophy.

Actual entities do not move; they do not *do* anything other than become and perish. "In the 'organic' doctrine, motion is not attributable to an actual occasion" (PR 119). Motion is not a phenomenon of the microcosmic, but of the macrocosmic. Clouds drift and rocks roll even though actual occasions suffer no motion; and their drifting and rolling is quite intelligible in Whitehead's scheme. Words move across the track on the side of the Times Building in New York, even though the banks of lightbulbs that support them are not moving. The message moves though the bulbs do not. "'Change' is the description of the adventures of eternal objects in the evolving universe of actual things" (PR 92).

The motion of a being acting telically is also intelligible in Whitehead's scheme, though a more elaborate explanation is required. The superjective aspect of an actual entity must be distinguished from the subjective aspect. An actual entity "is subject-superject, and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of" (PR 43). Conceived of as superject, an actual entity "is the atomic creature exercising its function of objective immortality" (PR 71). It seems odd to speak of an actual entity *exercising* its function of objective immortality precisely because, when objectively immortal, a creature has perished and can *do* nothing. Whitehead's meaning here is that as "subject presiding over its own immediacy of becoming" (PR 71), the actual occasion "has one eye," to speak metaphorically, on what it will be as dead datum for the transcendent creativity. Its superjective character is "the pragmatic value of

its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity" (PR 134). The point is, that as concurring subject the actual occasion is already superject, meaning that how it will have its impact on future occasions is an important factor "right now" in determining the character of its own becoming. In this way an actual occasion *exercises* its function of immortality.

These distinctions suffice to account for the purposive motions of, for example, an artist. Every component occasion in the creative action is "looking ahead," is estimating its role as objectively immortal in the production of the final aesthetic product. Artistic creation is an instance of superjectively oriented becoming.

The third type of motion constitutes the most difficult challenge to a rational account of motion in terms of Whitehead's later philosophy. Artistic creation is *ad quem*, telic; whereas moral responsibility is said to be *a quo*, cumulative. But can Whitehead deal with the cumulative? "Each time [Descartes] pronounces 'I am, I exist,' the actual occasion, which is the ego, is different" (PR 116). Why execute a murderer or why pin a medal on the tunic of a military hero? In each case the actual entities which did the deeds have perished; there is nothing *actual* present in the *post-facto* individual which was *actual* at the time of the deed. This objection is serious and merits more careful attention than Whiteheadians have paid it.

I can only adumbrate a possible rejoinder. Final moral judgment is made by God. It is made by Him as His consequent nature evolves. Every actual occasion is judged immediately, on-the-spot, by God: "For the kingdom of heaven is with us today" (PR 532), which implies that the day of judgment is with us always also. Benedict Arnold the hero was judged at the moment of his heroism, as was Benedict Arnold the traitor at the moment of his betrayal. That the ultimate medals and punishments are not for us to award is sound moral sense; there is a "judge arising out of the very nature of things, redeemer or goddess of mischief" (PR 533), and this judge deals with actual occasions directly. There is no backlog on His docket.

But men do punish and reward. I would suggest that in as far as they are intelligible and defensible, the motions involved in

punishing and rewarding are motions *ad quem* and not *a quo*; they are motions which, in the case of punishment for example, stress control and direction rather than retribution. Such motions are aiming at a certain result in the future—the criminal will be encouraged to act in socially acceptable ways, or people will be likely to emulate the conduct of the bemedalled hero. The activities of punishing and rewarding therefore fall under the second type of motion, for which an account has already been provided.

The final item required is an account of why the motions involved in punishing and rewarding have been thought to be *a quo* rather than *ad quem*. The reason is the Category of Transmutation. Transmutation, what I term vertical transmutation, is the operation whereby the macrocosmic emerges from the microcosmic, whereby one tree, one rock, one house emerge in perception in place of a welter of actual occasions. But a tree, or rock, or house is not a concrete actuality; it is an abstraction. Operating in the dimension of time, transmutation can be labeled horizontal transmutation. Horizontal transmutation is productive of the notion of self. Descartes committed the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness in the "Cogito" argument; he mistook the abstraction resulting from his horizontal transmutations for a concrete actuality (see SMW 52). The same confusion is at the root of outmoded theories of punishment which stress retribution rather than control and direction. Taken for what it is, a high abstraction, the notion of self is not simply useful, it is indispensable. "Apart from transmutation our feeble intellectual operations would fail to penetrate into the dominant characteristics of things. We can only understand by discarding" (PR 383). But taken as something it is not, a concrete actuality, the notion of self is productive of confusion and paradox.

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AJIT KUMAR SINHA

Whitehead tried to harmonize the different problems of philosophy in his unified theory of reality. He made an attempt to reconcile and harmoniously relate the concepts of matter and

mind, intellect and feeling, space and time, change and permanence, and so on, in his philosophy of organism. His philosophical standpoint may be described in general terms as a dynamic pluralistic monism.

Whitehead did not like to dichotomize reality into heterogeneous entities, such as matter and mind, change and permanence, and so on. Yet it appears from the study of Whitehead's later philosophy that there is a marked tendency in it to characterize reality as changeless. In agreement with Plato, Whitehead believed that eternal objects were the ingredients of things. In Whitehead's view, eternal forms are the ingredients of actual forms. They do not change. They are what they are. They have Being independent of actual occasions. There is ingression of eternal objects into actual entities. Actual occasions are the particularizations of eternal objects. Eternal objects continue in events. They are the forms of events. Objects and events are organically related. The object is the permanent character which is contained in an event. An event shapes itself by virtue of the permanent character of the object. "The character of an event," Whitehead wrote, "is nothing but the objects which are ingredient in it and the ways in which these objects make their ingression into the event."<sup>1</sup> Ingression relates objects to events. Events do not succeed one another in time; but rather they enclose one another so that every event is related to certain events as whole to parts and to others as parts to whole. Eternal objects which ingress into actual entities are the eternal principles or pure possibilities. Particulars perish, but eternal objects persist. An actual entity dies in order to be born again in the succeeding entity.<sup>2</sup> It perishes, but it does not change. There is no motion in an actual entity; it is where it is.

According to Whitehead, actual entities which emanate from God have spatio-temporal relations, but when these entities are synthesized and reabsorbed in God, they transcend space-time. Space-time is an aspect of concrescence of reality. Eternal objects are spaceless and timeless; and hence, they are also changeless.

<sup>1</sup> *The Concept of Nature*, p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> *Nature and Life*, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 113.

A thing is composed of a succession of actual entities in which one actual entity gives place to another; but changes do not take place in these entities themselves. Whitehead compared his idea of actual entities with the theory of monads of Leibniz. In his view, a monadic actual entity is the concentration of the world in one unit of complex feeling. Actual entities have no external adventures; they have only internal process of becoming. They are related through internal relatedness. Their birth is their death.<sup>4</sup> In the process of becoming an actual entity is not extended in space-time. Space-times are merely relations among actual entities which are accomplished facts. The creative advance of actual entities does not involve a succession of physical time. The present stage of creative advance embodies in itself the past history of the world. Becoming is a metaphysical rather than a physical concept. On this point, Whitehead's view has some affinity with that of Hegel who maintained that the dialectical movement of reality is a logical one in which there is transition from premises to conclusions in a train of syllogisms. Both Whitehead and Hegel recognized the existence of time and change from the empirical or the lower point of view, but not precisely from the ultimate philosophical point of view. Nevertheless, Whitehead assumed like Hegel that a satisfactory philosophical theory "must embody an understanding of interweaving of change and permanence, each required by the other."<sup>5</sup> In spite of this fond wish to reconcile the concepts of change and permanence, Whitehead was inclined to believe that change belonged to the seeming reality and not to the ultimate reality. He had a firm conviction, like most of the idealistic philosophers of the world, that the idea of timeless and changeless reality is real, and not a mere product of wishful thinking.

In Whitehead's view, the Primordial Nature of God is complete, perfect, infinite, timeless, and changeless. God has the vision of all possibilities of the world. He prehends the prehensions of all finite individuals. He is like an infinite reservoir in which all actual entities have their being. He is the super-actual

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>5</sup> *Modes of Thought*, p. 73.

entity in which all actual entities are preserved. He is the self-surpassing Being in the sense that He surpasses all conceivable beings. The Consequent Nature of God, on the other hand, is relative and is in flux.<sup>6</sup> The temporal nature of the world is determined by the Consequent Nature of God. All possibilities of a changing and temporal world are determined by Him. Actual entities are in the process of self-transcendence. They are in the process of self-perfection. However, the world transcends change and space-time order as it is united and absorbed in the all-inclusive experience of God.

It may be concluded, therefore, that Whitehead could not free his philosophical standpoint from the concept of static and changeless reality in the final stages of the development of his philosophical thought, even though he tried to reconcile the concept of change with the concept of permanence.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Process and Reality*, p. 523.

<sup>7</sup> Sinha, A. K., *A World-View Through a Reunion of Philosophy and Science*, p. 324.

## EXPLORATION

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN ELOF BOODIN (1869-1950)

ANDREW J. RECK

#### I. The Conception of Philosophy

"Philosophy is the love of the wholeness of things both human and divine." In this quotation from Plato, cited in the opening sentence of *The Posthumous Papers*, John Elof Boodin succinctly expressed his conception of philosophy, a conception which guided him in a series of important works, including *Time and Reality* (1904),<sup>1</sup> *Truth and Reality* (1911),<sup>2</sup> *A Realistic Universe* (1916),<sup>3</sup> *Cosmic Evolution* (1925),<sup>4</sup> *God and Creation*, in two volumes: *Three Interpretations of the Universe*,<sup>5</sup> and *God* (1934),<sup>6</sup> *The Social Mind* (1939),<sup>7</sup> *The Religion of Tomorrow* (1943),<sup>8</sup> and *The Posthumous Papers of John Elof Boodin*

<sup>1</sup> John Elof Boodin, *Time and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1905); *The Psychological Review* (Monograph Supplement, vol. VI, No. 3, Oct. 1904).

<sup>2</sup> John Elof Boodin, *Truth and Reality: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911). In future references this book will be indicated by the abbreviation TRR.

<sup>3</sup> John Elof Boodin, *A Realistic Universe* (New York: Macmillan, 1916); 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1931). In future references this book in the second edition will be indicated by the abbreviation RU.

<sup>4</sup> John Elof Boodin, *Cosmic Evolution: Outlines of Cosmic Idealism* (New York: Macmillan, 1925). In future references this book will be indicated by the abbreviation CE.

<sup>5</sup> John Elof Boodin, *Three Interpretations of the Universe* (New York: Macmillan, 1934). In future references this book will be indicated by the abbreviation TIU.

<sup>6</sup> John Elof Boodin, *God* (New York: Macmillan, 1934). In future references this book will be indicated by the abbreviation G.

<sup>7</sup> John Elof Boodin, *The Social Mind: Foundations of Social Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1939). In future references this book will be indicated by the abbreviation SM.

<sup>8</sup> John Elof Boodin, *The Religion of Tomorrow* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943). In future references this book will be indicated by the abbreviation RT.

(1957).<sup>\*</sup> The desire to do philosophy in the grand style by probing into the fundamental categories of experience and reality and by formulating speculative hypotheses of universal scope was apparent in Boodin's first major publication, *Time and Reality*, where (taking off from his doctoral dissertation which, submitted at Harvard in 1899, had been based on a paper presented before Royce's seminar as early as 1898) he expounded a strikingly imaginative "creeping in" theory of time as dynamic non-being. Despite a manifest propensity for speculative daring, however, Boodin was sensitive to the epistemological and methodological strictures by which the pragmatists and the new realists sought to chasten metaphysics at the beginning of the century. From a consideration of the problems of methods and knowledge came Boodin's epistemology of pragmatic realism in *Truth and Reality*.

Boodin's theory of knowledge was but a moment in an unfolding metaphysical system. Although *Truth and Reality* began with a plea for the toleration of different metaphysical interpretations, on the ground that each system is the result of the peculiar perspective afforded by the temperament of the particular philosopher, Boodin nevertheless promised in the "preface" to publish a metaphysics, entitled *A Realistic Universe* (TRR, viii). This book was a bold philosophical adventure, because it claimed nothing less than the application of pragmatic method to the task of constructing a metaphysical system. By this Boodin meant "... that we must judge the nature of reality, in its various grades and complexities, by the consequences to the realization of human purposes, instead of by *a priori* assumptions" (RU, vii). "The only key we have to reality is what reality must be taken as in the progressive realization of the purposes of human nature" (RU, 73). The synoptic vision afforded by metaphysics, inextricably linked to a conception of reality as that with which human purposes must cope, is moreover grounded in the procedures and results of the empirical sciences. "Whenever philosophy has been vital," Boodin wrote in the "Introduction" to the first edition of

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<sup>\*</sup> *The Posthumous Papers of John Elof Boodin*, in *Studies in Philosophy* (University of California, Los Angeles, 1957). In future references this monograph will be indicated by the abbreviation PPJB.

*A Realistic Universe*, "it has always followed close upon the heels of science and human interest."

*A Realistic Universe* appeared in 1916, with Europe caught in the noisy orgy of the First World War and unlikely to note the metaphysics of an American professor whose work had "grown up for the most part on the western prairies" and had reflected, he hoped, "the homely sanity of the great West" (*RU*, x). But the book constituted, according to its author in the Preface to the second edition, published fifteen years later, ". . . the first systematic effort in the English language to create a metaphysics in the intellectual climate of the twentieth century" (*RU*, xi). What Boodin had sought to accomplish was the synthesis of pragmatic methods in theory of knowledge, with empirical scientific results and procedures, to produce a systematic, synoptic metaphysics in which human life is both understood and idealized. As Boodin remarked: "We build philosophies and air castles for the spirit, as we build houses for the body, to keep out the blast and cold of an unfriendly cosmic weather" (*RU*, xx-xxi). Such a philosophical structure, moreover, must agree with empirical science. "The philosopher must be a poet who makes use, in so far as he is able, of the material of science" (*RU*, xxxv). Thus Boodin's numerous writings take account of what the sciences teach; and as the second edition of *A Realistic Universe* reveals, Boodin was ever ready to update his philosophical hypotheses to keep abreast of scientific advances, although he felt that these advances left the major outlines of his system undisturbed.

Hence Boodin's metaphysics is shot through with references to the developments in the sciences. His conception of reality, as we shall see, is shaped by the reduction of matter to energy in contemporary physics. Similarly his approach to the theory of mind is affected by the new discoveries in physiology and psychology which overcome the traditional Cartesian dualism. Other important areas of his thought, such as his theory of evolution and his conception of social institutions, owe their substance and color to the results and procedures of the sciences. It might seem, then, that Boodin's philosophy merely copied science. But if this were true, his philosophy would be but the handmaiden of science, so dependent upon science for content and method that

any scientific change would subject philosophy to dismissal or radical overhauling. However, in spite of a profound concern with science and what it tells about reality, Boodin never wanted to exaggerate its role. As he remarked:

Why should we suppose that science alone can capture reality? Art gives us reality, love gives us reality, worship gives us reality. We need all the various openings of human experience to capture the meaning of nature. To do so is man's momentous adventure. It is a far off goal, but we are on the way and we have "time in store." (PPJB, 83)

Boodin's conception of philosophy as a whole that draws upon all the aspects of man's experience in order to forge an understanding of the world and man's place in it, consistent with the findings of the sciences, fostered the quest for *Gestalten* or wholes within the subject-matters investigated. It is no wonder, then, that Boodin's key to the cosmos is the concept of form, an illuminating structure which, progressing in inclusiveness, embraces and interlaces all parts in a synoptic whole. Nor is it a surprise that a philosopher with Boodin's breadth of vision and keen interest in the sciences should concentrate on formulating a theory of evolution, inasmuch as so many philosophers have suspected that evolution would explain not only the forms of life but even the genesis of the laws of nature as well as nature itself. But in Boodin's case, there was, in addition to the scientific interest, a metaphysical motive, harking back to *Time and Reality*, where he had conferred upon time a pre-eminent position in the galaxy of basic concepts. The first sentence of the first chapter of one of Boodin's books reads: "All reality is history and all history is a process of evolution" (TIU, 13). Boodin's examination of evolution resulted in his book, *Cosmic Evolution*. At first he thought he had originated the special interpretation of evolution this work offered, but later he was delighted to discover that Plato had anticipated him in the *Timaeus*.

Boodin's holistic philosophy, itself striving to articulate the most comprehensive whole suggested by science, art, religion, and all other areas of human experience, logically could not halt with a theory of evolution. By the necessary dynamism of its own conception this philosophy had to pursue the theological and

sociological implications of its epistemological, metaphysical, and cosmological theses. The two volumes of *God and Creation*, supplemented nearly a decade later by *The Religion of Tomorrow*, map out the theological and religious dimensions of Boodin's thinking, while *Social Mind* amplifies his holistic approach to social theory and practice. Thus Boodin elaborated a general philosophical system with universal scope.

## II. *Theory of Knowledge*

*Truth and Reality* presents Boodin's theory of knowledge, a theory which he named pragmatic realism. By realism he meant not a "brand of metaphysics" but an "epistemological attitude" (*TRR*, 252). "What realism insists," Boodin wrote, "is that objects can also exist and must exist in a context of their own, whether past or present—independent of the cognitive subject; that they can make differences within non-cognitive contexts; independent of the cognitive experience, of which the latter a *posteriori* must take account" (*TRR*, 253). Within epistemology Boodin avowed not to decide between the metaphysical interpretations of idealism and materialism, though he acknowledged that both positions contribute concepts useful in inquiry and explanation (*TRR*, 256). As a method pragmatic realism, he contended, remains primarily critical. Boodin defined pragmatism as "... simply the application of the ordinary method of the scientific testing of an hypothesis to philosophic hypotheses as well" (*TRR*, 186). Explicitly crediting his pragmatism to C. S. Peirce (*TRR*, 184; *RU*, vii), Boodin repeatedly repudiated James' equation of the true with the useful and Schiller's identification of pragmatism with humanism. What verifies hypotheses, Boodin held, is not human nature, but "... their tallying with the constitution of the object aimed at, as it appears in further experience" (*TRR*, 192). Thus pragmatic realism is realistic: "It means the willingness to acknowledge reality for what it is; what it is always meaning for us, what difference it makes to our reflective purposes" (*TRR*, 260). Despite the disavowal of metaphysics, Boodin's epistemology of pragmatic realism, it should be clear, involves a metaphysics of mind and its objects.

Mind, according to Boodin, is instinct. Instinctive response, moreover, is "... response that is called off as a result of organic structure, given the proper stimulus" (*TRR*, 35). Initially universal, instincts become more restrictive with increased development in the organism. "All our fundamental adjustments or categories are instinctive or organic adjustments; (and) ... the stimuli, which constitute the environment, are simply the occasion for calling into play the structural tendencies of the organic growth series ..." (*TRR*, 15). Since the efficacy of the environment in stimulating the organism depends upon the prior development in the organism of the appropriate structural tendencies, intellectual reflection, like sexual love, is biologically dependent upon the evolution and maturation of the organic structure (*TRR*, 31). Boodin traced three stages of mind, each with its appropriate instincts: 1) physiological or sensitive reaction, with egoistic-preservative instincts; 2) associative memory, with social instincts; and 3) reflection, with ideal instincts (*TRR*, 34). The instinctive tendencies, inherent in the structure of the organism, operate, therefore, as *a priori* innate categories which, though dependent upon the biological evolution of the organism, shape and articulate its experience.

Like Kant, Boodin acknowledged the *a priori*; but, anticipating the later work of C. I. Lewis, this *a priori* is pragmatic. Boodin, however, more like Kant than Lewis, undertook a deduction of categories in terms of the structure of the knowing organism. Thus he provided a table of categories justified by their survival through processes of trial and elimination. Categories are certain inherited "... tendencies to reaction which are brought into play by the stimuli of the organism; and by continuous trials and the elimination of unsuccessful movements, these reactions become definite" (*TRR*, 44). There are fifteen categories, tendencies or laws which are part of our mental constitution and are not learned by experience. They are: (A) Categories of Perception: 1) Space, 2) Time, 3) Habit, 4) Imitation; (B) Categories of Reproductive Imagination: 5) Contiguity, 6) Similarity, 7) Set; (C) Categories of Empirical Generalization: 8) Quantity, 9) Quality, 10) Causality, 11) Individual interpenetration; and (D) Categories of Idealization:

12) Ego, 13) Nature, 14) History and 15) Absolute. (*TRR*, 45-46; cf. *PPJB*, 37-61).

Boodin's equation of the categories of intelligence with organic instincts did not rule out the constructive role of thought in experience and knowledge. Boodin's description of the cognitive activity is cast in the language of idealistic voluntarism. Thinking, as the adaptation of one's self to a novel situation, "... is a form of volitional conduct, which asks the why and whither..." (*TRR*, 69-70). Hence "... conative leading ... constitutes the core of thought..." (*TRR*, 81). As Boodin wrote:

Thought is a living, moving will, a will which has set itself a definite conscious goal—the realization of its intent with reference to the nature of the environment. It is will, awake as to its direction. Instinct bequeaths to thought certain tendencies or demands, among them the theoretical demands... Thought bequeaths to instinct the definiteness of articulate and self-conscious purpose, instead of vague groping impulse. (*TRR*, 83)

Hence Boodin's theory of truth, treating the process, form, content, and test of truth, is developed within a framework which conceives thought as voluntaristic.

Now "... the process of truth is the process of judging" (*TRR*, 98). And judgment "... involves, on the one side of the will, a specific attitude or set ... (and), on the side of the content, certain relations which the judging process must imitate... Judgment is a certain set toward certain content relations" (*TRR*, 106). The morphology of the truth process accords with the forms of judgment. Negative judgment initiates thought, the consciousness of non-being preceding the consciousness of being. "Our first consciousness, in the breakdown of the old habits or the customary forms of judgment, is consciousness of *no*..." (*TRR*, 89). Next thought proceeds to the hypothetical judgment. Thought "... proceeds through the trial stage of ideal construction and verification, which flows out in advanced knowledge into the disjunctive schematization of alternatives." Here thought adopts "... a provisional scheme for conduct." Finally, thought concludes in a categorical judgment. "The end of thought is a consciously adopted type of conduct. The judging process

terminates in a method of control or plan of procedure, physical or logical" (*TRR*, 94). In the last phase, the categorical judgment becomes "... thought stereotyped into social habit" (*TRR*, 96). Thought, therefore, is teleological. The function of truth "... is to regulate conduct—the conduct of the understanding as well as to adapt to a perceptual environment" (*TRR*, 124).

However, the thought process is not arbitrary, since it is checked not only by the success of the conduct to which it leads but also by its own postulates. These postulates of truth, or laws of thought, are: 1) the law of consistency (including identity and non-contradiction); 2) the law of totality (expressed as a command to look for connections among facts); 3) the law of duality (consisting in the universality of the subject-object relation for experience, and its restriction to experience); and 4) the law of finitude (limiting knowledge to what is finite, and assigning what is beyond to faith). Although these postulates are justified pragmatically in that successful knowing presupposes them, Boodin insisted that they are *discovered* in the thinking process, not arbitrarily devised for it. "Thought is an activity of the will, predetermined as regards its form by certain presuppositions which are posited by the will to think" (*TRR*, 155). Paradoxically, the postulates of truth are, according to Boodin, both *a priori* and hypothetical. "While they are *a priori* and necessary postulates from the point of view of formal knowledge, from the point of view of reality they must be treated as hypotheses to be verified in the procedure of experience" (*TRR*, 152). Thus there are no "*a priori* valid metaphysical postulates . . ." "The only possible ontological necessities," wrote Boodin, "are the necessities of facts—of the conditions which we must meet in realizing our purposes, what reality must be taken as in order to satisfy the demands of the will . . ." (*TRR*, 152); but since our knowledge is fragmentary, even these necessities, Boodin conceded, are hypothetical.

Furthermore, on the side of content, truth consists in a relation of agreement between judgment and its objects. Requiring more than internal consistency and intelligibility, "validity can only be stated as the agreement of an idea or belief with its reality" (*TRR*, 210). "To correspond or agree means to realize

my purpose or at any rate to be able to act as if my hypothesis were true. Correspondence . . . has a twofold significance, the *instrumental* relation of the knowing attitude to its object and that of *sharing*, to use a Platonic term" (TRR, 217). When the object of truth is physical, the relation is instrumental, for two reasons: 1) the facts which themselves *know* no system are arranged systematically to suit our purposes; and 2) our knowledge never grasps the real object in its entirety (TRR, 219). When the object of truth is a psychological unity or a social ideal, the relation of correspondence is sharing. As Boodin remarked: "We must imitate, not merely externally, but share and acknowledge, soul confronting soul, the individual's own meaning in its unique wholeness" (TRR, 220). Regardless of the sense of correspondence, the test remains the same—the agreement of our purposes and hypotheses with the ongoing of experience. Thus Boodin's voluntaristic pragmatism is balanced by his realism of objects. Even though Boodin looked upon the object-construct of the scientific context as an instrument by which we cope with our own world, there yet remains the real object—" . . . that which we must meet, to which we must adjust ourselves in order to live to the fullest extent" (TRR, 269).

### III. Theory of Reality

Pragmatic realism had posited the existence of objects (or processes) with which the knower must come to grips if his knowledge is to succeed. Now these objects exist not in isolation but in contexts, of which Boodin differentiated three. Objects (or processes) " . . . figure in the world of interacting energies, with their causal and space relations; they figure in social contexts—in science and institutions, which we must imitate and react upon; they figure in the special context of each individual, as he tries to appropriate the processes as part of his world of meanings" (TRR, 276). And he added: "The persistent effort to see the various contexts of the world of objects as one pattern, the divine love for the wholeness of things, we call metaphysics" (TRR, 288). This conception of metaphysics as synoptic, however, did not preclude

its pragmatic character. On the contrary, Boodin insisted, "Metaphysics means the systematic difference that facts make to each other and to our reflective procedure. It is what facts must be taken as in the *entirety* of our experience and not merely for a conventional purpose" (TRR, 292).

*A Realistic Universe* is system-building in the grand style of traditional metaphysics, yet executed according to the requirements of a pragmatic method. Pragmatically conceiving reality as "the differences it makes to our reflective purposes," Boodin undertook to formulate the ultimate set of differences comprising reality. On analogy with the thought of Spinoza, these "*summa genera* of differences not further reducible" Boodin called attributes, and he identified substance with the epistemological postulate of totality—namely, that "... the facts are part of one world in such a way that every fact can, under certain conditions, make a difference to other facts" (RU, 385). Furthermore, the attributes are not parallel; but they overlap, reality itself being individual yet presenting us with irreducible differences with which we must cope when we try to realize our purposes. Boodin discriminated five ultimate attributes: 1) being (stuff, or energy), 2) time, 3) space, 4) consciousness, and 5) form. In one sweep, then, his position discards the rival metaphysics that have dominated modern philosophy—dualism and idealistic absolutism; dualism because more than two attributes are acknowledged; and monistic absolutism because substance, no longer regarded as an empirically or dialectically confirmed ontological fact, is reduced to an epistemological postulate of totality. Boodin's metaphysics is, therefore, the theory of the five attributes, hailed in his opening chapter of *A Realistic Universe* in excessively rhetorical language as "the Divine Five-Fold Truth."

#### A) *Being*

By "being" Boodin meant "the stuff character of reality. This stuff is capable of making definite differences under statable conditions to other stuff" (RU, 391). Further, the attribute of Being does not denote "... static, inert 'being,' but constellations of energy, conscious and unconscious . . ." (RU, 3). Boodin's

theory of being, which he termed "pragmatic energism," involves 1) the replacement of the idealistic equation of absolute substance with experience by his realistic conception of experience as transitive and dependent, and 2) the substitution of dynamic energy for static substance. Apropos the first point, the idealistic equation of experience with absolute substance, accepted as an epistemological postulate but rejected as metaphysically real, becomes an ideal for realization, with experience viewed as presupposing trans-experiential contexts to guarantee both the communion of diverse experients in an objective space and the continuity of processes independently of their being experienced (*RU*, 16ff). Hence experience is not being, but an adjectival transaction in being. Apropos the second point, Boodin drew upon the sciences to support the equation: "Being = energy" (*RU*, 32). Substances, he asserted, "... are mere abstractions of the relative uniformities and constancies, physical and psychological, which we observe in the stream of processes" (*RU*, 27). Hence not substances in the traditional sense, but energy systems are the simplest units of reality. What is energy? "Energy is what it does" (*RU*, 53).

All energy systems contain three necessary factors: certain variables, the form or organizing relation of the system, and recurrence, the latter being the pragmatic equivalent of substance (*RU*, 37). Energy systems, moreover, are empirical, and in consonance with the pragmatic method, which stipulates that realities consist in the differences they make to us in the realization of our purposes, three types of energy systems are distinguished: the material, the electrical, and the mental (*RU*, 55). Within the complex totality of these interacting, overlapping energy systems, we may discern, again in accordance with pragmatic procedure, things, qualities and relations. Things, though evincing each its own center of energy, are individuated "... by the purposes which select them and which they fulfill" (*RU*, 69), as are qualities, which belong to things yet vary with the change in contexts to which the things belong; and relations, which designate the connections, pragmatically ascertained, that conjoin things within contexts. "Qualities," Boodin defined pragmatically, "are

certain permanent expectancies which we have with reference to things under definite conditions" (*RU*, 89).

### B) *Consciousness*

Boodin defined the attribute of consciousness so as to avoid the reductionisms of materialism and the extravagances of idealism without succumbing to the difficulties of dualism. Unlike the materialist, who looks upon consciousness as an ineffectual epiphenomenon magically emerging from complex material organizations under certain conditions, Boodin conceived consciousness as a universal constant, thus sidestepping the insuperable problems of its origin. As he wrote: "... logically it is simpler to assume the presupposition of consciousness than to derive it from non-conscious processes. It is easier, for epistemological purposes, to suppose that consciousness is a constant, rather than that it butts in; that it shines upon the just and the unjust, the simple and the complex, and in all kinds of weather, and that the difference in its effectiveness is due, not to it, but to the energetic conditions in the universe" (*RU*, 142). And unlike the idealist, who treats consciousness as a condition for all reality and consequently is entangled in argument lacking evidence and cogency, Boodin emptied consciousness of causal efficacy and even deprived it of the capacity to create meanings and cognitive contexts (*RU*, 122). Consciousness, therefore, is the attribute whereby energy becomes aware of itself as meaningful (*RU*, 123). And unlike the dualist, who is beset by the problem of explaining the transmutations and transfers of energy concomitant with the interactions of consciousness and material systems, Boodin eluded this difficulty by not treating consciousness as an energetic system (*RU*, 128). Now since, for Boodin, being is identical with energy and consciousness is not energy, it follows that consciousness is non-being, just as time, space and form will prove, in later discussion, also to be attributes of reality which are properly non-being.

What is the pragmatic meaning of consciousness? Boodin answered: "It makes only one difference to reality. Under certain energetic conditions, it makes the difference of aware-

ness" (*RU*, 135). Consciousness, in its most generic form, is pervasive sensitivity of energy systems to one another throughout the whole of nature; it is, more specifically, epitomized in the energetic context of active mind. There is for Boodin, then, a distinction between mind and consciousness: "Consciousness and mind are conceptually separable facts, . . . consciousness is a fact superadded upon the contents of mind and their relations, under certain energy conditions of complexity and intensity; and . . . this consciousness when so added, does not *make* the will attitudes or perceptual contents nor does it add the *relations* of meaning to the contents" (*RU*, 132). Mind, on the other hand, is "a distinctive type of energy, however ignorant we may be of its relation to other energies" (*RU*, 117). The essence of mind as energy is conative constitution or will: "In answer to the question: What is mental? we must say, then, that the will in its various stages of organization is mental . . ." (*RU*, 173-174).

### C) *Space*

Space is an ultimate attribute which must be acknowledged if our purposes are to be realized. But space as an attribute of reality is distinguished from serial or mathematical space, which is purely ideal or conceptual (*RU*, 208). In contrast with ideal, mathematical space, real space is known through *a posteriori* empirical investigation. Real space is defined ". . . as a limit of exhaustion and as the absence of resistance," reached by a process of abstracting away all contents (*RU*, 397). Real space, moreover, is empirically required to account for motion and distance. The objective reality of empirically evident motion as the translation of an entity from one place to another presupposes the objective reality of the medium of motion—i.e., space (*RU*, 229-230). The empirical evidence that entities exist without fusing, yet are related to each other in terms of distance, also confirms the objective existence of the medium of external relatedness—i.e., space. From these considerations Boodin concluded that space is a real attribute.

The properties of real space are: externality, dimensionality, homogeneity, homoloidal structure, continuity, infinity, conductivity, temperaturelessness (*RU*, 234-243). Further, since real

space is construed through empirical methods of observation, the properties listed above are subject to modification as new theories, e.g., Einstein's, demand; although in the case of Einstein's theory, widely received after the first edition of *A Realistic Universe* had appeared, Boodin was convinced that he had good reasons for not revising his own theory on its account. Boodin argued 1) that Einstein's theory is a mathematical conception of space which restrictively equates space with gravitational field; and 2) that the specific tests met by Einstein's theory can, as A. N. Whitehead had shown, be met also by adhering to a concept of invariant space in line with Boodin's theory of real space (*RU*, xxxi-xxxiv, cf. *CE*, Part III).

#### D) *Time*

Although Space is the ultimate attribute of reality which expresses the translation of a being from one position to another without affecting its nature, Time is the ultimate attribute of reality which denotes the processes of transformation of beings. Time pertains to passage and change, so that the acknowledgment of time as an attribute of reality is tantamount to an acknowledgment of flux or "the fluency of process" (*RU*, 264). Boodin's commitment to flux, however, did not obliterate his recognition of constancy. Indeed, he proposed a reconciliation of the antinomy between constancy and change, which had dominated the course of philosophy since its origin, by pragmatically accepting constancy as representative of features of energy systems and change as the attribute of time. The alternative, rejecting either change or constancy, would be a conception of reality inadequate for successful adaptation on our part (*RU*, 262-263). Time, for Boodin, though empirically confirmed as the flux attribute of reality, is neither Bergsonian substantialized time nor mathematical, serial time: "The flying, fleeting, evanescent character of experience, it seems to me," wrote Boodin, "is the primary character of time. The serial character is secondary, and is the result of a *posteriori* construction, necessitated by the real time character" (*RU*, 265).

Incorporating the theory of time presented in *Time and Reality* (1904), Boodin construed time as dynamic non-being.

"That does not mean that time is unreal. What time *does* is something positive.

"It is responsible for passing away and novelty; it creeps into the intended reality and so makes necessary new judgments. What I mean by placing it under the category of non-being is, that it is not a thing or energy, though it makes positive differences to the world of energy" (*RU*, 268). Boodin, moreover, emphasized the pragmatic difference time as dynamic non-being makes to knowledge. He summarily stated the relation of time to judgment as follows: "Time is that attribute of the real subject-object, which makes incompatible judgments (i.e., different judgments as regards the same aspect of reality at the same point) necessary" (*RU*, 277).

#### E) *Form*

Reality, as we have seen, is a flux of energetic centers spread out in space and characterized by sensitivity or awareness. Empirically, human experience embodies the attribute of consciousness, and encounters directly the attribute of space in its "sense of extensity with complex instinctive coordination," the attribute of time in its "sense of duration with complex structural adjustments for measuring the flight of the time-process," the attribute of form in "the feeling for form with its tendencies and its sanctions in social institutions, to meet the demands of the universe upon us" (*RU*, 334). These tendencies and demands, relevant to our thought activities, our aesthetic appreciation, and our conduct, crystallize in the ideals of Truth, Beauty and Virtue. With respect to these ideals of life Boodin argued that they are identical in form, "or the demands which they set to the concrete will," but are differentiated by the contents of the areas of life to which they apply (*RU*, 307). The Ideals of Life are expressions of the attribute of Form.

Metaphysically, the attribute of Form is Boodin's answer to the question: "Does the process have direction, or is there validity in the flux?" It is the affirmation of holistic philosophy to the effect that form is "... a part of the executive constitution of nature" (*RU*, liii). "Form has to do, not with transformation, but with *formulation*—with the possibility of defining our situa-

tions in terms of clear and distinct principles" (RU, 330). Upon the acceptance or rejection of form pivots the primary differences between metaphysical systems (RU, 338). If form is not accepted as a fundamental attribute of reality, then, regardless of the conception of stuff that is adopted, the consequent cosmological theory would interpret the world as devoid of a standard to guide and evaluate its processes. Thus there would be no guarantee that the ultimate ideals are valid, and since the invalidity of these ideals is inadmissible on the grounds that their collapse would remove the possibility of truth and value even for the philosophy which expressed their non-operancy, form as an attribute of reality must be acknowledged. "The Ought" itself is defined as "the consciousness of the form character of the universe" (RU, 356).

Like consciousness, space, and time, form is not-being; but its role is different from the dynamic not-being of time and the medium for relatedness and distance that is space. Form, as non-spatial and non-temporal, transcends the flux of energy, although it is, in a sense, ingredient in the flux as direction and order. Upon form depends the creativity of the flux, so that for Boodin "form is creative, but it creates not by production, but by elimination. It is creative as the artist is creative, i.e., by selection" (RU, 333).

#### IV. *Theory of the Cosmos*

Boodin's theory of the cosmos is, in his own terms, "*empirical realism and cosmic idealism*" (CE, 7). By empirical realism he meant to designate his method, a method which prescribes strict attention to the sciences. By cosmic idealism Boodin meant to express the conclusion to which this method led him in cosmology—namely, to the conviction that in the flux of matter control and direction are exercised by Form, Spirit, or God, guaranteeing the preservation and ultimate triumph of the highest ideals to which man aspires, the fundamental constitution of the cosmos being revealed by and exemplified in the highest organic types. In this real way, Boodin's philosophy fulfilled his hope "to combine the Greek love of Form with the modern respect for process" (CE, 91).

A) *Evolution*

Boodin's cosmology unfolds with special attention focused on the biological theory of evolution. His treatment of evolution springs from a consideration of two seemingly incompatible principles of science. One principle, the second law of thermodynamics, projects a world run out of energy, a cosmos dissipated, exhausted, reduced to nothing in the far distant future. The other principle, the theory of evolution regnant in the life sciences, portrays nature as a scene bursting with the perennial emergence of new forms and novel crystallizations of energy. Whereas on the one hand, the prospect is that nothing will come of all that now is, on the other hand, the outlook is the continuous creation of new being, rising ever higher and higher in the scale of perfection until Deity itself comes to be. Not only is the scientific philosopher confronted with a grave contradiction of principles; he is faced, on either side of the dilemma, with an implication which violates what Boodin regarded as "perhaps the most momentous hypothesis in the history of science"—i.e., Leucippus' statement: "Nothing happens without a reason" (*CE*, 47). Boodin's solution of the dilemma was to formulate a theory of evolution which, instead of taking either the downward process of the second law of thermodynamics or the upward process of the theory of evolution as the principle sufficient to explain nature and its laws, subordinated all change, including evolution, to the governance of cosmic structure.

This solution has induced R. F. A. Hoernlé to remark that a more accurate title for *Cosmic Evolution* would have been *Cosmic Structure*.<sup>10</sup> A cosmos structured by permanent coexistent levels of energy is neither dissipated by an endless loss of energy nor enriched by utterly accidental emergents. As Boodin said: "We may be sure that in a self-sustaining cosmos there must be an upward as well as a downward path and that therefore the levels of energy are eternal" (*CE*, 112). Hence the cosmos is a closed whole from which neither energy nor matter escapes; it is a spatio-temporal dynamic equilibrium. By "dynamic equilibrium"

<sup>10</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, review of Boodin's *Cosmic Evolution*, *Journal of Philosophy* XXIV (1927), 160-163.

Boodin meant "not merely that as the quantity or intensity of energy varies in any one part of the cosmos there must be corresponding variation in intensity in other parts of the cosmic field, but . . . also that the variation of phases and types of organization in one part will tend to produce corresponding variation in other parts" (CE, 114-115). Every element, or part of the cosmos, moreover, exists within a cosmic field, and this field, a region of the cosmic structure, determines the state of the element, or part. The universe, as self-moving and self-maintaining, is, in the words of Boodin, ". . . a closed system, curved on itself so that nothing can escape in the void," and within its system there is ". . . a balance of exchanges and rhythms . . . , so that the shifting of potentials and the shifting of structure in any history is controlled by adjustment within the cosmic field" (CE, 116). Because the cosmos has a constant structure in dynamic equilibrium, Boodin compared it to an organism. He wrote: "We may think of the universe as a sort of organism or superorganism" (CE, 35).

Boodin's holistic interpretation of the cosmos logically entailed a redefinition of evolution. In *Three Interpretations of the Universe* Boodin distinguished three theories of evolution: Preformation, Emergence, and Creation. Now preformation is ". . . the notion that evolutionary development is latent in the process so that later forms and stages are really an unfolding or making explicit what is already present in the earlier stages of the same history" (TIU, 13). Originating in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, continuing in the Middle Ages in the writings of Scotus Erigena, Cusanus, Bruno, and Boehme, and in the modern period in the systems of Leibniz, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and even, according to Boodin, in the work of A. N. Whitehead, preformationism was credited with a proper stress on the structures in nature as well as a rational simplicity, which, rendering it amenable to the scientific mentality, have enabled it to prevail. Against preformationism, however, Boodin charged:

It has failed to take time seriously. It has done its business with a spatialized time, and has eliminated real time with its novelty and contingency. The real world is too pluralistic and indeterminate to be fitted into one rigid scheme. It is far more interesting and more tragic than that. (TIU, 87-88)

For Boodin emergence meant "... the appearance of new characteristics and structures with no apparent guidance from within or without" (TIU, 13). As preformation is the original meaning of evolution, epigenesis, signifying the intrusion of novelty into process, is the old word for emergence (TIU, 136). Boodin distinguished two theories of emergence: 1) materialistic emergence, and 2) hybrid emergence. Whereas materialistic emergence, as expressed in the works of Lucretius, Democritus, Feuerbach, Engels, and Broad, "... holds that everything happens by blind combinations of the elements of matter or energy, i.e., without any guidance" (TIU, 95), hybrid emergence, as expounded by Herbert Spencer, S. Alexander, and C. Lloyd Morgan, restricts the process of emergence to the phenomenal order of appearance, implying that there is an order which guides or underlies the process (TIU, 128ff). Although Boodin admitted that emergence had done philosophy a service by taking time seriously and by calling attention to novelty in nature, still he judged it inadequate as a principle of explanation, despite its validity as a description of what happens.

An explanation is not a mere statement of an occurrence, but of the *how* and *why* of the occurrence. We want to know how the electron, the atoms, the molecules, organisms, mind can occur in our world. This means an inquiry into the structure of a world which makes such things possible. (TIU, 137-138)

This "enquiry into the structure of a world" led Boodin to embrace a theory of creation. By creation he meant

the occurrence of new forms, characters and stages under the guidance of an actuality which controls and animates the course of history. According to this view the later stages are not pre-existent, but are due to an impetus from outside the particular history. They presuppose the interaction of the particular history with an actuality which foreshadows the future stages of the evolutionary process either existentially, or eminently (i.e., as capable of producing them because it implies them and more besides). Thus creation is epigenesis or emergence (in recent terminology) together with control from a higher level. (TIU, 13)

Rejecting monistic theories of creation, as upheld by Origen, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas, because they are based on the dogma of creation *ex nihilo*, which "lies outside the

field of a rational philosophy" (TIU, 488), Boodin adopted a dualistic theory of creation, as intimated in the first chapter of *Genesis* and elaborated by Plato in the *Timaeus*. Now Boodin's theory agrees with emergence in acknowledging the importance of novelty, with preformation in emphasizing structures and wholes, and with traditional creation theory in recognizing that "... the universe cannot be understood without creative genius."

In *Cosmic Evolution* Boodin termed his theory "cosmic interaction." As he succinctly put it: "Determination by adjustment is the master-key to the universe" (CE, 429). And Boodin gathered empirical evidence, cited scientific theories, mined the history of philosophy, employed logical argument, and engaged in effusive rhetoric to support his theory of cosmic interaction. According to this theory, the universe as a whole does not evolve; rather all its levels coexist, and evolution in one part of the universe stems from the responsiveness of this part to communication of form by some higher level. He wrote:

The universe cannot be understood as one history proceeding from chaos to cosmos by chance combination of elements and natural selection. Rather must we understand reality as a rhythm of multiple histories which exist at different levels and which interact. The order of evolution at lower levels must be determined by interaction of the lower level with the higher levels. (CE, 98)

And he added: "The past, present, and future levels of the developmental history of our earth may be conceived to exist in their generic structural characteristics yonder in the various histories of the cosmos as the various stages of a human individual in their generic features coexist in the overlapping generations of the race" (CE, 100). Viewing "the problem of evolution from the cosmic instead of the geological point of view," Boodin observed: "All the cosmic generations coexist in the depths of space" (CE, 103). Likewise, viewing the evolution of life upon the earth, Boodin concluded that its course was stimulated and guided by changes in the crust of the earth, the earth itself altering in response to its cosmic environment. "Thus in the history of the earth the various types and stages of life and intelligence have emerged as creative adaptations to the impulses of the cosmic environment" (CE, 123).

B) *Matter*

Boodin's idealistic interpretation of evolution as "cosmic interaction" did not exclude the concept of matter. Instead, he took to task those idealistic philosophies which either negate matter as non-being or find in it solely the source of evil. Boodin, in fact, defined evolution as "an adaptive organization of matter to respond to its cosmic field," and he spoke of it as "the incarnation of the energy patterns of the cosmic environment into material bodies" (*CE*, 94). Although he recognized matter as a sluggish inertia principle, he still credited it with the docility necessary to fulfill its role of storing the energy patterns and the complex conditions upon which the evolution of cumulative adaptive structures depends. The function of matter in cosmic evolution, therefore, is fundamental, but instrumental. "It is through the medium of matter, in its progressive organization, that quanta of higher levels of energy are captured and held for the time being in the organization of individual history. Matter is the instrument of energy exchange from the cosmos to the individual and back again" (*CE*, 257).

Has matter a character apart from its role in cosmic evolution? Here Boodin's answer agrees with the teachings of contemporary physics, as his metaphysics of pragmatic energism foreshadowed. As he briefly put it: "The fundamental unit of energy is the quantum, the rhythmic measure according to which all exchanges of energy take place; and the unit of matter is the electron" (*G*, 91). "Nature . . . consists of pulses of energy—quanta of radiation, positive and negative electric charges—within an electromagnetic field and a gravitational field" (*TIU*, 489). Matter, construed as energy in line with recent physical theories, never exists as mere matter, but "always . . . in various stages of organization" (*CE*, 109). Since, according to physicists' conceptions of the molecule, the atom, the table of elements, matter universally displays "a marvelous hierarchical organization" (*CE*, 103), Boodin concluded that matter, too, ". . . is an evolution, the result of interaction" (*CE*, 108). Unable to impute the uniformity of the constituents and the structure of matter to chance, he was persuaded that "Matter owes its regularity, unity and

dynamic structure to the fact that it is enveloped by mind, i.e., controlled by mind" (G, 34). "Matter runs its course within the field of spirit" (G, 37).

### C) *Mind*

"Higher in the scale and more valuable than matter," mind, too, has a primary role to play in cosmic evolution, but mind, Boodin stressed, is "not more real than matter," since it "requires the organization of matter for its realization as much as matter of a lower order requires mind for its guidance," both mind and matter being "aspects of the hierarchical organization of the cosmos" (CE, 128). Mind is not inert: "I am not interested," confessed Boodin, "in mind as an emasculated ghost" (CE, 242). Rather mind is "a field of energy, which in turn owes its characteristics to the interaction of the life stream with the structure of the cosmos . . ." (CE, 218). This does not mean that mind is reduced to or wholly derived from matter. As an energy pattern mind is superimposed upon organic patterns just as these are superimposed upon inorganic patterns. Thus, even though human mind evolves as the specific response of organic matter to the stimulus of the cosmic environment under certain conditions, mind as an existent level of energy in the cosmos does not evolve. As Boodin observed: "From the point of view of cosmic evolution, it would be truer to say that the body is evolved for the mind or, in the language of Plotinus, that the soul makes the body, than to say that the mind is a mere function of the body . . ." (CE, 185).

According to Boodin, the milieu of mind is threefold: 1) the individual inner complexity of mental states, 2) the social synthesis of individual minds, and 3) the cosmic milieu of mind with nature and society (CE, 200). The second milieu listed above is the topic discussed and investigated in Boodin's *Social Mind*. Boodin, in fact, used "the expression, social mind, for the synthesis of individual minds into wholes, with new properties" (SM, viii). He contended that ". . . there is a genuine social unity, distinguishable from what we call the unity of individual experience, and if not more real, at least more inclusive than this" (SM, 141). Thus the

study of mind, instead of concentrating on the individual isolated minds, a topic properly explored by physiology (*CE*, 161), should start with "the postulate of intersubjective continuity as an elementary fact," meaning thereby "the immediate consciousness of mental responsiveness" (*SM*, 141). Mind energy, then, is correctly construed as will energy permeated with social significance and valuations: "Mind is essentially a system of intersubjective meanings and valuations, and of controls as resulting therefrom (*CE*, 162). A paradox underscored by Boodin is that mind, though originally intersubjective, has socialized itself into privacy (*SM*, 142).

Intersubjective continuity does not suffice, however, to constitute a social mind. Examples of social minds are race, nation, family, and religion. In addition to intersubjective continuity, other elements requisite for the existence of social mind are the sense of reciprocal response to a common situation and the fusion of several individual minds into a whole dominated by a particular quality rising to a specific intensity. Social minds differ, therefore, according to degrees, some being more inclusive of members, others more uniform in quality, others more intense as unities. Moreover, social minds exhibit the capacity "to overlap in a hierarchy of greater and greater complexity" (*SM*, 181), and herein emerge the prospects of world order. Boodin's remedy for the present crisis in civilization is the development of social minds that are moral unities capable of directing the social unities that embrace increasingly large masses of individual minds and of employing these social groupings as instruments to higher ends without shattering or diminishing those personal values indispensable to morality. Hence upon the evolution of higher social minds, both moral and personal, hinges the resolution of those conflicts that menace contemporary civilization (*SM*, 459-479).

#### D) God

The creative advance of evolution does not stop with the genesis and growth of social minds, nor is the hierarchy of energy levels that comprise the architecture of the cosmos topped with the type of social mind that exhibits itself in human history. "The

whole process of evolution," Boodin wrote, "is a process of spiritualization" (*TIU*, 499). A *nisus* toward divinity is manifest in nature because "divinity, the supreme organization of harmony, beauty, goodness and love, is active throughout the cosmos, stimulating the evolution of every part in the direction of divinity. As light stimulates towards the adaptation to seeing light, so divinity stimulates towards communion with itself" (*CE*, 123). Similarly within the individual person there is the presence of God, but not as a comforting acquiescence and resignation; rather God is felt in us as "a divine restlessness which spurs us on so long as we truly live. When it deserts us, we are already dead. Be productive and be productive for the common good—that is the eternal commandment" (*RT*, 103).

God therefore guides the creative process of evolution within the cosmos and is the presence that urges each part to respond by further creation. At first, then, Boodin's answer to the question: What is God?, is framed according to his conception of evolution as the cosmic interaction of levels of existence. He wrote:

God is the highest level of the cosmos. There can be no question of the existence of God, for whatever the quality of the highest level to which we strive to adapt ourselves in our best, this is God. God is for us the unique and perfect realization of matter. (*CE*, 129)

But it would be a mistake to view Boodin's God as the final state of matter in an evolutionary cosmology. Not Samuel Alexander, but Plato of the *Timaeus* is the forerunner of Boodin's cosmogony. An ultimate dualism is posited, with matter and spirit coeval principles. For "Spirit and matter have complementary properties. Matter is characterized by inertia, spirit by spontaneity; matter by entropy, spirit by creativeness" (*G*, 115). The difference between matter and God is illuminated in many passages where Boodin distinguished matter from space and expressed himself in a fashion explicitly influenced by Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists. Space, conceived in the manner laid down in *A Realistic Universe*, becomes an absolute field identifiable in principle with the spiritual field (*G*, 129). Further, this absolute space, or spiritual field, ". . . prescribes the architecture of all subordinate fields, which in turn make their variant individual adjustments according to their own relativity" (*G*, 69). Hence

"God is the real life of space, present to everything, everywhere and always, in its creative activity" (*G*, 150). But God is more than the space, just as being is more than one of its media. "God is the spirit of the whole which, in the words of Clement of Alexandria, 'gives spiritual tone to the universe'" (*G*, 74). And He dominates the cosmos, in the language of Plato, not by despotic power but by persuasion (*G*, 96).

Although Boodin advised that we think of God in terms of the highest values we know—"personality, creative intelligence, creative beauty, creative goodness, and creative love" (*G*, 46), he was aware that his redefinition of God, required by modern science and altered social conditions, necessitated a reinterpretation of His attributes. For if God is defined as "pervasive energy which is present everywhere by its activity . . . that spiritual power that works for the good—a leaven, a catalytic agent which works constructively in our world for order, unity and harmony" (*RT*, 74), it follows that such attributes as the traditional ones of omnipotence and omniscience must be modified. Accordingly, God must be understood "as limited in His effectiveness by our willingness, by our cooperation or opposition. Our attitude makes a real difference to God's activity" (*RT*, 79).

Nonetheless, Boodin's admission that God's power to direct the cosmos toward the realization of maximal values is contingent upon the variant responsiveness of the parts did not diminish his optimism about the outcome. Of course Boodin never glossed over the reality of cosmic tragedy: ". . . the life of nature is a tragic life without hope. Nature ever consumes itself in restlessness; and those that live the life of nature are ever carried hither and thither, in futile motion, by the winds of their desires" (*G*, 202). But whereas the contemplation of the tragedies of nature breeds melancholy, sensitivity to the creativity within nature and to the spirituality of this creativity engenders joy. "Laughter like music," he wrote in hyperbolic prose, "runs through all creation. Creation is a choral dance" (*G*, 210). Indeed, the failure of nature to satisfy the craving of the human spirit testifies to a field of spirit which, though immanent in the creative processes of nature, yet transcends it. Thus, just as the cosmos, in one sense, is "an aesthetic process of realization"

(G, 115) exhibited in the vast architecture of nature and its processes, so too, in another sense, the cosmos is an infinite society of spirits. As Boodin wrote:

With my beloved teacher, Josiah Royce, I believe that I am a member of a universal spiritual community and that it is my vocation to participate creatively with the eternal Spirit of truth, goodness and beauty, in companionship with all spirits that create in like manner, to spiritualize this temporal world. And I take courage from the faith that, however confused and discordant the life of this world may seem, there is ever present, like a Pilgrim Chorus, the eternal harmony of the Spirit of the Whole; and the music of this in my soul—distant and faint though it often seems—is the inspiration to strive to bring more harmony into a chaotic world. (G, 75)

*Tulane University.*

## DISCUSSION

### ABSOLUTE OBJECTS AND RELATIVE SUBJECTS: A REPLY

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

**P**ROFESSOR FRANCIS H. PARKER'S REVIEW of the book written and edited by William L. Reese and myself, *Philosophers Speak of God*—along with Alexander Skutch's *The Quest of the Divine*—contains a number of detailed criticisms which, if valid, would largely dispose of the philosophy expressed in our book.<sup>1</sup> I am grateful for the strenuousness and comprehensiveness of the review, since I am thereby afforded an opportunity to clarify certain central points in that philosophy.

So far as the criticisms bear merely upon the book, I have little wish to discuss them. The book is there and can speak for itself. Also, after the years which, as the reviewer apologetically remarks, he has allowed to pass, I should have to reread the book to judge of the appropriateness of some of the criticisms. Whatever its merits or defects, the work does what no other has attempted; it indicates how a certain view of deity, held in some approximation by at least a few important philosophers, can defend itself against its rivals, old and new. Many books do something like this on behalf of more conventional and widely-known forms of theism, but not for this form. Ours is also almost the only "book of readings" dealing throughout with ideas of God; and certainly it is the most comprehensive, covering nearly 3000 years, all the great religions, and including substantial selections from anti-theistic or agnostic writers. One criticism at least is acceptable: it was indeed "odd" that so little attention was paid to theistic proofs or arguments (other than the ontological). At no very distant time I expect to publish systematic discussions of the various forms of proof. And it was with this in mind that we said in the Introduction that this was "a subject for another

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<sup>1</sup> "Head, Heart, and God," *This Review*, December, 1960, pp. 328-52.

occasion." As for interest in the "logical" aspect of thought about God, I had supposed that this was, in a way, the book's main theme.

It was pleasant to see an acknowledgment of the fine work by Skutch, to whom as naturalist I am deeply indebted, and for whose philosophical views, though not close to mine, I have respect.

What are now to be dealt with are certain criticisms, especially charges of inconsistency or arbitrariness, taken as referring not primarily to *Philosophers Speak of God*, but to the position which, well or ill, is expounded in it. Our reviewer's searching, sometimes illuminating, but in my opinion uneven, discussion seems to offer six main objections to our position.

1) Absoluteness and Relativity, mere Being and Becoming, are held by us to be mutually necessary, by the Law of Polarity; yet Relativity or Becoming is said to have the ontological primacy or priority. (Of course the reviewer is correct in taking us to mean priority, not only in the order of knowing but in objective reality.) How can two ideas, coordinate to one another by mutual requirement, yet have a one-way relation of subordination? The question is reasonable, and it has a reasonable answer. One must keep in mind the distinction between levels of concreteness. (The "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" is not an occasional slip; it is a pervasive medium of philosophizing into which, unless we are very careful, we all keep slipping.) As mere abstractions, there is no priority between the polar contraries. But we must consider abstractions in terms of the sorts of concrete instances which they can have. For instance, take the abstractions, *whole* and *part*. Neither term has meaning unless the other does. So far, they are coordinate. Nevertheless, in any particular instance, it is the whole which contains the part, not vice versa. The one is the inclusive entity, and the other the included entity. In the sense in which "primary" or "ultimate" means "descriptive of the total reality, not a mere aspect or element of this total," "whole" is primary, not "part." But note that although wholes include parts, they also depend upon them. If then by "primary" one means "designating independence," it is wholes which are

secondary. (That a certain complex,  $xyz$ , exists depends upon the existence of  $x$ , of  $y$ , and of  $z$ ; but unless all wholes are "organic,"  $x$  might exist not in  $xyz$ .) This ambiguity in the meanings of "primary" or "ultimate" has worked havoc throughout the history of metaphysics.

One must keep track of which meaning one has in mind. Our proposal, in effect, is to avoid using "primacy" as a synonym for "independence," since the latter word for *this* use is obviously much the clearer; and to keep "primacy" as label for "inclusiveness." The idea is that, granted the total reality, one can always proceed by abstraction to distinguish elements, parts, or aspects. Hence the basic concepts are those which, like "whole," describe total situations; not those which, like "part," do not. With "whole" belong, we submit, "relative," "contingent," and "becoming"; and with "part" or "element" belong "non-relative or absolute," "necessary," and (pure) "being." This is our proposition, and I hold that all careful analysis supports it. "Absolute," in its clearest meaning, and the one which we wish to assign to it, connotes "not constituted by any particular relationships rather than any others which might have obtained instead." *Independence of contingent relational alternatives* is what we mean by absoluteness; dependence upon such alternatives, by relativity. Now plainly, if you change any relationships of parts, you change the wholes into which they enter; but (short of universal organicism, which subverts logic) things entering into wholes have some independence from the relations obtaining in these wholes. Thus when we refer to Washington's crossing of the Delaware, we put this crossing into a new relationship, a new complex or whole. But it is the same old crossing, the same set of historic facts, to which we wish to and can refer. (Deny universally such independence of relationships and you make all analysis impossible, as Bradley and Russell between them sufficiently showed.) There must be wholes to some extent built up out of parts independent of those particular wholes, or else all clarity of thought is falsification, and should dissolve in a mystical haze. And I am a resolute rationalist.

But the wholes built up out of independent elements can be just those wholes only because, and insofar as, there are just those

parts. Thus wholes are dependent or relative, and only parts can be absolute or non-relative. Relative reality is the inclusive reality, absolute reality is the exclusive reality. This is why "classical theists" were so scornful of pantheism. For if God includes the creatures, then he depends in some manner upon or is relative to them, and thus is not purely or wholly absolute. But if God does not include all things, then he is but a constituent of the inclusive or total reality, in some sense an abstraction from the whole. To avoid this, the "classical pantheists" asserted the inclusiveness of deity. But since they wanted, almost as ardently as the classical theists, to keep their skirts clear, as it were, of relativity, they were forced to absolutize the creatures by denying that even they depend upon contingent selection among alternative relational possibilities. This is the key to Spinoza's necessitarianism, and that of the Stoics before him. (We called Royce a classical pantheist simply because he did not unequivocally break with this tradition at this point. His Absolute selected among "possibilities," except that these were, he said, not "really" possible, since they were eternally and infallibly excluded by the absolute wisdom. This is Leibniz's paradox over again, and I agree with Russell that Leibniz failed to make an unequivocal distinction between the contingency and the necessity of the world.)

The strife between classical theism and pantheism is to my mind a paradigm of the philosophical blind alley. What divides in such cases is the error held in common. The views mentioned share in the exaltation of the absolute over the relative, the independent as such over the dependent. This is either to exalt the part over the whole, or to violate the law of polar contrast by universally denying contingency, and with it all significant distinction between relative and non-relative. If the including reality could not be otherwise, then nothing in it, and nothing at all, could be so. A whole is constituted by its parts or elements, plus whatever unity of its own the whole possesses; no element can fail to contribute something to the whole, for this contribution is its being in the whole, and if the contribution were different, the whole, to that extent, must be different. This, as I see it, is analytic.

Let us consider being and becoming. If any element varies,

so does the whole; but if some element does not vary, the whole may yet vary. Thus "becoming," or variability, is the inclusive term; and "being," taken here as standing for what is invariant, is exclusive. To reason, "X does not change, therefore neither does XY" would be a fallacy of composition; but "X changes, therefore XY changes" is a valid inference. (Even in "2 times 3" compared to "2 plus 4," though the resulting quantity—an abstract feature—is the same, the formulae and the total ideas expressed are not.) "Variable, relative reality" must always apply to the entirety of the real, as well as to certain parts; but "invariant, absolute reality" can apply only to some constituent. Not that the mere abstraction *relativity* includes more than the mere abstraction *absoluteness*; for just as "concreteness" is no less abstract than "abstractness" (as Russell long ago pointed out), we have to go beyond the mere concepts to what they signify, or beyond the mere abstractions to instances, to find out which is descriptive of the total reality, and in this sense primary. By virtue of instances, relativity is inclusive, not absoluteness.

One can so easily be caught in a verbal trap if one asks, does being include becoming or becoming, being! Being becomes, and becoming is. We must rather ask, is it what becomes, or what does not become, which includes the other? A "process philosopher" denies that a thing which does not and has not become can include anything which does or has become; and he asserts that what becomes can include what does not. His reason is that becoming is a creative synthesis, and the "emergent whole" can be produced out of elements not all of which have likewise emerged or been produced. The unproduced, however, must be unproduced all through.

The being of what has already become offers no difficulty; for in the present act of synthesis the prior products of synthesis can enter as data or elements. Creative synthesis is the only form of reality which is entirely self-explanatory. It feeds on its own products and qualities; and as for the wholly uncreated, mere or "pure" being, this is definable as the one fixed datum or element of *all* synthesizing. It is thus the universal common denominator of process as such, which of course never becomes.

Yet it is only a universal aspect of what has or does or may become, isolated by abstraction or comparison.

If becoming is synthesis, of course what becomes is relative, for it is dependent upon its relations to presupposed data. The asymmetrical relationship between relativity (or becoming) and absoluteness (or being) may be put thus: in whatever respect a thing is relative or becomes it is inclusive; and in whatever respect it is absolute or does not become it is exclusive. Relativity is in this sense the absolute [*sic*] principle; for the totality of its instances forms reality in its fullness, omitting nothing. "Absolute" in the previous sentence has the special meaning of "absolutely all-inclusive by virtue of its instances." But "the absolute," as merely that, cannot be absolutely inclusive; indeed, it must be absolutely exclusive of all relative things. But then it must be an abstraction, and not worthy of worship! I think we must make up our minds to recognize the divine relativity as the divine concreteness, and the divine absoluteness as merely an abstraction from God in his fullness.

We find the same relationships if we consider necessity and contingency. Abstractly taken, the two are coordinate, imply each other, in the sense that neither can apply unless both have some application. Nevertheless the conjunction of a contingent proposition and a necessary proposition cannot be necessary, but must always be contingent, no less so than the conjunction of two or more contingent propositions. The whole truth, therefore, is always contingent; and necessary truth is only a constituent. This is shown also by the theorem that a necessary proposition is strictly implied by, and its truth therefore included in the truth of, any contingent proposition you please. If the inclusive truth is thus always contingent, how could an inclusive reality be necessary? A necessary reality must be assertible in a necessary proposition. We shall return to this point (see the discussion of the 4th objection).

2) Professor Parker's second criticism is closely related to his first. Objects of knowledge, he points out, are held by us to be in each case independent of the knowing; but yet all reality is held to depend upon God's knowledge of it. There is, how-

ever, no inconsistency. In the quoted dictum, "what in particular is known in a given knowledge is not in its existence dependent upon this knowledge," the words "given" and "this" are key words, and might well have been italicized. We have, once more, the distinction between an abstraction and its instances. Things never depend upon any *particular* knowledge of which they are objects—not even the particular knowledge which God has of them, for God could have known the same things in a different knowledge (see the next paragraph below). Things must indeed be known; but if we ask, "In what particular states of knowing or in what actual experiences must they be known?" the answer is, "In any you please, provided that these be capable of constituting knowledge of the things in question." There is an emergent unity in any experience of a set of things; the things to be known cannot dictate or require the actual unity which comes to know them. Given an entity E, then the class "knowings of E" cannot remain empty; but to say this is not to define any particular member of the class.

God's knowledge is essential to things as follows: any E must not only be or become known, but be adequately known; thus the class "adequate knowings of E" also cannot remain empty. Only God can have such knowings. Yet, according to the theory, any actual knowing of E which God has is inessential, both to God and to E; for he could have known E by a different yet equally adequate state of knowing or experience. Presupposed or asserted here is the denial of the Leibnizian identification of the enduring individual with the sequence of his actual states. Rather, individuality is held to be at least somewhat more abstract than an individual history, and therefore at least somewhat (in the divine case wholly) independent of alternative details. To say that individuality is abstract does not mean that you or I, say, are mere abstractions, but only that our full concreteness is more than our mere individual identities; more than merely what makes me me, and you you. For I could have been myself at this moment, yet myself in a different state from the one I am actually in. It follows that to depend upon a certain individual does not entail depending upon his actual state of knowledge. Our existence may require

God's adequate knowledge of us, but not the actual state of this knowledge.

It may seem that there can be only one adequate way of knowing a given object. But this, I hold, is a mistake. Knowing is enjoying, and the enjoyment is a creation. It is not a mere duplicating of the object. Also, there is an element of decision as to how the determinate past is to be utilized in the as yet indeterminate future. Knowing is using, and there are always alternative possibilities. To suppose otherwise is to imply that God must lose all freedom in knowing the world. This, I hold, is contrary to the very meaning of "know."

The reader will have noted the connection of the two chief points so far made. These concern the relations of objects to knowings, and of absolutes to relatives.

If independence, invariance, and absoluteness are essentially one idea, then that objects are independent of, unchanged by, their particular subjects is the same as that they are in each case absolute, so far as the particular subject-object relation is concerned, while the particular subjects are relative in respect to this relation. ("Subject" in this essay means momentary actual cognitive state.) Since, as we have seen, the relative includes the absolute, subjects must include the objects upon which they depend. And the only possible home for the absolute or abstract is in something relative or concrete. As in the case of existing universal forms and particular actualities embodying them, the same form may be in this thing or that, yet (according to Aristotle's sound principle) it must, in order to exist, be in some suitable thing or other; so objects may be in this relative subject or that, but must be in some subject or other. To be is to be known, not necessarily by this subject or that, but still by some suitable subject. Thus subject has the primacy; as Hegel said, it "overlaps," in the subject-object duality. Just so, the relative overlaps the absolute. (If Hegel saw *this*, I do not find that he said it very plainly.)

Knowledge of E forms a concrete actuality (the reviewer's objections to this will be considered presently) of which E is by comparison but an abstract constituent. ("Knowledge" here refers to the total cognitive experience or momentary subject.)

Knowing is thus an actualizing of concreteness additional to that of the things to be known. The definite more in this gain of concreteness cannot be constitutive of the less. But it can be constitutive of the less *that* there shall be more. The mere "necessity of something additional" need not itself be any additional thing. For suppose it is inherent in being E that E is destined to become an item in a greater reality; then it cannot be an addition to E that this destiny applies to it. Rather it is a tautology. For if E is intrinsically destined to be included in E plus something, then to be E at all is to be so destined. And since "greater than E" adds no concrete specification to E, but only the abstract "something greater than," not the least step has been taken toward the more concrete. The definite more is not being deduced from the less; all that is being deduced is that some step toward greater definiteness will be taken. If it be said that this is, after all, an increase in definiteness, since it cuts off the possibility of E's forever failing to be included in any greater reality, then the reply is that this is a verbal possibility only; since it is equivalent to E's remaining forever present, never becoming past, as well as to its never becoming known. In our version of process philosophy, this is not conceded as a possibility.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Professor Reese has some misgiving at this point. He writes:—

"Concerning the second and third objections, my answer would differ from yours to some extent. While accepting the part-whole logic, and the principle of polarity, I do not subscribe wholeheartedly to the idealistic theory of knowledge to which you relate these principles (even though I am moved by it). I admit that one achieves, so far as I can judge, the most coherent theory through adding, to the necessity-abstractness and contingency-concreteness distinctions, the epistemological point: 'things must be adequately known' while the knowledge content can be contingent; and its corollary that to be is to be known adequately.

"And the reason for my uneasiness before this beautifully-balanced and symmetrical point of view is that such knowing, as I have thought since graduate school, returns us to the Newtonian present moment, whereas I can understand only a relative present. This is the reason, too, that the 'cell within body' figure leaves me restive. I prefer to think of God's knowledge as including everything as it becomes part of, and belongs to, the total past. In this sense just as we know each other through the remote and immediate past of each other, so it is with God, even though his is the adequate knowing. Yet why should we equate 'knowing' and 'being'? I rely not on the spatial part-whole metaphor, but on a spatial-

3) Professor Parker cannot see how we *know* either that things are constitutive of the knowing of them, or that they *must* enter thus into the constitution of some such knowing. He thinks this last can only be a sheer assumption. He admits that things when experienced are parts of the subject's experience, but denies that they are parts of his actuality. Thus in experiencing red one does not become red. I wrote a book partly to support the contrary view. (So it is not for me a mere presupposition.) Moore long ago maintained the view Parker accepts, but Moore never succeeded in quite convincing himself. Ducasse has argued ably for the other side.<sup>3</sup> Neither Moore nor Ducasse sees the possibility of making both points at once, that in seeing red my actuality becomes tinged with redness (as a quality of feeling) and yet the redness which is the initial datum of my experience is also independent of this experience (being antecedently actualized also in certain of my nerves as individuals). In other words, experience is participation, feeling of feeling. If one denies that the given is part of one's concrete actuality, what happens is that one's idea of this actuality ceases to be that of something concrete, and becomes the notion of bare awareness which, as Moore quaintly put it, is "diaphanous," thus indistinguishable from an extreme abstraction, save that one adds, "and it is (say) the awareness of red." But how does this awareness differ from awareness of blue, unless as red differs from blue (whatever

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temporal one, while stressing its temporal aspects. For me it is not true without qualification that to be is to be known adequately. Furthermore, I think one cannot speak of all reality *simpliciter*, but only of reality from some perspective or other. God's is the adequate perspective. And yet, since it is a perspective, it is not quite all reality—but wait a second, and any particular content you please will be added to his inclusiveness.

"To my mind the above qualifications do not change the constitutive relations of the total system. I simply want more *aseity* for individuals. And I rather think that my view here follows Whitehead more closely than does the alternative interpretation which you favor. Whether this is so or not, it was the above that I had in mind when I wrote that I agreed in part . . . with Parker's criticism.

"Except for this qualification I agree with every aspect of your Reply."

<sup>3</sup> See *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago, 1942), pp. 223-52, esp. 232 ff. For Moore's reply to Ducasse, see pp. 653-60, esp. 659-60.

additional difference there may be)? You cannot simply juxtapose awareness and its objects. Here is where the theory of universally external relations breaks down, or where the theory of internal relations must be given some application.

If objects are absolutes, and subjects or experiences relatives, then by our principle the former must be in the latter, wherever both exist. Moreover, an absolute must be in some concrete or relative thing; and other than awareness we have—this was Hume's great discovery, seen by him only from its negative side—no candidate for relativity: It is the one clear sample before us. So I maintain, for these and other reasons and not as a mere assumption, that objects not only are, but must be, in some suitable subjects or other. And here I do not beg the question by using the word "object," for I could as well say, entities as independent or absolute. Independence is of particular contingent things, not of there being such things. Nothing is independent of that. "It is not an accident that accidents happen"; and the necessary is that which is all-pervasive of the possible accidents, so that whatever happens (and something must happen) the necessary is included in it. The necessary, therefore, in the abstract way appropriate to it, also "is."

Exception is taken to the use of hyphens in such expressions as "knowledge-of-x." But perhaps this is a quibble. The argument was not made to depend upon this device. In "feeling of pleasure" and "feeling of pain," or "feeling happy" and "feeling unhappy," we all realize that it is feeling itself which varies in the two cases. Now either-or (does the reviewer object to this hyphen?): knowledge about Washington and knowledge about Newton are simply the same, as knowledge, and the sole difference is in the objects; or the knowledge itself differs in a manner corresponding to, and ideally fully inclusive of, the objective differences. To me the latter is evident, and this is all that was meant by the hyphens. They were used to communicate, not to justify, an intuition.

4) In commenting upon our formulation and qualified defence of the ontological argument of Anselm and Descartes, our critic appeals to the distinction between necessity in thought and

in objective reality, as though the two could vary simply independently. I grant this only in the following sense: language can be arranged so that its rules render some assertions formally necessary though what they affirm is objectively contingent, and other assertions contingent though what they affirm is objectively necessary. (This is one of two chief technical problems involved in the ontological argument.) My view is that if a language does either of the things just referred to, that is, if it fails in its rules to express *objective* contingency and necessity (should these expressions have no objective meaning, our theory must indeed be erroneous or absurd), then to that extent it is a defective language; and I believe there are ways of showing this. But to argue the matter out is to go far beyond any simple ontological argument, and for that and another reason the argument is not self-sufficient.

Parker is, I believe, in error in supposing that our version of the ontological argument proves at most that "there must be, at any time, some state of affairs greater than any other . . . and it could be a mental idea of such a greatest state of affairs with no corresponding reality." What is proved, if anything at all, is rather approximately this: it is necessarily true, and therefore true, that an individuality exists which cannot fail to be expressed in some appropriate concrete actual states, each such state integrating, in a manner which could not conceivably be improved upon, the *de facto* totality of the real, with all its quality and value. The "greatest state" of the moment must be unsurpassable, even in thought, as the ideal unification of the prior moment's total worldly content, with all its value. And to say that some such divine state must be actual means precisely what Parker thinks it does not mean, that it must be extra-mental, in whatever sense anything can be so. "Actual" means fully concrete or determinate; and this no mere "logical universal" or "mental idea without corresponding objective reality" can be. Our critic is really only saying that the argument is invalid—period. In this he has plenty of company; but perhaps he and others will not utterly close their minds on the question until my forthcoming *Logic of Perfection* has been out long enough to be studied.

That the ontological argument can arrive at the religious idea

can be shown by using "worthy of unqualified devotion or worship" as starting point of the inference. For this very idea implies non-contingency. Granted this non-contingency, there is only the choice between necessity and impossibility. The argument, as Leibniz correctly remarked, is essentially an inference from non-impossibility and non-contingency to necessary existence. But the contention that the object of worship is impossible is as old as Carneades. To meet this objection one must go outside the argument of Anselm.

5) Our resourceful, agile-minded critic fails to see how we can pass from such a principle of meaning or of thought as the Law of Contrast (supposing, which he is not sure about, that it is a valid law of thought) to any conclusions about reality as independent of thought. This is something like Kant's great problem: how we must think is one thing, how reality in itself must be is another. Yet, in what form is this distinction itself compatible with the laws of correct thinking? If we admit that we cannot think something, but say, "It may yet exist," this assertion itself either is or is not in accordance with the laws of thought. If not, have we any right to make it? To show, if it can be shown, that we cannot think reality, we must, I should suppose, first really try to think it, carefully observing all the logical requirements of our basic conceptions, such as relation, possibility, all, some, none, experience in the widest sense, and the like. If this attempt fails, then perhaps we can begin to talk about what things might be if no concepts (even that of thing?) applied to them. I maintain that previous failures to think reality derive, not from the supposition that the irreducible and universal requirements of human concepts apply to reality, but from more or less unwitting violations of these requirements. The Law of Contrast or of Polarity, and the analytic relations of relative and absolute, contingent and necessary, subjects and objects, have been persistently neglected or flouted. When these errors have (at long last) been systematically avoided, then we shall see how we get on.

6) The reviewer falls, I think, into a somewhat subtle error in consequence of which he accuses us of a very unsubtle one, that of mistaking quantitative greatness for quality or value; as

when we argue that "God and world" must be "greater" than "God alone." If we had compared two merely separate things, one larger than the other, and had thence inferred the superiority of the former, he would have a case. But this we have nowhere done. God-and-world includes God, with all his quality, and more besides. Unless, then, the world is totally without value, there must be a value-difference between the referents of: "God and the world," and "God alone." And we may apply here one of R. B. Perry's three ultimate measures of values, that the more inclusive value is superior. Will Parker deny this principle? If so, I think he is indeed in error.

As for the American fondness for bigness to which our critic, oddly enough, alludes: in the first place, the size of instrumental things (regarded only in this light) such as cars or houses, seems to have no bearing upon the present discussion, which is concerned with intrinsic value. And which of us needs a reviewer to tell him that big enough for the purpose is better than too big for the purpose? Also, is God and his world, perhaps, too big for God's purpose? And does the world have no intrinsic value; is it a mere instrument or divine prestige symbol?

Incidentally (and since this not obviously pertinent subject has been brought in), one thing especially wrong with American bigness is that it is largely (I hesitate to use the word) private and individualistic bigness, not public or national. Some of our space vehicles, schools, and public transportation systems ought to have been larger, and our private cars smaller (and fewer). To add a bit of comic relief, let it be noted that I have no car, but a bicycle, and a slender foreign type of bicycle at that. Also I have moved from a large city and university to much smaller ones, and partly for these very reasons. I could give our Haverford friend a long list of things that for years I have been saying are too big in this country, starting with baked potatoes, helpings of dessert, and chairs; going on to cars, cities, and finally the population and area of the country as a whole. To be attacked for the opposite attitude seems ironical, if not ludicrous. In these frivolous remarks, I have been speaking for myself; but bringing my collaborator into the reckoning would furnish no reason for withdrawing the question which suggests itself. Has not our reviewer

rather wandered from his subject, and thereby incurred a share of responsibility for the mostly trifling irrelevancies making up this paragraph?

One confession may "help to clear the air." *Philosophers Speak of God* is not only fairly big, but in some respects it may deserve the term "pretentious" which an English critic applied to it. But no one can deduce this fault from the doctrine; their association is contingent. Let us not confuse questions of etiquette with those of metaphysical truth.

The "repetition" of which Professor Parker complains, and here he has my sympathy, is an effort to overcome more than twenty centuries of reiteration of doctrines which I believe to be ambiguous or self-contradictory, but which are still taken as the basis of discussion not only by numerous theists, but by many skeptics as well. And my attempt to weaken this tradition springs from a conviction, not that I must get certain alternative views accepted, but that it is my bounden duty to try to get them understood sufficiently so that their merits or demerits can be ascertained by that method of critical discussion which Popper, with such deep wisdom, has told us is rationality itself. And with all my reiteration I have not yet succeeded. I shall, however, persist, not to be sure by mere repetition but by searching for new and more penetrating modes of analysis.

The theory of divine relativity (as embracing an element of divine absoluteness) is a serious proposal, based upon definite reasons. It cannot be evaluated until it has been understood; nor can its value be determined by considering incidental oddities or defects of writings in which it is expounded. The issues at stake infinitely transcend such matters. Sooner or later, it seems reasonable to expect, competent judges (perhaps our keen-witted reviewer, taking second thought) will attend to these issues.

*Emory University.*

## BOOKS RECEIVED

### SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS \*

RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN AND STAFF

ARON, R. *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, trans. by G. J. Irwin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961. 351 pp. \$7.50—A translation of an early work by Aron which has become almost a classic. First published in 1938, it is one of the best discussions of the limitations of objective historical knowledge. Analyzing man as both the subject and object of historical knowledge, Aron argues against the reduction of human history to natural history. There are also some brilliant chapters on the epistemological and sociological problems of historical knowledge. — K. R. D.

BAHM, A. J. *Types of Intuition*. University of New Mexico Publications in Social Sciences and Philosophy, Number 3. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1961. 58 pp. \$1.25—Bahr surveys three types of intuition and three corresponding types of conflicting theories of intuition. He argues for an organic theory which views intuition as a dialectical synthesis of the oppositions discussed. — J. M. W.

BAUMGARDT, D. *Great Western Mystics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. xii, 99 pp. \$3.00—An interesting but brief sketch of the teachings of some Christian and Jewish mystics. Baumgardt believes that mysticism adds an important, but presently neglected, dimension to human experience. — G. A.

BEGIASHVILI, A. F. *Metod analiza v sovremennoi burzhoznoi filosofii* (The Method of Analysis in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). In Russian. Tbilisi: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR, 1960. 198 pp. 87 kopeks (1961 ruble).—A significant advance toward a more objective understanding of western philosophy in Soviet philosophical circles. Unlike the off-hand condemnations of western philosophers which so often fill the pages of *Voprosy Filosofii*, this Georgian philosopher presents a well documented historical development of twentieth century analytic philosophy from Russell's atomism, through Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, logical positivism, and recent trends in English analysis. The "moral" of the story is that

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\* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Assistant Editor and his staff, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., Douglas C. Berggren, Margery V. Fischer, and Robert H. Kane.

western thinkers are gradually coming to see the poverty of their philosophical perspective; linguistic analysis must give way to the "precise vision of historical materialism." — K. R. D.

BOCHENSKI, I. M. *A History of Formal Logic*, trans. and ed. by I. Thomas. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. xxii, 567 pp. \$20.00—In contrast to many other scholarly continental works, Bochenski's monumental survey waited only five years for its English translation. The translator has made some minor emendations and has appended a few pages concerning Abélard's contribution to logic. A great contribution to the scholarship of this exciting field. — D. D. O.

BRUMBAUGH, R. S. *Plato on the One: The Hypotheses in the Parmenides*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. xv, 364 pp. \$6.50.—An impressive display of various modes and levels of argumentation, defending the view that the hypotheses in the *Parmenides* form an integrated set of indirect proofs that show the necessary presupposition of a doctrine of forms and the inevitable failure of understanding to articulate such a doctrine. To support his interpretation, Brumbaugh appeals to the historical context of the Academy, the aesthetic form of the *Parmenides*, and the relation of this dialogue to the rest of Plato's thought. Brumbaugh offers his own critical edition and translation of the dialogue. A volume of noteworthy scholarship, offering an incentive for creative thought. — R. C. N.

CHADWICK, O. *The Mind of the Oxford Movement*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. 239 pp. \$4.25—These selections from Tractarian writings are prefaced by an introductory essay which elucidates the historical background of the movement and perceptively notes the moral and spiritual orientation of the movement. The well chosen selections concentrating on the years 1833-1841 provide a good introduction to the beliefs of Newman, Pusey, Keble, and lesser known participants in the Oxford religious revival. — M. V. F.

COMBÈS, J. *Le Dessein de la Sagesse Cartésienne*. Lyon-Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1960. 349 pp. N. P.—The author regards the *Passions de l'Ame* as substituting a definitive ethic for the provisional morality of Descartes' earlier years, and sees "generosity" as the culminating passion within the framework of "la sagesse." The treatment of Divine omnipotence, human freedom, and their resolution in Descartes is especially thorough and enlightening. — W. L. M.

COP, I. M. *Introduction to Logic*, Second Edition. New York: Macmillan Co., 1961. xviii, 512 pp. \$5.25—Only minor changes have been introduced in the second edition of this widely used introductory text. The number and the quality of the exercises have been considerably improved, a few obscure points clarified, and some superfluous paragraphs omitted. The discussion of induction remains the weakest part of the book, and one is disappointed at the continued omission of

any proof technique or any reference to the concept of a deductive system. — D. D. O.

DUCASSE, C. J. *The Belief in a Life after Death*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1961. 318 pp. N. P.—After first defending dualism against epiphenomenalism and other theories which would render survival impossible, the author discusses what would be admissible evidence either for a discarnate life after death or for reincarnation. He then presents some evidence for both beliefs. — W. L. M.

FACKENHEIM, E. L. *Metaphysics and Historicity*, The Aquinas Lecture, 1961. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961. 100 pp. \$2.50—Do both man and nature undergo essential change through time such that a time-transcendent metaphysical knowledge becomes impossible? Labeling this the problem of historicity, Fackenheim attempts to show that the answer one gives to this question is not an empirical generalization but a metaphysical thesis which rests on certain assumptions and categories. These rule out historicism or skepticism; and consequently enable one to counter the most serious challenge to metaphysical knowledge. A probing, scholarly, and tightly argued essay. — D. D. O.

FROMM, E. *Marx's Concept of Man*. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961. x, 260 pp. \$1.75—Includes the best and most complete English translation of Marx's controversial *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* by T. B. Bottomore. Fromm in his introductory essay argues that Marx's philosophy of man is to be found in these manuscripts; it is a "spiritual existentialism in secular language." Fromm skirts some difficult problems of Marxist interpretation, and the concept of man that is attributed to Marx resembles the sentimental socialism which Marx so bitterly attacked. — R. J. B.

GREENWOOD, D. *The Nature of Science and Other Essays*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. xiii, 95 pp. \$3.75—A collection of essays on the nature of science, concept formation, causality and counterfactuals, and the theory of real numbers. The argument is in the form of an exposition and critique of classical and recent literature; but more programmatic remarks are registered, and more promissory notes issued, than are made good. — A. P. D. M.

HARRIS, H. S. *The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960. xii, 387 pp. \$5.75—Harris traces Gentile's philosophy of "actual idealism" from its roots in Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and the Italian idealist Bertrando Spaventa to its outworking in Italian fascism. Gentile's theory of the individual and the state is presented by an extensive analysis of his educational theory and his attempts to implement it in fascist Italy. Gentile's thought is weighed, as it deserves to be, for its philosophic merit. An extensive bibliography is included. This is a fine study of Gentile's thought, carefully and sympathetically presented and judiciously criticized. — R. C. N.

HART, H. L. A., and HONORÉ, A. M. *Causation in the Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. xxxii, 454 pp. 55s.—The authors ably demonstrate the value and relevance of sophisticated conceptual analysis in law. Such concepts as cause, reason, consequence, condition, opportunity, and explanation are carefully investigated. The use of the causal notions in the Anglo-American tradition of tort, contract, and criminal law, as well as in continental theories, is examined in detail. A book of importance which carries out English analysis in a subtle and exciting way. It is sure to be one of the lasting contributions of the recent analytic movement. — A. P. D. M.

HILL, T. E. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*. New York: The Ronald Press, 1961. vii, 583 pp. \$8.00—An impressive array of succinct expositions of a large variety of British and American epistemological theories. Bergson and the Vienna Circle are also treated in detail. Idealism, Realism, and Pragmatism are discussed as well as constructionist, intuitionist, and organismic theories. — R. C. N.

HOOK, S. *The Quest for Being*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. 254 pp. \$6.00—A collection of popular and semi-technical philosophic essays written during the past twenty-five years, in which Hook defends an "experimental or pragmatic naturalism." A large part of the essays are concerned with defending naturalism against its critics and subjecting the recent revival of religion and theology to a devastating polemical attack. Hook's tough-minded intelligence is evident throughout, though he does little toward a careful explication of the knottier problems that cluster about naturalism. — R. J. B.

HOROWITZ, I. L. *Philosophy, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1961. xiii, 169 pp. N. P.—An exposition and defense of the sociology of knowledge, i.e., "the ideational factors compelling men to act." Horowitz holds that the sociology of knowledge has now shed its metaphysical inheritance and assumed the status of a science. — R. C. N.

JUNG, H. Y. *The Foundations of Jacques Maritain's Political Philosophy*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960. 66 pp. N. P.—The author shows Maritain's view of the place of political philosophy in the hierarchy of the speculative and practical sciences. Some criticisms of Maritain are also suggested, particularly in connection with democratic theory. — S. M. W.

KAUFMAN, G. D. *Relativism, Knowledge and Faith*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. xiii, 149 pp. \$3.75—Historical studies suggest that all ideas, including the philosophical, scientific, and religious, are relative to the culture in which they are formulated. After clarifying the concept of relativism, and exploring the epistemological reasons why knowledge is relative, Kaufman argues that these admissions are not fatal to the achievement of valid knowledge in philosophy and theology. — D. D. O.

- KRÜGER, G. *Critique et Morale chez Kant*, trans. by M. Regnier. Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, 1961. 272 pp. N. P.—A translation into French of a work originally published in Germany in 1931. The unity of Kant's thought is highlighted through an examination of the relation of the moral philosophy to Kant's general critical program. Krüger acknowledges a debt to Heidegger, while differing from the latter in his interpretation of Kant. — S. M. W.
- LALL, G. C. *Buddha Dhamma: A Higher Affirmation*. Allahabad, India: Kitab Mahal, 1960. xv, 252 pp. \$1.50—A self-admittedly unorthodox attempt to apply the teachings of Buddha to the problems of contemporary India. Unostentatious in design, it is a highly personal interpretation of Buddhist teaching by a sensitive Indian thinker. — J. D. T. Jr.
- LANDMAN, M. *Der Mensch als Schöpfer und Geschöpf der Kultur*. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1961. 237 pp. DM 15—Anthropology must be centered not on human reason, freedom, or Existenz, but on the reciprocal relation of individual men to human culture. The comparative study of cultures must be considered the foundations of the whole edifice of human knowledge. Consequently, the task of synthesis and integration in the university, formerly assigned to the philosopher, should be assigned to the cultural anthropologist. — D. D. O.
- LYNCH, S. J., W. F. *Christ and Apollo: The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination*. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960. xvii, 267 pp. \$5.00—This work provides an interesting, though sometimes rather sweeping, demonstration that the metaphysical problem of the same and the other is also the central problem of literature and literary criticism. The author defends the analogical imagination as the symbolic counterpart of *participation* in Platonic metaphysics. — D. C. B.
- MARTIN, G. *An Introduction to General Metaphysics*, trans. by E. Schaper and I. Leclerc. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961. 156 pp. 18s—An authorized, eminently readable translation of a work first published in German in 1957. Martin leads his reader into the problems of metaphysics by tracing the development of Plato's thought and Aristotle's criticism of Plato, focusing throughout on the question, "What is unity?" Although the book is introductory in intent and tone, it offers its own interpretation of Plato and Aristotle. — J. M. W.
- MASLOW, A. *A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. xix, 161. \$4.00—Written in 1933 when the author was under the influence of logical positivism, but published only in 1961. Perhaps because the author did not at the time of writing have access to Wittgenstein's early notebooks, the study suffers from a lack of subtlety and appreciation of the problems that were preoccupying Wittgenstein when he wrote the *Tractatus*. It offers a general interpretation rather than a detailed explication of specific propositions. Of special interest is Maslow's

attempt to show that the *Tractatus* bears a strong family resemblance to the transcendental philosophy of Kant. Quite independently, he thereby supports an interpretation of the *Tractatus* which has been gaining acceptance among commentators on Wittgenstein. — R. J. B.

MAYER, C. L. *Sensation: The Origin of Life*, trans. by H. Larrabee. Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1961. 145 pp. \$3.50—An eminent French biologist expounds his naturalistic theories. There are interesting though brief treatments of cybernetics, and Mayer's aristocratic, will-to-power ethic.

MÜLLER-MARKUS, S. *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie: Krisis einer Lehre, Erster Band*. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1960. xvi, 482 pp. Hfl 43.75—The first systematic study printed in the recently inaugurated "Sovietica" series, edited by J. M. Bochenski. In this volume, the author examines the basic theses of dialectical materialism and reviews the efforts of Soviet philosophers and physicists to accommodate their official philosophical framework to the challenge of Einstein's special relativity theory. The excellent handling of this subject owes much to the author's masterly grasp of physics, philosophy, and Russian. — K. R. D.

NAGEL, E. *The Structure of Science*. New York & Burlingame: Harcourt Brace, & World, 1961. xiii, 618 pp. \$10.00—This study in the philosophy of science analyzes "the logic of scientific inquiry and the logical structure of its intellectual products." The author distinguishes four patterns of scientific explanation: the deductive model, probabilistic explanation, functional and teleological explanation, and genetic explanation. The structure and application of each is explored with respect to some of the more specialized areas of science. Many of the traditional problems of philosophy of science are discussed, and there are excellent treatments of the methodology of the social sciences and historical explanation. A large and important book, presenting a vast amount of material handled in an incisive manner. — B. J. H.

PEPERZAK, A. T. B. *Le Jeune Hegel et la Vision Morale du Monde*. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 264 pp. Hfl 24.50—This well-documented and well-written study divides Hegel's development into a Tübingen, Berne, and Frankfurt period. Key ideas are traced to their origins in Hegel's youthful notions of antiquity, liberty, beauty, religion, and alienation. One of Peperzak's principal concerns is to deflate exaggerated claims about the influence of Kant's system on the young Hegel.

PRICE, D. J. d. S. *Science Since Babylon*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. x, 149 pp. \$4.50—A series of five lectures delivered at Yale University, this book discusses the historical and technological roots of natural science, its present organization, and its probable future in our scientific civilization. A particularly good chapter on the "Diseases of Science" discusses some of the problems of science's internal economy—its increasing specialization, the exponential growth rate of

scientific publications, and the consequent difficulties for scientific education and research. A fascinating and well-written account. — B. J. H.

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. and RAJU, P. T. *The Concept of Man*. Lincoln, Neb.: Johnsen Publishing Co., 1960. 383 pp. \$5.50—Subtitled "A Study in Comparative Philosophy," the concept of man in Greek, Jewish, Chinese, and Indian cultures is briefly outlined. — W. L. M.

ROME, B. K., and ROME, S. C. *Leviathan: A Simulation of Behavioral Systems, to Operate Dynamically on a Digital Computer*. Santa Monica: System Development Corporation, 1959. 48 pp. N. P.—An explanation of the how and why of computer-simulation of complex, hierarchically organized systems (such as industrial organizations), together with a rough outline of a specific program (Leviathan) suitable for such use. Though the program and the suggested techniques are intrinsically interesting, the claims made for the theoretical and practical consequences of such simulation are perhaps overexpansive. — N. D. B. Jr.

ROME, B. K., and ROME, S. C. *Formal Representation of Intentionally Structured Systems*. Santa Monica: System Development Corporation, 1959. 47 pp. N. P.—This is a first attempt to formalize the language required for analysis of purposive organizations or systems into the subordinate systems of which they organically consist. The authors take a philosophic position midway between Atomism and the Absolute; like Aristotle, they take a finite, complex individual as the ultimate referent of explanation. The sole primitive is " $s /// t O x$ ," interpreted as "upon analytic dissection, the system  $t$  organized by [the property]  $x$ ." It is claimed without argument that the relationship is independent of who, so to speak, is doing the dissecting. This paper is welcome as a first attack on a difficult problem, although it does not pay off in the production of non-trivial theorems or in clarification much beyond that afforded by technical English. — N. D. B. Jr.

RUNES, D. D. *Letters to my Teacher*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961, 105 pp. \$2.75—A miscellaneous collection of prejudices concerning the state of modern culture. — W. L. M.

SCHELER, M. *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. by B. Noble. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 480 pp. \$10.00—Scheler gives a phenomenological account of problematic aspects of religion and theology. The essential nature of the divine, the different forms of revelation, and the act of religious faith are central themes. There are illuminating treatments of the notions of communal guilt, conversion, Christian love, and their relevance to the contemporary world. There is also a candid discussion of the "phenomenological dilemma" in this excellent translation of Scheler's classic in the philosophy of religions. — A. E. F.

- SMITH, J. G., and KENDZIERSKI, L. H. *The Philosophy of Being*. New York: Macmillan, 1961. xvii, 384 pp. \$5.75—Intended for students of Thomistic metaphysics, this is a companion to Smith's earlier work on *Natural Theology*. From the basic question of being, stated in terms of the one and the many, a consistent metaphysics is developed. Stress is put upon the questions of our knowledge and the cause of being, and the relations of metaphysics, epistemology, and theology in Thomistic philosophy. The treatments of analogy, possibility, abstraction, and the transcendentals are especially informative. — R. H. K.
- SPIEGELBERG, H. *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, two volumes. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 735 pp. \$13.15—The author's first-hand knowledge of phenomenology enables him to select advisedly from the vast stores of available material, and to present the thought of the major figures in the movement so that neither the differences nor dependencies are obscured. The history deals with both the French and German branches of phenomenology. There are also helpful examinations of contacts and affinities between the European phenomenologists and American philosophers such as James and Royce. Altogether a thorough and first rate piece of scholarship. — S. M. W.
- SPINK, J. S. *French Free Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire*. London: University of London, the Athlone Press, 1960. lx, 345 pp. \$8.00—A richly detailed history of French secular thought in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A wealth of material is introduced from unpublished manuscripts. Spink's stress on the clandestine spread of the enlightenment, in spite of official suppression, is interesting and sobering. — J. M. W.
- SPINOZA, B. *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, trans. by H. E. Wedeck. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. 192 pp. \$4.75—A new translation from the Latin of an important early work of Spinoza. — S. M. W.
- SPRAGUE, E. *What is Philosophy?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. xii, 139 pp. \$1.60—The attractive format and readable style of this paperback might have proved useful to achieve the author's purpose of acquainting "the beginning student with the forest before he is hopelessly lost among the trees." But the material selected is restrictive, and Sprague prefers to be clever rather than just. — R. I.
- SUPPES, P., and ATKINSON, R. C. *Markov Learning Models for Multiperson Interactions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. xii, 296 pp. \$8.25—An application of probabilistic, stimulus-response learning theory to game-like small group situations. The theory is axiomatic, precise, and quantitative; and is deductively fruitful. There is a running comparison of the predictive success of the stimulus-response theory and game theory. The authors claim to have demonstrated "in empirical detail and with quantitative accuracy" that "the social situation, *qua* social, does not require the introduction of new concepts" beyond those of stimulus-response learning theory. — N. D. B. Jr.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. *Notebooks 1914-1918*, ed. by G. H. Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe; and trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 91 pp. in German and 131 pp. in English. \$7.00—The editors have continued the procedure of placing the English translation opposite the corresponding German text. In addition to the *Notebooks*, there are some additional English notes given to Moore and Russell as well as some letters to Russell. All of this material is extremely helpful for understanding the context of the *Tractatus*. The philosophic style of these remarks also reveals a greater continuity between the so-called earlier and later Wittgenstein than is frequently acknowledged. — R. J. B.

ZABEEH, F. *Hume: Precursor of Modern Empiricism*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. viii, 166 pp. N. P.—Hume's troubles, we are told, stem from giving psychological rather than logical and semantical explanations for his theory of meaning, knowledge, and the principles of analyticity and deductive reasoning. Despite such difficulties, Hume is indeed the "precursor" of the contemporary empiricists. — G. A.

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*Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*. Washington: Catholic University of America, 1960. 252 pp. \$3.50—The theme of the thirty-fourth annual meeting was analytic philosophy. The guest speaker was Wilfred Sellars whose paper, "Being and Being Known," offers an interpretation of isomorphism between the knower and the known based on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* which is compared with the Thomistic position. — R. I.

*Contemporary Social Problems*, ed. by R. Merton and R. Nesbit. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961. ix, 754 pp. N. P.—In this introduction to social problems, sixteen social scientists discuss the major forms of deviant behavior and social disorganization. The introduction attempts to elicit the general theoretical orientation which is implicit in the specialized studies making up the main body of the book. — B. J. H.

*The Philosophy of Physics*, ed. by V. E. Smith. New York: St. John's Press, 1961. 85 pp. N. P.—The second in the series from the Philosophy of Science Institute at St. John's University, this volume contains four essays by guest lecturers at the Institute, and provides "a summary introduction to the leading Thomistic philosophies of science in vogue today among those who believe that the philosophy of nature has an autonomy of its own, and is not applied metaphysics." The papers include an essay on Maritain's philosophy of science; a discussion of the Bohr atom; and examinations of scientific method, and the subject-matter of the philosophy of nature. — B. J. H.

*Problems of Ethics*, ed. by R. E. Dewey, F. W. Gramlich, and D. Loftsgorden. New York: Macmillan, 1961. ix, 754 pp. N. P.—Intended for

use in a problems-type course, this book presents selections from proponents of positions together with criticisms of these positions. The selections are good and comprehensive, ranging from Plato to linguistic analysis. — G. A.

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BAKER, H. *The Image of Man*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. 365 pp. \$1.85.

BOCHENSKI, I. M. *Contemporary European Philosophy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. 326 pp. \$1.75

BROWN, R. M. and WEIGEL, S. J. G. *An American Dialogue*. New York: Anchor Books, 1961. 240 pp. \$.95.

CARR, H. W. *Leibniz*. New York: Dover, 1960. 222 pp. \$1.35.

DATTA, D. M. *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961. 154 pp. \$1.50.

KAUFMAN, W. *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*. New York: Anchor Books, 1961. 446 pp. \$1.45.

PEPPER, S. C. *World Hypotheses*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. 348 pp. \$1.95.

POOLE, R. L. *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning*. New York: Dover, 1960. 327 pp. \$1.85.

WADDELL, H. *The Wandering Scholars*. New York: Anchor Books, 1961. 352 pp. \$1.45.

WRIGHT, G. E. and FREEDMAN, D. N., eds. *The Biblical Archaeologist Reader*. New York: Anchor Books, 1961. 342 pp. \$1.45.

ZAEHNER, R. C. *Mysticism: Sacred and Profane*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. 256 pp. \$1.50.

## **DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS, 1961**

### *Boston University*

- ROBERT E. BERGMARK, "Moral Objectivism in W. R. Sorley, W. D. Ross, A. C. Ewing, and A. C. Garnett." Adviser: J. H. Lavelly.
- PETER V. COREA, "Freedom in Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant." Adviser: R. M. Millard.
- BENJAMIN PETTY, "The Definition of Category in Aristotle, Kant, and Bowne." Adviser: P. A. Bertocci.
- RONALD A. SANTONI, "The Realism of C. J. Ducasse and J. B. Pratt." Adviser: G. D. W. Berry.

### *Brown University*

- MARY B. MILLER, "The Logic of Indeterminacy in Quantum Mechanics." Adviser: W. C. Salmon.
- JAMES K. MISH'ALANI, "Objects, Names, and Variables: an Investigation in the Theory of Designation." Adviser: W. C. Salmon.
- JAMES PRATT, "Standards of Criticism in the Visual Arts." Adviser: V. Tomas.

### *Bryn Mawr College*

- RILLA M. PHILLIPS, "Time, Freedom, and Self-Consciousness in the Philosophies of Karl Jaspers and Nicholas Berdyaev." Adviser: I. Stearns.
- ANNE MARTIN SCHRECKER, "A Study of Francis Hutcheson's Two Ethical Theories in Relation to Some Moral Philosophies of the Enlightenment." Adviser: M. C. Nahm.

### *University of California (Los Angeles)*

- GERTRUDE JAEGER SELZNICK, "Functionalism, Freudian Theory, and Philosophy of Value." Adviser: D. A. Piatt.

### *The Catholic University of America*

- DONALD X. BURT, "The State and Religious Toleration: Aspects of the Church-State Theories of Four Christian Thinkers." Adviser: R. P. Mohan.
- SISTER MIRIAM ANN CUNNINGHAM, "Certitude and the Philosophy of Science." Adviser: L. A. Foley.
- JUDE P. DOUGHERTY, "Recent American Naturalism: An Exposition and Critique." Adviser: J. K. Ryan.
- JAMES B. NUGENT, "The Fundamental Theistic Argument in the Metaphysical Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas." Adviser: G. F. McLean.

- JOHN MICHAEL QUINN, "The Doctrine of Time in St. Thomas Aquinas: Some Aspects and Applications." Adviser: L. A. Foley.

*University of Chicago*

- HENRY HAYS CRIMMEL, JR., "Verbalism and Nihilism." Adviser: R. McKeon.  
GEORGE DENNIS O'BRIEN, "Meaning and Fact: A Study in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein." Adviser: M. Thompson.

*Columbia University*

- DAVID W. BENNETT, "The Natural Numbers from Frege to Hilbert." Adviser: J. C. Cooley.  
JEROME ECKSTEIN, "Interestedness and Non-interestedness: Two Approaches to Knowledge." Adviser: J. Buchler.  
BERNARD ELEVITCH, "The Critical Idealism of Léon Brunschvicg." Adviser: J. H. Randall, Jr.  
A. JAMES GIMIGLIANO, "The Ethical and Political Thought of Giovanni Gentile." Adviser: P. O. Kristeller.  
LOOMIS G. IRISH, "Human Nature and the Arts: The Aesthetic Theory of Henry Home, Lord Kames." Adviser: A. Hofstadter.  
BEREL LANG, "The Cognitive Significance of Art." Adviser: A. Hofstadter.  
MILTON MAYEROFF, "John Dewey's Concept of the Unification of the Self: An Exposition and Critique." Adviser: R. D. Cumming.  
STEPHEN D. ROSS, "The Philosophy of Experience: An Analysis of the Concept of Experience in the Philosophy of John Dewey." Adviser: J. Buchler.  
DAVID THOREAU WIECK, "Comic as an Aesthetic Concept." Adviser: R. D. Cumming.

*Cornell University*

- KEITH S. DONNELLAN, "C. I. Lewis and the Foundations of Necessary Truth." Adviser: M. Black.  
EDMUND L. GETTIER, "Bertrand Russell's Theories of Belief." Adviser: N. Malcolm.  
CARL GINET, "Reasons, Causes, and Free Will." Adviser: J. Rawls.  
THOMAS J. SLAKEY, "Aristotle's Theory of Perception and Thinking as the Reception of Forms: A Critical Analysis." Adviser: D. Sachs.

*Duke University*

- ALLISON L. LEWIS, "A Critical Examination of Three Contemporary Aesthetic Theories." Adviser: P. Welsh.  
PALMER C. TALBUTT, JR., "The Emotive Interpretation of Metaphysics." Adviser: P. Welsh.

*Emory University*

- LUCIO CHIARAVIGLIO, "Abstraction and Temporality: a Study of Whitehead's Metaphysics." Adviser: C. C. Hartshorne.
- BOWMAN CLARKE, "An Approach to the Problem of Language and Natural Theology." Adviser: C. C. Hartshorne.
- J. BRENTON STEARNS, "Gabriel Marcel's Repudiation of Idealism." Adviser: R. Hocking.
- ALBERT SWEET, "A Semantic Explication of Metaphysical Analogy." Adviser: C. C. Hartshorne.

*Fordham University*

- BERNARD BRENNAN, "The Moral Implications of James' Pragmatism." Adviser: J. Q. Lauer, S. J.
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
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*Studies in Romanticism*, a new quarterly journal sponsored by the Graduate School of Boston University, will begin publication in the fall of 1961. The journal will be devoted to all aspects of the Romantic Movement. Manuscripts dealing with any phase of the Romantic Movement will be welcomed, including those dealing with philosophy. The subscription price is \$4.00 per year, and both manuscripts and subscriptions should be sent to the editor, David Bonnell Green, 236 Bay State Road, Boston 15, Mass.



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